Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Chief of Police Lillis announced his retirement. Lieutenant Hilde, on the force for 29 years, was the second-ranking officer, and had served as acting Chief. A commission that controls hiring had previously promoted internally. They selected finalists, including Hilde and external candidate, Koivunen. Hilde had an Associate’s degree in law enforcement. Detective Koivunen had served another city for 18 years. He had a Bachelor’s degree in criminal law. The hiring protocol involved: weighted years of service, training and employment, and an interview. Hilde had a service score of 65, the highest of the finalists. He received 9 out of 20 on training-and-employment, the lowest of the finalists. The commissioners could not explain that score. Koivunen received a service score of 28 and 15 out of 20 for his training-and-employment, the highest of the finalists. Each commissioner gave Koivunen an unprecedented perfect 100 score for his interview. Hilde’s interview sheets also reported identical scores: 69 points. Hilde and Koivunen each had 143 points after the interview. Two commissioners claimed not to remember changing Hilde’s scores, although the sheets were altered. When Hilde applied, he was 51 years old. Koivunen was 43. An officer is retirement-eligible at 50. Commissioner England said that retirement eligibility “might have” been a factor. Hilde sued, alleging violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623(a)(1), 631(a), and the Minnesota Human Rights Act. The district court granted the city summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. View "Hilde v. City of Eveleth" on Justia Law

Defendant and others were charged with conspiring to distribute and conspiring to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a). He originally was appointed counsel, but later retained new counsel. Unsatisfied, defendant retained a third attorney, Rozan. Represented by Rozan, defendant pleaded guilty. He was sentenced to 151 months’ imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit upheld the conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. Defendant then filed a pro se motion to vacate his conviction under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial and appellate levels. Defendant argued that Rozan did not disclose that in 2004 and 2005, Rozan was privately reprimanded by the State Bar of Texas; in 2007, he was publicly reprimanded; and in 2009, while representing defendant on appeal, he was suspended from practice in Texas for five years, effective January 1, 2010. The Texas Supreme Court ordered Rozan to provide written notice of his suspension to every client and to every court officer in every court in which Rozan practiced. The Eighth Circuit affirmed denial of relief. It was defendant’s responsibility to investigate the disciplinary past of his attorney; the required notification occurred after defendant’s sentencing, and defendant did not show how he was prejudiced by Rozan’s silence. View "Ghost Bear v. United States" on Justia Law

Responding to a report that a man wearing a Steelers jacket had stolen an iPad wrapped in bubble wrap from an electronics retailer, Officer Loftis pursued a car identified by customers. Loftis pulled the Cadillac over; the driver was wearing a Steelers jacket. Williams eventually obeyed an order to exit the car and locked the doors behind him. The car window was partially down. Loftis looked inside and noticed bubble wrap between the seats. Unlocking the car through the window, Loftis removed the bubble-wrapped item, which was the stolen iPad. Williams grabbed the iPad and resisted attempts to handcuff him. The store manager arrived and identified Williams. Loftis ordered Williams’s car to be towed, reasoning that he “didn’t want to leave a Cadillac on the side of the road.” Loftis did not want to release Williams to sign an “authorization not to tow.” Loftis later testified that he did order towing as a punitive action, nor was he expecting to find additional evidence. After ordering a tow, officers inventoried the vehicle, pursuant to policy. In the trunk, they discovered a stolen, loaded AK-47 rifle. Williams admitted, after receiving Miranda warnings, that he had stolen the firearm. Charged as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1); possessing a stolen firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(j); and stealing a firearm from a licensed dealer, 18 U.S.C. 922(u), Williams unsuccessfully moved to suppress the rifle, entered a conditional guilty plea, and was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Adejumo pled guilty to bank fraud and aggravated identity theft and was sentenced to 124 months in prison. Adejumo did not waive his ability to present argument on the amount of the loss to the victims. A year later, the government moved to amend the judgment to add a restitution obligation of $1.1 million. In support, it provided a single page exhibit containing the names of four asserted victim banks and amounts owed to each. Although Adejumo's trial counsel received electronic court filing (ECF) notice of this motion, he did not respond nor inform Adejumo of it. Trial counsel had withdrawn as appellate counsel. Substitute counsel had been appointed, but the ECF system still showed trial counsel as counsel of record. The district court entered the requested restitution order. Two months later it denied Adejumo's motion to reopen or for reconsideration. The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that the district court lacked sufficient information to set restitution. View "United States v. Adejumo" on Justia Law

In 2011 the Roy home on the Red Lake Indian Reservation was engulfed in flames and collapsed before fire crews could extinguish the fire. The next morning the bodies of Roy and Beaulieu were retrieved from the rubble. Autopsies indicated that Roy and Beaulieu had been stabbed multiple times before the fire and that their death was caused by exsanguination. A jury convicted defendants, including Martin and Robinson, under 18 U.S.C. 1153, which allows the federal government to prosecute certain "offenses committed within Indian country," including murder or robbery. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of improper ex parte contact by the district court with the jury venire; that the government failed to prove Martin’s Indian status under section 1153 even though he stipulated to that fact; that the court erred by denying Robinson’s motions to sever and allowing the prosecutor to comment on his failure to testify; and that the court erred by declining to give Martin lesser included instruction on theft and by enhancing his sentence by six levels under U.S.S.G. 2B3.1(b)(3)(C) for infliction of permanent bodily injury. View "United States v. Martin" on Justia Law

