Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Hawkes wishes to mine peat from wetland property owned by affiliated companies in northwestern Minnesota. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers issued an Approved Jurisdictional Determination (JD) that the property constitutes “waters of the United States” within the meaning of the Clean Water Act, requiring a permit to discharge dredged or fill materials into the “navigable waters,” 33 U.S.C. 1344(a), 1362(7). The district court dismissed a challenge, holding that an approved JD, though the consummation of the Corps’ jurisdictional decision-making process, was not a “final agency action” within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 704. While the appeal was pending, a panel of the Fifth Circuit reached the same conclusion. The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that both courts misapplied the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision, Sackett v. EPA. A “properly pragmatic analysis of ripeness and final agency action principles compels the conclusion that an Approved JD is subject to immediate judicial review. The Corps’s assertion that the Revised JD is merely advisory and has no more effect than an environmental consultant’s opinion ignores reality.” View "Hawkes Co., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs" on Justia Law

Batemon, represented by court-appointed counsel, pleaded nolo contendere to distributing cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). After the court announced his sentence, Batemon complained that his attorney had predicted a sentence of probation and failed to perform adequately, then declared that he was innocent. The district court relieved the attorney of his appointment and sentenced Batemon to 39 months’ imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments concerning the acceptance of the plea and the conduct of the sentencing hearing. The absence of counsel post-sentencing could not have caused prejudice. The district court apparently did err by failing to provide information required by Rule 11(b)(1)(M), but Batemon did not establish a reasonable probability that he would have proceeded to trial if the district court had satisfied the rule. The court did inform Batemon that he faced a maximum sentence of “not more than 20 years,” and told Batemon that he might “get time in the federal correction institution.” Batemon’s attorney stated that he had reviewed the sentencing guidelines with Batemon, estimated where Batemon would fall in the guidelines, and explained to Batemon how the guidelines work “in a generalized way.” Batemon confirmed counsel’s representation in open court. View "United States v. Batemon" on Justia Law

Law enforcement received information that McMahan was part of a methamphetamine distribution conspiracy that was bringing drugs from Minnesota to Iowa for resale. The next day, an officer observed McMahan driving a red vehicle, and called for a marked patrol unit to stop the car. The unit attempted to make a traffic stop, but McMahan drove off at a high rate of speed. McMahan eventually pulled into a driveway, abandoned his car, and fled on foot. A witness observed him enter a private home. Nobody was home when McMahan entered, but the homeowner later told police that he did not know McMahan and did not give him permission to enter the home. Officers entered the house and located McMahan in the basement, where he surrendered. McMahan pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 846. The Eighth Circuit affirmed application of a two-level increase under USSG 3C1.2 for reckless endangerment during flight, resulting in an advisory guideline range of 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment, and the actual sentence imposed, 196 months’ imprisonment. McMahan’s uninvited entry into a private home created a substantial risk of serious bodily injury to another person that was sufficient to justify the increase. View "United States v. McMahan" on Justia Law

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) creates “navigators,” to assist consumers in purchasing health insurance from exchanges, 42 U.S.C. 18031(i), and authorizes the Department of Health and Human Services to establish standards for navigators and exchanges. HHS regulations recognize: federal navigators, certified application counselors (CACs), and non-navigator assistance personnel. They conduct many of the same activities, but federal navigators have more extensive duties. Plaintiffs, federally-certified counselor designated organizations, employ CACs. The federal government established a Missouri Federally Facilitated Exchange. The Health Insurance Marketplace Innovation Act (HIMIA), Mo. Rev. Stat. 376.2000, regulates “person[s] that, for compensation, provide[] information or services in connection with eligibility, enrollment, or program specifications of any health benefit exchange.” Regulatory provisions dictate what state navigators and cannot do. Plaintiffs challenged: the definition of state navigators; three substantive provisions; and penalty provisions. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, finding that the ACA preempted HIMIA. The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, finding likelihood of success in challenges to HIMIA requirements that: state navigators refrain from providing information about health insurance plans not offered by the exchange; that in some circumstances, the navigator must advise consultation with a licensed insurance producer regarding private coverage; and that CACs provide information about different health insurance plans and clarify the distinctions. The court vacated the preliminary injunction, holding that ACA does not entirely preempt HIMIA. View "St. Louis Effort For AIDS v. Huff" on Justia Law

The government charged Armstrong with distribution of 12.5 grams of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), based on Armstrong's alleged sale of crack cocaine to a confidential informant (CI) during a controlled buy that occurred in 2009. At the time of the 2009 Controlled Buy, the CI was working with the Drug Enforcement Agency and local law enforcement and had already participated in several controlled buys involving different suspected drug dealers. At trial, the government introduced substantial evidence regarding how the 2009 Controlled Buy unfolded and Armstrong's role in the buy. The district court sentenced Leslie Armstrong to 180-months' imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, the admission of evidence of a prior (uncharged) controlled drug sale in which he was allegedly involved and that involved the same CI, and to his sentence as a career offender. View "United States v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

