Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Stratus Franchising sells master franchises, which grant a master franchiser the exclusive right to sell Stratus unit franchises in a particular regional market. Each plaintiff (current or former unit franchisees of the commercial cleaning business) entered into a standard unit-franchise agreement that included a broad, standard-form arbitration provision. They filed a putative class-action suit against their respective master franchisers and other individuals and entities associated with the Stratus Group, alleging violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968. Applying Missouri contract law, the district court granted the Stratus Group’s motion to compel individual arbitration. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the arbitration provision was unenforceable as unconscionable and that members of the Stratus Group who were not signatories to their respective Agreements could not invoke or enforce the arbitration provision. View "Torres v. Simpatico, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2005 E3’s predecessor began construction of an ethanol plant, to be powered, in part, by methane, and contracted with Biothane for a boiler system. Biothane, an expert in systems integration but not in boilers specifically, subcontracted with PEI to install and integrate the boilers. Biothane retained overall responsibility. Both are engineering companies. In 2007, PEI’s engineer repeatedly tried and failed to light the main flame of one of the boilers. The repeated attempts caused gas to build up and explode. E3 claims that the boiler never worked properly afterward and that the plant failed as a result. The plant’s owners eventually reorganized in bankruptcy. In 2011 (3 years and 364 days after the explosion) E3 sued, alleging torts against both companies and breach of contract against Biothane. The district court granted defendants summary judgment, finding all of E3’s claims time-barred under Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-222, Nebraska’s two-year limitations period for actions based on professional negligence. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Regardless of whether the chain of events ultimately led to the breach of a contract, E3 still sued Biothane “for an action performed in a professional capacity.” View "E3 Biofuels, LLC v. Biothane, LLC" on Justia Law

Lyons, a part-time lecturer at the University of Missouri at Kansas City, gave a student athlete a grade of “F” in the Fall 2010 semester. The student appealed. Lyons’s supervisor determined the student should be allowed to submit a second paper. Lyons complained to Dean Vaught, who referred the appeal to the Academic Standards Committee, which also determined the student should be allowed to write a second paper. Vaught upheld the ruling. The student submitted a second paper. An appointed committee gave it a 75% grade; Vaught instructed the registrar to change the student’s course grade to D. Lyons then met with Chancellor Morton, claiming preferential academic treatment for student athletes. Morton did not take action. Lyons continued to pursue the matter. He received no advance notice that his course would be eliminated for the Spring 2012 semester. Lyons sued for First Amendment retaliation, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The defendant-administrators unsuccessfully moved to dismiss, alleging that Lyons failed to state a claim and they were entitled to qualified immunity. The Eighth Circuit reversed. Lyons failed to allege plausibly that his only constitutionally protected speech could have been a substantial or motivating factor in defendants’ alleged adverse employment action. View "Lyons v. Vaught" on Justia Law

A guard found a letter near Porter’s former cell, addressed to the Missouri Governor. It had Porter’s name on the return address and said it contained anthrax. An inmate near the cell had threatened “to get” Porter. An investigation concluded that a different inmate wrote the letter. Officials took no further action. Three months later, Porter filed an unrelated 42 U.S.C. 1983 case. Officials then wrote a conduct violation against Porter for the anthrax threat despite the investigation months earlier. Porter timely filed a grievance, but never received a response. Porter had a second disciplinary hearing on the anthrax charge and was found “Not Guilty” with a recommendation to dismiss and expunge. The warden overruled the recommendation, reinstating his administrative segregation. Porter submitted a timely grievance, claiming retaliation for his unrelated section 1983 case. Porter was not released from segregation until he served five months. More than 14 months after Porter filed his grievance, the new warden confirmed the dismissal and expungement and apologized. Porter filed suit for retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed for failure to exhaust remedies. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The delays in responding to Porter were unjustified, but did not prevent him from using follow-up procedures. View "Porter v. Dormire" on Justia Law

After arresting prostitutes, officers noticed markings on one woman (victim). She identified Roy as her pimp and boyfriend. Roy had posted ads for the victim on Backpage.com. She was required to give Roy the money she earned. Roy hit and threatened her. The victim received disability benefits because she had difficulty reading, writing, and understanding complex concepts. In his trial for violation of 18 U.S.C. 1591(a)(1), Roy sought to introduce a videotape of the victim performing oral sex on him, claiming that it showed that the victim was not forced into engaging in prostitution. The district court allowed Roy to cross-examine the victim about the video, but ruled that showing it was too prejudicial. The court did not allow testimony that the victim had engaged in prostitution before meeting Roy. The government provided disclosure about prosecution witnesses, but did not know that, years earlier, the victim made a statement in an Arkansas murder investigation, identifying the shooter. She later testified that she did not see the shooter and had told the police what her friend said to say. Roy moved for a new trial, claiming that the court erred in excluding the video and the victim’s sexual history, and asserting a Brady violation for failure to disclose the prior false statement. The Eighth Circuit affirmed denial of the motion. View "United States v. Roy" on Justia Law

