Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Previously, Missouri’s lethal-injection protocol involved Sodium thiopental to anesthetize the prisoner and render him unconscious, pancuronium bromide to paralyze him and stop his breathing, and potassium chloride to stop the prisoner’s heart. In 2012, after sodium thiopental became unavailable, the state revised its protocol to use a single drug—propofol—as the lethal agent. While a challenge was pending, the state revised its protocol to use pentobarbital as the lethal agent. An amended complaint alleged that use of compounded pentobarbital constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, that the defendants are deliberately indifferent to the plaintiffs’ medical need for their executions not to inflict gratuitous pain, that use of compounded pentobarbital creates a significant risk of increased punishment over previous methods and amounts to ex post facto punishment, that the defendants deprived them of due process by not providing notice of the lethal injection methods, that the defendants deprived them of equal protection by deviating from execution protocol in certain instances, that the defendants violated their First Amendment rights by refusing to disclose the identities of the pharmacy that compounds the pentobarbital and its suppliers, and that the defendants violated federal laws by soliciting and using the compounded pentobarbital in executions. The court dismissed all claims except for that alleging “cruel and unusual punishment” in violation of the Eighth Amendment and its state equivalent. The prisoners’ concession that “other methods of lethal injection . . . would be constitutional” did not suffice to state a claim. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Zink v. Lombardi" on Justia Law

Bucklew was convicted in state court of murder, kidnapping, and rape and sentenced to death. After Missouri courts denied post-conviction relief, the Eighth Circuit affirmed denial of Bucklew’s petition for habeas corpus. The Supreme Court of Missouri set Bucklew’s execution date as May 21, 2014. Bucklew was a plaintiff in a pending 42 U.S.C. 1983 action (Zink) that challenged Missouri’s method of execution. The district court tentatively dismissed that action on May 2. Bucklew filed another Section 1983 action on May 9, asserting that the method of lethal injection would violate his Eighth Amendment rights because of the unique risk that his serious medical condition (cavernous hemangioma) will result in excruciating pain. On May 16, the district court finally dismissed the Zink complaint. On May 19, the court denied a stay of execution and dismissed Bucklew’s Eighth Amendment claim. On May 21, the U.S. Supreme Court granted a stay pending appeal. The Eighth Circuit then reversed the dismissal: it was not “patently obvious” that Bucklew could not prevail. His as-applied challenge is distinguishable from Zink’s facial challenge. Bucklew’s allegations of a substantial risk of serious and imminent harm were far more specific than those allegations. There was also support for Bucklew’s allegations that the state unreasonably refused to change its regular method of execution to a “feasible, readily implemented” alternative that -would “significantly reduce” the substantial risk of pain. View "Bucklew v. Lombardi" on Justia Law

In 2011, after about two weeks of reporting symptoms and being treated for constipation and gas, Allard, a prisoner at the Clarinda Correctional Facility of the Iowa Department of Corrections , suffered a bowel obstruction and perforation. Allard had emergency surgery where a colostomy bag was installed and his bowel was repaired. Allard filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted summary judgment to the prison staff. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that material questions of fact existed regarding the appropriateness of the care Allard received. Although Allard demonstrated that CCF medical staff failed to properly diagnose his bowel obstruction, and demonstrated that failure to treat the bowel obstruction led to a bowel perforation, Allard failed to put forward evidence to support a finding of deliberate indifference. View "Allard v. Baldwin" on Justia Law

An officer testified that he was watching a parking lot, based on intercepted phone calls concerning cocaine sales; he observed what appeared to be a narcotics sale, and followed Peeler when he left the rendezvous. A subsequent consensual search of Peeler’s car uncovered 81 grams of crack cocaine hidden in a door panel. A jury convicted Peeler of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than five kilograms of powder cocaine and 280 grams of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846. The district court granted a downward variance and sentenced Peeler to the mandatory minimum of 120 months in prison. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. View "United States v. Peeler" on Justia Law

Riehl pleaded guilty to one count of conspiring to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine or 50 grams or more of actual (pure) methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846. The district court calculated Riehl's sentencing guidelines range to be 292 to 365 months and sentenced him to 214 months' imprisonment, after an uncontested departure motion for a 35 percent reduction in the guidelines range. At the sentencing hearing, both parties argued for a downward variance by two levels in anticipation of Amendment 782 to the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The district court recognized it had authority to vary downward but declined to do so, explaining the proposed amendment was not guaranteed to take effect. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The district court was not required to consider the pending guidelines amendment. View "United States v. Riehl" on Justia Law

