Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Pepper, who suffered from cerebral palsy, owned an extensive collection of Elvis Presley memorabilia as a result of his friendship with Elvis. When he moved into a nursing home in 1978, he told Nancy to “keep it.” Nancy, a nurse and a devoted Elvis fan, had cared for Pepper after the death of his father until he went into the nursing home. Nancy was not compensated for her efforts. Gary died two years later. Nancy maintained the collection until 2009, when it sold for $250,000. The estates of Pepper and his mother sued, alleging that Pepper retained ownership of the collection and that his interest passed to his heirs. A jury found that Pepper had made a conditional gift to Nancy; when he died, Nancy’s ownership was no longer subject to that reversionary interest. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The jurors heard testimony about the care Nancy provided, read notes that Pepper wrote to Nancy, and saw photographs of the two spending time together. Nancy explained how important the Collection was to Pepper. Pepper’s relatives, who lived in California and were not Elvis fans, testified that Gary did not even tell them about the Collection. View "Estate of Pepper v. Whitehead" on Justia Law

Protestors, including those concerned with sexual abuse by clergy and those advocating the Catholic ordination of women and acceptance of gay, lesbian, and transgender people, raised a facial First Amendment challenge to Missouri's 2012 House of Worship Protection Act" Mo. Rev. Stat. 574.035, which prohibits intentionally disturbing a "house of worship by using profane discourse, rude or indecent behavior . . . either within the house of worship or so near it as to disturb the order and solemnity of the worship services." The district court upheld the Act. The Eighth Circuit reversed, noting that there was no evidence of actual disturbances to houses of worship or that protesters interfered with churchgoers' entry or exit. The Act draws content based distinctions on the type of expression permitted near a house of worship, forbidding profane discourse and rude or indecent behavior which would disturb the order and solemnity of worship services and runs "a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process." It impermissibly requires enforcement authorities to look to the content of the message and cannot survive strict scrutiny since its content-based distinctions are not necessary to achieve an asserted interest in protecting the free exercise of religion. View "Survivors Network v. Joyce" on Justia Law

Patterson's mother called police after an argument. Officers approached Patterson, who sat on the porch, and told him, repeatedly, to leave. Patterson became agitated when they suggested that he go to a homeless shelter. They stated that he was under arrest and would be physically removed. The officers attempted to lift him. Patterson resisted. Patterson and an officer fell against a barbeque grill "with considerable force." Officer Hasiak punched Patterson in the stomach. That failing, Officer Hiatt used her taser; its probes did not connect. Hasiak thrust his knee into Patterson's thigh. Hasiak attempted to kick Patterson's leg, missed, and contacted Patterson's torso. Patterson stopped resisting. The officers put Patterson in their police cruiser and took him to the hospital. Medical staff diagnosed fractured ribs but believed that they would heal without further treatment. Patterson pleaded guilty to failing to leave his mother's property and was released. He collapsed outside of the jail and was returned to the hospital. Doctors discovered a torn intestine. He underwent surgery and was released a week later. Patterson sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. A jury found excessive force, yet only awarded $1. The district court and Eighth Circuit affirmed. A jury may reasonably conclude that compensatory damages are inappropriate despite finding that excessive force was used if it finds that both justifiable and unjustifiable force might have been used and the injury may have resulted from justifiable force. View "Patterson v. City of Omaha" on Justia Law

In 2002, Mogeni, a Kenyan citizen, entered the U.S. as a non-immigrant visitor. In 2003, Mogeni married Byers, a U.S. citizen. Byers filed an I-130 Petition for Alien Relative on Mogeni's behalf. The Department of Homeland Security denied the petition, finding that the marriage was a sham. Neither Byers nor Mogeni appealed. Byers and Mogeni divorced in 2004. In 2005, three months after his divorce from Byers, Mogeni married Gullie, another U.S. citizen, who filed an I-130 petition on Mogeni's behalf. Because the DHS previously found Mogeni had entered into a sham marriage to obtain an immigration benefit, the DHS denied the second I-130 petition. Mogeni appealed. Gatere, Mogeni's daughter from a previous marriage in Kenya, also filed an I-130 petition on Mogeni's behalf. In December 2006, the DHS initiated removal proceedings under, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(B). Mogeni appeared with the assistance of counsel and requested a continuance. From 2007 to 2012, an immigration judge granted Mogeni 12 continuances. The IJ rejected a thirteenth requested and ordered Mogeni to be removed. The Board of Immigration Appeals and Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Mogeni v. Holder" on Justia Law

Minnihan worked for Mediacom for 30 years. As an Ames, Iowa technical operations supervisor (TOS), His duties included observing service calls, being on call 24/7 to respond to outages; accident investigations; unannounced safety checks; and delivering equipment to the field. Mediacom provided a vehicle. At least half of his working hours were spent outside of the office. In 2009, Minnihan had a seizure and was prohibited, by Iowa law, from driving for six months. Mediacom reallocated his driving responsibilities. After another seizure, Mediacom asked Minnihan to apply for positions that did not require driving. Minnihan inquired about Family Medical Leave or having his position restructured. Mediacom accommodated him until October 2010, when Minnihan resumed his regular duties. In April, 2011, Minnihan had a third seizure. Mediacom transferred him to the Des Moines office in a non-driving position with the same pay and benefits as a TOS. Minnihan did not report to the position, although Mediacom provided transportation options, including another employee with whom Minnihan could ride to Des Moines. Mediacom terminated Minnihan's employment. After receiving right-to-sue letters from the Iowa Civil Rights Commission and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Minnihan sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, and the Iowa Civil Rights Act. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment, finding that Minnihan was not a qualified individual under disability law because he could not perform the essential functions of his job. View "Minnihan v. Mediacom Commc'ns Corp." on Justia Law