Young approached an Iowa UPS truck to give the driver a package, anxiously offering to pay with cash. The driver directed Young to a dropoff location. Returning to that location, he saw a package from Young’s address. Because of Young’s behavior, the package’s shape, and the need for transport by plane, the driver contacted a supervisor, who opened the package and found cash wrapped in foil. UPS consulted local officer Weber, then sent the package to its intended recipient, Gonzalez, in Yuma, Arizona. Weber contacted Yuma police, who saw Gonzalez retrieve the package. Two days later UPS had a package from Gonzalez addressed to Young. A drug-detection dog handler had UPS place Gonzalez’s package with three similar packages without telling him or Weber which one came from Gonzalez. The dog nudged the third package and scratched at the fourth. On second and third passes, the dog showed no interest in the third package but scratched at the fourth. Weber learned that this package came from Gonzalez, took possession, and obtained a search warrant the same day. The package contained methamphetamine. Yuma police obtained warrants, arrested Gonzalez, and searched his home, finding marijuana, a rifle, and ammunition. Gonzalez was Young’s nephew. Indicted for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); 846, Gonzalez unsuccessfully moved to suppress. Gonzalez conditionally pleaded guilty; the court sentenced Gonzalez to 168 months’ imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed denial of the motion and the sentence. View "United States v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Officers responded to a call of a rape in progress and saw a car leave an apartment complex about 1,000 feet from the scene. The car stopped and remained idle for 30 to 45 seconds. Investigators recovered a Missouri identification card by the window that was broken to gain access, with the name Acie Evans and a photograph. Officers then observed the same car drive by at less than five miles per hour and identified the driver as the man whose photograph appeared on the identification card. The car was registered to Bobby Evans. Because the last names matched, officers followed the car into the nearby apartment complex. The manager indicated that Acie was an emergency contact for a tenant and remembered showing an apartment to Acie before leasing it to the tenant. Entering the building they believed the driver had entered, officers knocked on a door that was partially open. A man resembling the driver answered and identified himself as Acie Evans. A computer check revealed that Evans’s license was suspended. Officers arrested Evans for driving without a license. The manager wanted Evans and his vehicle removed from the property. The officers towed Evans’s vehicle. During an inventory search, officers recovered a loaded pistol. Evans entered a conditional guilty plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and was sentenced to 180 months. The Eighth Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to dismiss. View "United States v. Evans" on Justia Law

In March, 2004, Harris closed on a home with a mortgage loan from MPI. To be licensed in Missouri, MPI, as obligor and principal, bought two “Missouri Residential Mortgage Brokers Bonds” from Hartford, its surety, RSMo 443.849. The surety bonds stated that the two parties were “jointly and severally” bound for payment to any person “who may have a claim against” MPI. Harris sued MPI for violating the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, sections 407.010-.1500. Harris obtained a judgment for compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney fees. Hartford had notice of the suit against MPI, but chose not to intervene. As surety, Hartford failed to pay the judgment amount due on the bonds. In 2012, Harris sued Hartford for breach of contract, vexatious refusal to pay, and equitable garnishment. The district court granted Hartford summary judgment, rejecting the 10-year statute of limitations in RSMo 516.110(1) in favor of the three-year statute in section 516.130(2). The Eighth Circuit reversed. Harris’s claim against Hartford sought the amount due on the bonds, not a penalty. View "Harris v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Deputy Wintle initiated a traffic stop and obtained Brewer’s consent to a sniff search of the vehicle. The drug dog alerted to the trunk. Wintle patted Brewer down. Brewer had no weapons on his person, but had $1,000 in cash in his pocket. While searching the trunk, Wintle found backpacks with a strong odor of raw marijuana, containing $63,530. Deputies later located disability documents, old paystubs, tax returns, and articles entitled “How to Make Wicked Hash” and “How to Make Weed Oil without Blowing Yourself Up.” Deputies did not recover any drugs. After the seizure, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 983(a)(1)(A)(iv), the government sent notices to the address listed on Brewer’s driver’s license and to the address listed on the vehicle registration and insurance paperwork. All were returned to sender. Notice was later sent by certified mail and accepted by signature. The government later published notice and sent a third round of notices. After Brewer filed a claim to the currency, the government sought its forfeiture as proceeds from drug transactions or money to facilitate drug transactions. Brewer moved to dismiss, alleging that the government did not notify him of the seizure within 90 days as required by statute. The court denied the motion and ordered forfeiture. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, upholding findings that a substantial connection existed between the currency and drug activity; that Brewer failed to prove he was an innocent owner; and that he failed to show gross disproportionality to sustain an Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines challenge. View "United States v. Brewer" on Justia Law

Petruk stole Behning’s pickup truck. Separate charges were brought against Petruk in Minnesota state court (2012) and federal court (2013) related to the theft. While incarcerated on the theft charges, Petruk attempted to obtain false exculpatory statements. Petruk was convicted of carjacking, 18 U.S.C. 2119(1) and two counts of corruptly attempting to obstruct an official proceeding, 18 U.S.C. 1512(c)(2). The district court sentenced Petruk to three concurrent terms of 168 months in prison, at the bottom of the Guidelines range of 168-210 months. The Eighth Circuit affirmed Petruk’s conviction for attempting to obstruct an official proceeding for actions he took to obtain false statements after his original federal indictment had been filed, but vacated the carjacking conviction and his remaining obstruction conviction based on insufficiency of the evidence. The court remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Petruk" on Justia Law