Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Misquadace pleaded guilty to failure to pay child support, 18 U.S.C. 228(a)(3). He was sentenced to five years’ probation and $54,613.12 in restitution. In 2013, he admitted failing to assign his tribal gaming per capita payment to the South Dakota Department of Social Services in violation of his probation conditions. Misquadace remained on probation and was ordered to pay $200 per month toward his outstanding child-support balance. The condition that he assign his per capita payment was eliminated. Weeks later, a second petition alleged failure to report a change of residence. At his revocation hearing, Misquadace admitted the violation. His probation was revoked. He explained that he had been homeless because of his alcohol addiction but had joined a new church, obtained housing, and was attempting to get his life back in order for the benefit of his children. Misquadace’s violation was a Grade C offense, and his advisory sentencing range was 8 to 14 months’ imprisonment. The district court imposed the statutory maximum of 24 months’ imprisonment and 1 year of supervised release, and reduced the amount of restitution owed to $53,716. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that the court properly weighed the sentencing factors. View "United States v. Misquadace" on Justia Law

Miller purchased an annuity from Minnesota Life Insurance, with a lump-sum “Purchase Payment” of $267,319.48, consisting of funds from his individual retirement account. Minnesota Life agreed to make an annual “Income Payment” of $40,497.95 to Miller for the next eight years. Miller later filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and claimed that the annuity was exempt under 11 U.S.C. 522(b)(3)(C), as “retirement funds to the extent that those funds are in a fund or account that is exempt from taxation under section . . . 408 . . . of the Internal Revenue Code.” Section 408 provides that an individual retirement account and an individual retirement annuity are exempt from taxation as qualified retirement plans, 26 U.S.C. 408(a), (b), (e)(1). The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The exemption generally applies even if the debtor transferred the retirement funds to the qualified retirement plan from another qualified retirement plan. There is no dispute that the funds used to purchase Miller’s annuity were retirement funds that came from Miller’s individual retirement account, which was a qualified individual retirement account. The court rejected the trustee’s argument that Miller’s annuity is not a qualified individual retirement annuity. View "Running v. Miller" on Justia Law

Argonaut filed suit against ACJC, alleging that ACJC's negligence in monitoring a security alarm panel caused or contributed to damages arising out of the burglary and fire of a grocery store insured by Argonaut. The district court denied summary judgment to ACJC, finding that ACJC had waived its sovereign and statutory immunity by purchasing insurance. ACJC filed an interlocutory appeal. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to address the question whether ACJC's purchase of insurance also waived any statutory immunity it might enjoy under Section 190.307 of the Missouri Revised Statutes as a 911 call center where the statute does not extend to ACJC a substantive right to be free from the burdens of litigation. The court found no clear error in the district court's determination that ACJC did not prove the existence of a pre-existing agreement between itself and the insurer to include the sovereign immunity endorsement with the original policy. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's determination that ACJC waived the common law sovereign immunity provided by Section 537.600 of the Missouri Revised Statutes through its purchase of insurance. The court dismissed the remaining portions of the interlocutory appeal based on lack of jurisdiction. View "Argonaut Great Central Ins. v. Audrain Cnty. Joint Commc'n" on Justia Law

Union Pacific filed suit against Progress Rail, alleging that Progress Rail negligently reconditioned certain railcar axles, causing the axles to fail and two trains to derail. A jury returned a verdict for Progress Rail and Union Pacific appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in excluding Union Pacific's metallurgical engineer's opinion and in admitting the opinion of Progress Rail's expert. Progress Rail filed a conditional cross-appeal. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the engineer's opinion that the axle failures were caused by corrosion pits that Progress Rail failed to remove when it reconditioned the axles because the engineer could not say when the corrosion pits formed and could not trace the fatigue cracks that caused the axles to fail to specific corrosion pits. In this case, the district court properly exercised its gatekeeping function in excluding the engineer's ultimate opinion as unreliable. The court also concluded that Progress Rail laid an adequate foundation for Progress Rail's expert's opinions and the district court acted within its discretion when it overruled Union Pacific's objections. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and dismissed the cross-appeal as moot. View "Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Progress Rail Serv. Corp." on Justia Law

