Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Cole pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court determined that Cole’s minimum sentence should be increased under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because he has three prior convictions for burglary – “a violent felony or a serious drug offense.” 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). In order for the sentencing enhancement to apply under the ACCA, the three prior convictions must be for offenses that were “committed on occasions different from one another.” Cole’s presentence investigation report (PSR) revealed that Cole has Missouri convictions for burglaries committed on July 20, 2005, March 1, 2007, and October 24, 2008. Neither Cole nor his lawyer objected to these PSR findings. The Eighth Circuit affirmed In Alleyne v. United States (2013), the Supreme Court ruled that any fact that increases the mandatory minimum sentence for a crime is an element of the crime that must be either admitted by a defendant or submitted to a jury. The Court specifically noted that it was leaving the “fact of prior conviction” exception intact. The determination of whether prior felonies occurred on separate occasions does not require “findings of fact beyond the mere fact of a prior conviction.” View "United States v. Cole" on Justia Law

Ruiz pleaded guilty to improper entry into the U.S., 8 U.S.C. 1325(a), and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The government agreed not to prosecute other methamphetamine offenses except those involving violence. Ruiz was later charged in a multi-defendant, 15-count indictment with other drug crimes, plus possession of a firearm in furtherance of, and use of a firearm related to, a drug-trafficking crime. Based on the plea, the court dismissed the drug charges. The jury found that Ruiz had received guns in exchange for drugs and guilty of "use" of a firearm. The Eighth Circuit vacated the possession conviction and affirmed the “use” conviction. On remand, the court determined that the seven-year statutory minimum for brandishing applied, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), and imposed a 300-month sentence. The Eighth Circuit again remanded because the Supreme Court had decided, in Alleyne v. United States, that any fact that increases the mandatory statutory minimum penalty is an “element” that must be submitted to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The court resentenced Ruiz to 300 months, stating that Ruiz had acted in a very “frightening” manner, discussing factors from 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), and reiterating that whether “this is a five-year mandatory minimum or seven-year mandatory minimum, my sentence would still be the same.” The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The sentence, although high, is not unconstitutional or unreasonable. View "United States v. Lara-Ruiz" on Justia Law

Soto pled guilty, with an agreement, to conspiring to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846. His presentence report calculated a two-level reduction to his base offense level, based on U.S.S.G. 3B1.2(b), for being a minor participant, which would require a commensurate four-level reduction under U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(a)(5)(iii). Based on these and other reductions, the PSR computed an offense level of 27 and an advisory range of 70 to 87 months imprisonment. The government agreed “not to object to a finding by the probation office or a ruling by the court which awards the defendant an appropriate level decrease in the base offense level for [his] role in the offense.” Soto acknowledged that any discussions about sentencing did not bind the district court. The court arrived at a final advisory Guidelines range of 87 to 108 months and sentenced Soto to 87 months imprisonment. After filing his appeal, Soto filed an unopposed motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), which the district court granted. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court failed to provide notice of an upward departure and to allow Soto’s attorney “a meaningful opportunity” to comment on Soto’s role in the conspiracy. View "United States v. Soto" on Justia Law

Long, the elected head prosecutor for the first judicial district of Arkansas, supervises deputy prosecutors in six counties. In 2006, Long hired Austin, an African-American, as a deputy prosecutor for Phillips County. The prosecutor previously hired for that position was African-American, as was the prosecutor hired to replace Austin. Austin failed to follow the instructions of Murray, the senior deputy prosecutor, conerning allocation of county funds. Long asserts that Murray and other court personnel had trouble contacting Austin during business hours, that Austin deviated from policy on felony bond reduction orders and expungement orders and incurred extraordinary expenses without approval. A judge reportedly contacted Long to ask why Austin had failed to appear in court. Austin contends that Long never provided him with a formal evaluation and never explained why he was fired. Austin filed an employment discrimination action under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983, claiming that Long treated him more harshly than similarly situated white prosecutors, who had been convicted of driving while intoxicated and sanctioned for an ethical violation. The district court denied Long's motion asserting qualified immunity. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the record gave rise to disputes of material fact over whether Long's stated reasons for firing Austin were a pretext for racial discrimination. View "Austin v. Long" on Justia Law

Johnson began working for U.S. Steel in 2004. On May 12 2011, he left work, complaining of a headache, and went to a clinic where a physician’s assistant indicated that he had high blood pressure. The next day he provided a note that was deemed insufficient by his employer. His regular physician later indicated that Johnson's blood pressure was normal. Emails, memoranda, and letters indicate that Johnson was suspended on May 16 and then terminated for altering, falsifying, or forging the work excuse. U.S. Steel never provided him with notice of his FMLA rights and obligations. Nor was such notice included in the employee handbook. Johnson filed suit under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601-2654, alleging that U.S. Steel retaliated against him for taking protected FMLA leave, failed to reinstate him after a period of protected leave, and otherwise unlawfully interfered with his FMLA rights. The district court entered summary judgment for the employer. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Johnson did not demonstrate how any alleged technical violations could have prejudiced him if his condition was not a serious health condition and did not qualify him for FMLA leave in the first place. View "Johnson v. Wheeling Mach. Prods." on Justia Law