Collection Associates garnished a total of $858.98 in wages Brandon earned during six pay periods. Brandon’s employer sent the first four garnishments, $562.78, to the state court that issued the garnishment order. That court delivered the payments to Collection Associates, under Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-1056(2). Brandon and his wife filed a bankruptcy petition and notified the state court they had done so. When the state court received the final two garnishments, totaling $296.20, instead of delivering those funds to Collection Associates, it returned the money to Brandon’s employer, which refunded the money to Brandon. The debtors then sought to avoid and recover the funds garnished during the preference period. The bankruptcy court found the preference action barred by the defense for consumer debtor payments under $600. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. The Eighth Circuit agreed that the defense applies because the Pierces sought to avoid the transfer of less than $600. View "Pierce v. Collection Assocs., Inc." on Justia Law

Hentges pleaded guilty to attempt to manufacture methamphetamine near a school, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C), 846, and 860. At sentencing, the district court determined that Hentges was a career offender, USSG 4B1.1; that he accepted responsibility for his offense; and that the advisory sentencing range was 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment. The court explained that even if Hentges were not a career offender, in which case the advisory sentencing range would have been 92 to 115 months’ imprisonment, the court would have varied upward under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), due to the seriousness of Hentges’s criminal conduct and his incorrigibility. Under either approach, the court declared, it would arrive at the same sentence of 188 months’ imprisonment. The court then granted the government’s motion to reduce Hentges’s sentence under USSG 5K1.1, based on his provision of substantial assistance. After Hentges was allowed to speak, the court announced that Hentges was sentenced to a term of 132 months’ imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court erred in determining that he was a career offender; that its pronouncement of an alternative sentence was insufficient to justify the sentence imposed; and that the court denied him the right to allocution at sentencing. View "United States v. Hentges" on Justia Law

Brothers Jose and Ismael were indicted for conspiring to distribute methamphetamine and heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846; possessing with intent to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 18 U.S.C. 2; and possessing heroin with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 18 U.S.C. 2. Jose pled guilty to count one, and the district court1 sentenced him to 175 months imprisonment. Ismael proceeded to trial, and a jury convicted him of all three counts. The district court sentenced Ismael to concurrent sentences of 188 months imprisonment on each count. The Eighth Circuit affirmed Jose’s sentence, and Ismael’s conviction and sentence. The court upheld denial of a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of a warrantless search of Jose’s truck, rejecting an argument that officers lacked reasonable suspicion for a stop because the informant had no prior track record at the department and the officers failed to independently corroborate the information he provided. The court also upheld a deliberate ignorance jury instruction; the government adduced sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find Ismael intentionally conspired to distribute illegal drugs. View "United States v. Corrales-Portillo" on Justia Law

Alleging illegal tip pooling Conners filed a collective action against her former employer (a restaurant) under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 216(b). The employer then implemented a new arbitration policy that requires all employment-related disputes between current employees and the employer to be resolved though individual arbitration. The policy purports to bind all current employees who did not opt out; each employee received an opt-out form. Citing public policy, the district court declared the policy unenforceable insofar as it could prevent current employees from joining this collective action. On interlocutory appeal, the Eighth Circuit vacated, holding that former employees like Conners lack standing under Article III of the United States Constitution to challenge the arbitration agreement, which applied only to current employees. View "Conners v. Gusano's Chicago Style Pizzeria" on Justia Law

Walz worked for Ameriprise, 1996-2012 and received mostly positive reviews. Walz suffers from bipolar affective disorder, which, beginning in 2012, caused her to interrupt meetings, disturb her coworkers, and disrespect her supervisor, Radel. Radel approached Walz several times to discuss her behavioral problems and to offer help, before issuing a formal warning. Walz applied for Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave, which was granted by a third-party administrator. Walz never disclosed the reason for her FMLA leave to Ameriprise. Upon returning from leave, Walz gave Radel a doctor’s note, clearing her to return to work and stating, “[s]he has been stabilizing on her medication.” Walz signed an Individual Treatment Policy, which explained Ameriprise’s policy against disability discrimination and the process for requesting accommodations. Months after returning to work, Walz’s erratic and disruptive behavior returned. Radel warned Walz, but Walz repeated her erratic and intimidating behavior in meetings. Ameriprise fired Walz because of her repeated misconduct. Walz never informed Ameriprise that she suffered from bipolar disorder or requested any accommodation. Walz sued, citing the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Minnesota Human Rights Act. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment, noting that Walz failed to establish that her termination was based on her disability and never requested an accommodation. View "Walz v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc." on Justia Law