Brown, Reyes, Lyons, and Tibbetts were indicted under the Lacey Act which makes it unlawful to "sell . . . any fish . . . taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of . . . any Indian tribal law." 16 U.S.C. 3372(a)(1). The indictments alleged that they had netted fish for commercial purposes within the boundaries of the Leech Lake Reservation in violation of the Leech Lake Conservation Code, then sold the fish. The four are Chippewa Indians, and they moved to dismiss the indictments on the ground that their prosecution violates fishing rights reserved under the 1837 Treaty between the United States and the Chippewa. The district court granted the motions. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the historic fishing rights of the Chippewa Indians bar the prosecution for taking fish within the Leech Lake Reservation. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Kanagu, a citizen of Kenya, arrived in the U.S. in 2009, without a valid visa or other entry document. Weeks later, DHS initiated removal, charging Kanagu as removable under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). Kanagu applied for asylum under 8 U.S.C. 1158, withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3), and relief under the Convention Against Torture, claiming that he feared persecution based on his membership in a “particular social group,” which he described as a group of vigilantes formed to counter the activities of the Mungiki sect. Kanagu, who had intermittently lived in the U.S. since 1998, said he had sent small amounts of money to this vigilante group between 2004 and 2006. The Mungiki accosted Kanagu in Kenya in July 2009, approximately three years after he had last sent money to the vigilantes, demanding money and telling him they knew he could pay because he had money in the U.S. They did not mention his membership in any group. The Mungiki let Kanagu go after he gave them $700 in cash. The immigration judge and Board of Immigration Appeals denied relief. The Eighth Circuit denied review, holding that Kanagu did not establish persecution based on membership in a particular social group. View "Kanagu v. Holder" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Germain and GM Enterprises, filed suit against defendants, HCH and Metropolitan, alleging breach of contract claims related to an option to purchase based on the assignment of a lease agreement. The district court dismissed the complaint because plaintiffs were precluded from bringing the action where a state court already had decided the issue underlying the claims alleged in their federal complaint. As a preliminary matter, the court held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar plaintiffs' claims where their complaint alleged injuries caused by breach of contract and related to torts. Turning to section 13 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, the court believed that the Arkansas Supreme Court would hold that the state-court judgment in this case was sufficiently firm to be considered final for purposes of issue preclusion; based on the state court's conclusion and the terms of the subordination agreement, Germain was not entitled to specific performance of the option and dismissal of the federal declaratory-judgment action was appropriate; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees to defendants. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Germain Real Estate v. HCH Toyota" on Justia Law

NanoMech, researcher and developer of nanotechnologies, filed suit against defendant, a former employee, for breach of a noncompete agreement. On appeal, NanoMech challenged the district court's judgment on the pleadings for defendant. The court affirmed the district court's finding that the noncompete agreement was unenforceable under Arkansas law where any error in the district court's decision to convert defendant's motion to dismiss into a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings was harmless; under Arkansas law, a noncompete agreement must be valid as written; and a blanket prohibition on defendant's ability to seek employment of any kind with an employer in the nanotechnology industry anywhere in the world is overbroad, unreasonable, and therefore unenforceable. View "NanoMech, Inc. v. Suresh" on Justia Law

Chief of Police Lillis announced his retirement. Lieutenant Hilde, on the force for 29 years, was the second-ranking officer, and had served as acting Chief. A commission that controls hiring had previously promoted internally. They selected finalists, including Hilde and external candidate, Koivunen. Hilde had an Associate’s degree in law enforcement. Detective Koivunen had served another city for 18 years. He had a Bachelor’s degree in criminal law. The hiring protocol involved: weighted years of service, training and employment, and an interview. Hilde had a service score of 65, the highest of the finalists. He received 9 out of 20 on training-and-employment, the lowest of the finalists. The commissioners could not explain that score. Koivunen received a service score of 28 and 15 out of 20 for his training-and-employment, the highest of the finalists. Each commissioner gave Koivunen an unprecedented perfect 100 score for his interview. Hilde’s interview sheets also reported identical scores: 69 points. Hilde and Koivunen each had 143 points after the interview. Two commissioners claimed not to remember changing Hilde’s scores, although the sheets were altered. When Hilde applied, he was 51 years old. Koivunen was 43. An officer is retirement-eligible at 50. Commissioner England said that retirement eligibility “might have” been a factor. Hilde sued, alleging violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623(a)(1), 631(a), and the Minnesota Human Rights Act. The district court granted the city summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. View "Hilde v. City of Eveleth" on Justia Law

Defendant and others were charged with conspiring to distribute and conspiring to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a). He originally was appointed counsel, but later retained new counsel. Unsatisfied, defendant retained a third attorney, Rozan. Represented by Rozan, defendant pleaded guilty. He was sentenced to 151 months’ imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit upheld the conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. Defendant then filed a pro se motion to vacate his conviction under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial and appellate levels. Defendant argued that Rozan did not disclose that in 2004 and 2005, Rozan was privately reprimanded by the State Bar of Texas; in 2007, he was publicly reprimanded; and in 2009, while representing defendant on appeal, he was suspended from practice in Texas for five years, effective January 1, 2010. The Texas Supreme Court ordered Rozan to provide written notice of his suspension to every client and to every court officer in every court in which Rozan practiced. The Eighth Circuit affirmed denial of relief. It was defendant’s responsibility to investigate the disciplinary past of his attorney; the required notification occurred after defendant’s sentencing, and defendant did not show how he was prejudiced by Rozan’s silence. View "Ghost Bear v. United States" on Justia Law