In 2001, N.D. Laws 53-06.2-10.1 was amended to authorize “account wagering,” a form of parimutuel wagering in which an individual deposits money in an account and, through a licensed simulcast service provider authorized to operate a simulcast parimutuel wagering system, uses the balance to pay for parimutuel wagers. The legislature did not make corresponding changes to section 53-06.2-11 or otherwise alter the statutory takeout formulas to authorize a tax on account wagering until 2007. Racing Services (RSI), formerly a state-licensed horse racing simulcast service provider, filed bankruptcy. PW Enterprises, its largest non-governmental creditor filed suit on behalf of all creditors to recover money the state collected from RSI as taxes on parimutuel account wagering. The district court held that the money must be returned to the bankruptcy estate because North Dakota law did not authorize the state to collect taxes on account wagering before 2007. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Though some members of the legislature may have understood account wagering would be taxed similarly to existing forms of parimutuel wagering, that belief does not make the statute as written ambiguous or require a court to strain to infer a legislative intent that is entirely absent from the statutory language. View "PW Enters., Inc. v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

Villanueva was the contact to the police department for her neighborhood watch group, communicating with Officer Moreno. She told Moreno that her ex-husband (Alvaro) had assaulted her. Moreno did not file a report or take official action, but spoke with Alvaro about the incident. Moreno began spending time alone with Villanueva, touching her, and sending sexually explicit messages. The relationship became sexual. Villanueva ended the relationship and began experiencing what she believed was harassment. She saw unknown cars parked outside her house and received anonymous threatening phone calls referencing private conversations between Villanueva and Moreno. Villanueva believed Moreno orchestrated the harassment. Villanueva reported to the Scottsbluff police. Officers were dispatched after many calls, but they generated only two reports and took no official action. Villanueva, diagnosed with PTSD, filed suit, citing the Equal Protection Clause and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The district court construed Villanueva’s complaint to allege substantive due process violations of her rights to bodily integrity and to be free from state-created danger, granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on the constitutional claims, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The evidence did not suggest Moreno coerced Villanueva into sexual relations through an abuse of authority so egregious and outrageous that it shocked the conscience. View "Villanueva v. City of Scottsbluff" on Justia Law

Johnson shot his ex-girlfriend in the head, causing serious permanent injuries. A South Dakota jury convicted him of first-degree attempted murder and aggravated assault. The trial judge imposed consecutive sentences of 25 and 15 years for the two offenses. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of South Dakota rejected Johnson’s claim that imposing consecutive sentences for attempted murder and aggravated assault based on the same act violated the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause. After exhausting state post-conviction remedies, Johnson sought a federal writ of habeas corpus. The district court dismissed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the double jeopardy claim as no “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,” 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). View "Johnson v. Young" on Justia Law

A January 2012 superseding indictment charged 12 defendants with conspiracy to commit bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344 & 1349. Various defendants were charged in 37 other counts with specific bank fraud and aggravated identity theft offenses, 18 U.S.C. 1028A. Maxwell was charged in Count 39 with conspiracy to commit concealment money laundering. Eight defendants pleaded guilty, including Maxwell and Royals, who then testified for the government at the trial of Burks, Powell, Allen, and Hamilton. A jury convicted the four of the conspiracy charge and most of the substantive counts. After a separate trial, a different jury convicted Moore of conspiracy to commit bank fraud and aggravated identity theft. Consolidating the appeals, the Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, the jury instructions, and the sentencing. View "United States v. Maxwell" on Justia Law

Raymond was stopped by police officers who determined that the vehicle in which he was traveling was stolen. During a search, they found a handgun underneath the driver’s seat and a case that contained methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. Raymond pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and illegal possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). He was designated an armed career criminal. The district court sentenced him to 15 years’ imprisonment, the statutory minimum. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting his argument that possession of a handgun is not a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). It does not matter whether Raymond’s current conviction for illegal possession of a handgun is a “violent felony”; that conviction triggers the 15-year sentence if he has three previous convictions that are violent felonies or serious drug offenses. His Minnesota convictions, for fleeing police in a motor vehicle, third-degree burglary, second-degree aggravated robbery, and simple robbery, are violent felonies. View "United States v. Raymond" on Justia Law