Archambault, a Native American, has many prior convictions for child neglect and substance abuse in the Tribal Court and a history of mental health problems. Archambault's 13-year-old son told a healthcare worker that his mother began forcing him to smoke marijuana when he was six years old and that he had been prescribed Ritalin, but his mother took it from him. His mother would crush the pills and either inhale or inject them. Archambault sold pills that she did not use. Her son stated that he would get in trouble if he took the Ritalin himself. The Bureau of Indian Affairs interviewed Archambault. She admitted using and selling Ritalin and giving her son marijuana. Indicted for distribution of a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), she violated the terms of her release by testing positive for alcohol and marijuana and by disorderly conduct. She pled guilty. The court calculated a guideline range of four to 10 months, heard arguments, discussed the section 3553(a) factors, and concluded that Archambault posed a risk to her child, had an extensive tribal criminal history not reflected in her guideline category, and had performed poorly on pretrial release, then sentenced her to 18 months imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the the sentence. View "United States v. Archambault" on Justia Law

Guerrero, a Honduras native, entered the U.S. illegally in 1990. He was granted Temporary Protected Status (TPS) after claiming to be a citizen of El Salvador. When Salvadorans' TPS status was due to expire, Guerrero applied for asylum, submitting a false Salvadoran birth certificate and alleging he faced potential retribution from the Salvadoran government because he and his father had been members of a guerilla group. Guerrero submitted work authorization requests misrepresenting his national origin. An asylum officer, believing Guerrero was Salvadoran, informed him of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA), which limited removals of Salvadorans. Guerrero did not correct the officer nor apply for NACARA benefits. Guerrero missed an asylum interview in 2008. DHS initiated removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Guerrero admitted his Honduran citizenship and sought cancellation of removal and asylum. The IJ denied relief, citing Guerrero's history of lying in immigration matters, driving while intoxicated convictions, and an arrest for domestic assault, and stating that Guerrero did not establish that his U.S.-citizen sons "would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship if [Guerrero] had to leave," or a well-reasoned fear of persecution based on his membership in a social group. The BIA and Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion. View "Guerrero-Tejado v. Holder" on Justia Law

Officers were informed that a “couple of black females” had stolen merchandise from Urban Outfitters, and that an employee from the nearby Heartbreaker store had called to report suspected shoplifters. The Heartbreaker manager said that an unidentified customer had pointed out African American females (Parker and her friends) inside the store that had run out of Victoria’s Secret. A Victoria’s Secret employee confirmed that a “group of black females” had “very recently” run out of the store, but could not confirm whether anything was stolen. The manager did not suspect the women of stealing from Heartbreaker. The officers noted no suspicious activity, but followed the group, pulled their squad car in front of Parker’s car and turned on the emergency lights. The women stated that they had not been to Victoria’s Secret. Parker consented to a search of her shopping bags; nothing appeared stolen. After running Parker’s license and speaking to her father on her cell phone, the officers told the women they could leave. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court denied the officers qualified immunity. The Eight Circuit reversed. It was not clearly established that the officers, having corroborated the running incident, and knowing shoplifting recently occurred, could not reasonably suspect Parker of shoplifting. View "Parker v. Chard" on Justia Law

Stephens, an attorney, is controlling principal of Southwest Medical, the Debtor, and has an interest in Southeast, the debtor in a separate bankruptcy. The Chapter 7 Trustee filed an adversary proceeding against Southeast and Stephens based on assets that were transferred post-petition by the Debtor to Southeast, and sought imposition of a constructive trust. By joint stipulation, Stephens was dismissed from the Adversary Proceeding. In 2013, following a trial, the Bankruptcy Court denied Stephens’ Motion to Intervene in the Adversary Proceeding; entered an order that allowed the Trustee an unsecured claim against Southeast ($1,190,000); and denied a constructive trust against Southeast’s assets. While Stephens’ appeal was pending, and on the last day of the one-year limitation period under FRCP 60(b), Stephens moved for Relief from Judgment or Order, alleging that the Trustee’s attorney had colluded with Southeast’s attorneys, amounting to a “fraud on the court.” The court denied Stephens’ Rule 60 Motion because, he was not a party in the Adversary Proceeding; held that Stephens’ allegations of fraud on the court violated Rule 9011(b)(2) and (b)(3); and ordered Stephens to pay $19,188.42 in attorney fees plus $1,659.10 as a sanction under Rule 9011(c)(2). The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Williams v. Stephens" on Justia Law

In 2007, Calandrillo purchased a boat manufactured by a Genmar subsidiary. Calandrillo claimed the boat was defective. In 2009, Calandrillo agreed to convey title to the boat to Genmar in exchange for payment of a lien plus $65,000. The bank received $140,000 and issued a lien waiver. Calandrillo conveyed title to Genmar, which sent Calandrillo a check for $65,000. Genmar filed for bankruptcy. The trustee sought recovery of $65,000 as a preferential transfer. The $140,000 payment was outside the 90-day preference period, 11 U.S.C. 547(b). Calandrillo argued that the payment was a contemporaneous new value exchange, exempt from avoidance. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that Calandrillo presented no evidence permitting a reasonable fact-finder to find that the parties intended a contemporaneous exchange for new value. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Calandrillo’s conveyance of the boat was completed on March 4, when he sent executed title documents. He received payment of the $65,000 settlement balance on March 23. The settlement provided that the $65,000 payment would be made no sooner than 15 days after Genmar received the lien waiver and title documents, reflecting a short-term loan of $65,000 to Genmar. Repayment of a loan within 90 days of bankruptcy is an avoidable preference. View "Ries v. Calandrillo" on Justia Law