In 2012, Lawin began to purchase and distribute MDMA (ecstasy). In 2014 Lawin pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), and 846. Before the sentencing hearing, both parties asked the court to vary downward by two levels in anticipation of Amendment 782 to the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The district court recognized it had authority to vary downward but declined to do so, explaining the proposed amendment was not guaranteed to take effect; calculated Lawin's sentencing guidelines range to be 135 to 168 months; and sentenced him to 147 months' imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The district court was not required to consider the pending guidelines amendment. Consideration of the pending amendment is merely permissible, not required. View "United States v. Lawin" on Justia Law

CVS hired Jain, a woman of East Asian descent, as a pharmacist in 2006. She claims that coworkers and supervisors discriminated against her, calling her the "little Indian lady," and her Indian clothing “unprofessional.” Referring to her "bossy" attitude, the manager remarked that "she was from India but might as well be from Germany." Jain became "pharmacist-in-charge" (PIC) at another store, with permission to work a three day schedule. Supervisor Deaner later learned that the store was struggling in numerous performance metrics; that Jain had not been following company policies; and that multiple complaints had been filed. Deaner issued a performance action plan and began holding weekly meetings to help Jain. Problems continued. Jain was issued another warning. After inspections revealed additional problems, Jain was terminated. Jain sued for discrimination and retaliation under the Missouri Human Rights Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. 213.055, 213.070. Jain opposed a summary judgment motion with a declaration from her husband, stating that an "arithmetic comparison" of scores showed that the pharmacy had improved in every performance metric after Jain became PIC. The court struck the declaration because Mr. Jain "never worked for [CVS] and did not claim to have industry experience” and granted CVS summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Jain v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc." on Justia Law

For more than 30 years, Wagner worked at the Merrick County sheriff’s office, as chief dispatcher and office manager. Campbell was appointed as sheriff in 2011 and told Wagner he wanted her to train another employee to perform her duties in her absence.” Campbell later expressed concerns that the training was taking too long and informed Wagner that he had received a complaint from a judge about delays in depositing bond money with the court. Campbell wanted to change policy to have bond money taken directly to court, rather than deposited in the sheriff’s office account. Wagner disagreed. Campbell gave Wagner a reprimand, stating that she failed to follow directives. Wagner refused to sign the reprimand, claiming it contained false information, told Campbell she was leaving, and walked home. Wagner never returned to work; she filed a grievance, which the Board of Supervisors denied. Wagner sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Neb. Rev. Stat. 20-148, alleging she suffered an adverse employment action in retaliation for protected speech on a matter of public concern. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Campbell. When a reprimand does not affect the terms and conditions of employment, a plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie case of retaliation. View "Wagner v. Campbell" on Justia Law

IPSCO Tubulars contracted for Ajax to provide equipment to heat-treat steel pipe at IPSCO’s Blythesville plant, which produces pipe for use in the oil and gas industry. After installation, the product did not perform properly. Tubing processed through the equipment was badly distorted. IPSCO sued for breach of contract, gross negligence, and punitive damages. The district court found Ajax liable for breach of contract, awarding $5,162,298.55 in damages. The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the breach-of-contract damages, holding that there were inadequate findings to support the award, and affirmed in all other respects. The most reasonable interpretation of the contract as a whole obligated Ajaxto provide equipment that could uniformly heat-treat pipe, at 96 fpm, without causing distortion, cracks or inconsistencies that would prevent the pipe's conversion to higher American Petroleum Institute grades; the evidence was sufficient to establish that the defects in the Ajax equipment was the cause of the defects in the pipe. View "IPSCO Tubulars, Inc. v. Ajax TOCCO Magnathermic Corp." on Justia Law

The Hughes, Arkansas school district hired Ray Nassar as superintendent in 2008. Nassar hired Gena Smith as a business manager. Both are white. The school district renewed Nassar’s contract until June 30, 2013. After the racial composition of the school board shifted to an African-American majority, Nassar’s already-poor relationship with two African-American board members deteriorated. One member, Jackson, referred to Smith as Nassar’s “girlfriend,” at a public meeting (both are married to others) and to Nassar’s “lie[s].” A profanity-laced exchange followed; soon after, the district fired Nassar without a hearing. Months later, the school district fired Smith, without a hearing. Nassar and Smith sued, alleging violations of due process, unlawful racial discrimination, breach of contract, and defamation. A jury found for Nassar and Smith on all claims, awarded Nassar $340,000 on his due-process claim (more than he would have earned through the end of his contract), $1.00 on his discrimination claim, and $1.00 on his contract claim. The court granted Nassar and Smith attorney’s fees at a rate of $375 per hour. The Eighth Circuit vacated the due process award and remanded with instructions to offer remittitur. View "Nassar v. Jackson" on Justia Law