Benson traveled from Houston to St. Louis, Missouri, to sell cocaine to O’Bryant. O’Bryant had purchased plane tickets for Jackson and Stringfellow to travel to St. Louis. Stringfellow testified that he, O’Bryant, and Jackson agreed to steal the cocaine and kill Benson. O’Bryant gave both men guns. Jackson shot Benson in the head, killing him. Jackson pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B), 846; conspiracy to possess a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(o); and possession, brandishing, and discharge of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A), 924(j)(1). He was sentenced to 400 months’ imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because the court did not adequately advise him of his rights and that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. O’Bryant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and was sentenced to 330 months’ imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the sentence violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments; that the evidence was insufficient to support the first-degree-murder sentencing enhancement, but at best, supported the second-degree-murder sentencing enhancement; and that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Story, an African-American inmate in Arkansas, sued four correctional officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that they violated his constitutional rights during a visual body-cavity search that occurred after Story returned to the Williams Correctional Facility from the Pine Bluff unit school. Story alleges that officers told him to remove his clothes, to lift his genitals, and to bend over and spread his buttocks and that the search took place in front of other inmates and in view of security cameras so female correctional officers observed the search through a video feed. He claims that an officer called him “monkey.” The district court, screening the complaints before service of process (28 U.S.C. 1915A), dismissed them without prejudice for failure to state a claim. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Story did not establish that the search violated his clearly established constitutional rights. The officers were not on clear notice that the aspects of the search to which Story objects contravened the Fourth Amendment. View "Story v. Foote" on Justia Law

Retired seamstress, Joseph, never had annual household income exceeding $40,000; her condominium, worth $169,990, was foreclosure. Joseph was born in Haiti. She did not speak English well. Jean referred Joseph to the Diverse insurance agency for a fee. In 2008, Diverse applied for a $10 million life-insurance policy on Joseph’s life to PHL. The application falsely stated Joseph’s net worth was $11,906,000 and her income was $497,000. The application listed a 2008 Irrevocable Trust as the proposed beneficiary and owner. Joseph signed an agreement establishing the Trust and appointed BNC as the trustee and Jean as the trust protector. Joseph did not know of the misrepresentations and likely signed blank documents. The Trust financed the premiums through a loan from PFG. In 2010, Jean directed BNC to surrender the Policy to PFG in satisfaction of the loan obligations. PHL sought to rescind the Policy for fraud. After Joseph died in 2011, the new policy owner claimed the proceeds. The district court granted rescission and held that PHL could keep the premium. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that PHL could not rescind the Policy because its own agent completed the application and that PHL was estopped from rescinding the Policy because it had reason to know of the misrepresentations. View "PHL Variable Ins. Co. v. Midas Life Settlements LLC" on Justia Law

In 2002, the Bagleys convinced a 16-year-old female (FV) to live with them in a wooded area in Lebanon, Missouri. FV had a troubled childhood in foster care. The Bageleys believed her to have “mental deficiencies.” Mr. Bagley started a sexual relationship with FV. In 2004, Bagley had her sign a “sex slavery contract,” which he told FV legally bound her indefinitely. The Bagleys then began severe physical, psychological, and sexual abuse and torture of FV. Bagley posted live video streams and pictures of the torture sessions online and advertised that FV would engage in sexual acts and could be tortured during live online sessions or in person. Cook watched and communicated with Bagley. Cook sexually tortured women in his St. Louis home and sent Bagley advice on methods to apply to FV. In 2006, Cook began traveling to Lebanon to engage in sex and torture, including, flogging, whipping, shocking, choking, piercing, skewering, sewing, stapling, and electrocuting. Cook gave Bagley a video showing how to bury someone alive, which Bagley used to threaten FV into submission. In 2009, medical personnel discovered the abuse after Bagley suffocated and electrocuted FV to the point of cardiac arrest. Cook pled guilty to commercial sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion, 18 U.S.C. 1591(a) and (b)(1),1 1594, retaining his right to appeal on grounds that the section was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him, a purchaser of commercial sex. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Cook" on Justia Law

Galarza entered the U.S. unlawfully in 1986. In 1999 he was granted voluntary departure. Galarza re-entered, unlawfully, in 2000. In 2010, he was arrested and removal proceedings were commenced. Galarza asserts that ICE agents promised to help him stay in the U.S. in exchange for information on Sanchez, Galarza's nephew. Galarza asserts he provided that information, which resulted in Sanchez’s arrest and removal. Galarza sought asylum, withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture, asserting that he was a member of social groups "consisting of people who have provided information to [ICE] to enable that organization to remove individuals residing illegally in the [United States]," and "witnesses for ICE." Galarza claimed that Sanchez had beaten his brother and killed his nephew and had threatened to kill him. He argued that the removal of Sanchez was a changed or extraordinary circumstance that excused his untimely filing. The IJ found the asylum application time-barred, that Galarza's claimed social groups lacked social visibility and particularity, that Galarza failed to establish the standard of asylum, and that he had not established that it was more likely than not that he would be tortured by the Mexican government or its agents upon his return. The BIA and Eighth Circuit rejected petitions for review. View "Martinez-Galarza v. Holder" on Justia Law