Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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Brooks, a member of the Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community, is incarcerated for Minnesota convictions of first-degree DWI and assaulting an officer. The Minnesota Department of Corrections (MDOC) requires a chemical-dependency assessment. Brooks was ordered to complete treatment in order to be transferred to a lower-security prison, qualify for work release, and avoid disciplinary sanctions. Brooks began treatment in 2011, but, in 2012, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983; the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc; the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. 1996; and the Minnesota Constitution. He claimed that his required chemical-dependency program deprived him of his right to the free exercise of his religion. The district court dismissed some claims and granted summary judgment for the defendants on all others. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, because, based on the complaint, the court and the defendants could not discern what beliefs he has or what faith he professes. View "Brooks v. Roy" on Justia Law

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Police had DNA evidence suggesting Barefield unlawfully possessed a firearm and engaged in a gunfight. The Bureau of Alcohol, Firearms, Tobacco and Explosives obtained a warrant. A confidential informant arranged a meeting in a parking lot, stating Barefield would arrive in a gold Oldsmobile with a dented door and would have a plastic water bottle containing drugs. At the appointed time, a gold-brown Buick with a dented door arrived and parked near the informant. The driver got out and conversed with the informant, then got into his car and left. Police conducted a traffic stop, having been told the driver would be an African-American male, likely armed, removed the driver (African-American male), placed him in handcuffs, patted him down, and placed him in a cruiser, noting a water bottle in the console which appeared to have a “leafy substance floating in it.” ATF agents arrived, found the bottle containing marijuana and fake cocaine, and a digital scale in the glove box. The driver claimed to have no identification but gave his brother’s name. At the police station a detective identified the driver as Patrick, who had an outstanding arrest warrant. The Eighth Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to suppress, determining the officers were justified in stopping Patrick and searching the car. View "United States v. Patrick" on Justia Law

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In 2008, Camacho pleaded guilty to capital murder in Arkansas state court. He did not file a direct appeal. After state post-conviction relief was denied, Camacho filed a 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition. The state responded that, although the limitations period was tolled while Camacho’s state post-conviction proceedings were pending, the petition was untimely under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1). The magistrate judge recommended denying relief, reasoning that because Arkansas law generally does not permit an appeal from a guilty plea, AEDPA’s one-year limitations period began to run when the judgment of conviction was entered, not 30 days later when the time for filing a direct appeal from that judgment expired. The district court dismissed the petition as being filed 18 days past the deadline. The Eighth Circuit reversed. For state prisoners, the AEDPA limitations period runs from “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” The critical date for finality of the state-court conviction is the expiration of the state’s filing deadline, regardless of whether the petitioner could file an appeal. View "Camacho v. Hobbs" on Justia Law

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Johnson’s trucking business operated 1986 and 1987 semi-tractor trucks, with one truck at a time insured through Acuity. In 2009, Johnson called Acuity’s agent, Holden, to switch insurance coverage to the 1987 truck. The 1987 truck broke down the next day. Johnson called Holden to switch the insurance back to the 1986 truck. A year later, Johnson's 1986 truck, pulling a J&B trailer, collided with Marlow’s vehicle, causing her death. Western insured the trailer. Holden claimed that Johnson had called in February 2010 and requested to switch coverage to the 1987 truck. Johnson denied ever making that request. At trial, Johnson pointed out that the 1987 truck remained inoperable; Johnson operated the 1986 truck throughout 2010. Johnson’s February 2010, renewal policy identified the 1986 International as covered. Johnson advised J&B that he would use the 1986 truck. Acuity and Johnson settled. The court denied Acuity’s motion to dismiss Johnson. Western's cross-claim against him remained pending; Johnson had assigned his claims against Western to Acuity and Acuity agreed to indemnify Johnson. Acuity paid $561,000 to Marlow’s estate and sought reimbursement. The court viewed the dispute as whether Johnson instructed Holden to change the coverage and rejected Acuity’s claim that Western lacked standing. The jury found that Johnson did not request a change. The court declared that Acuity had to provide primary insurance coverage. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the controversy did not concern contract reformation and upholding the district court's decision to allow Johnson to participate at trial. View "ACUITY v. Johnson," on Justia Law

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Chen, a citizen of China, entered the U.S. without inspection in 1997. She applied in 2008 for a "U" visa, which gives temporary legal status to crime victims. That application was denied. While the application was pending, Chen filed an affirmative application for asylum based on her fear that she would be persecuted if she returned to China because she is a Christian. Her application was referred to the immigration court because Chen had filed it more than one year after entering and had not shown any exception to the deadline. Chen conceded removability and sought relief in the form of asylum, withholding of removal, Convention Against Torture protection, and cancellation of removal, testifying that her mother had been arrested twice for her involvement in a Christian church. Chen initially testified that her mother's first arrest occurred in 1990, but later stated it was 1997. Chen was unable to name or describe the branch of Christianity to which her mother belonged. Chen's testimony about when and how she came to the U.S. conflicted with statements in her applications. The Immigration Judge denied relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed Chen's appeal. The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review View "Chen v. Holder" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
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In 2002 an uncontrolled, runaway commercial aircraft at Las Vegas’s McCarran International Airport came to a rest at the bottom of an embankment. A maintenance worked had failed to properly engage the parking brake. The resulting property damage and loss-of-use of the aircraft totaled more than $10 million. The aircraft’s owner, Northwest Airlines, obtained a default judgment in Minnesota state court against PALS, the maintenance company responsible for the wreck, then commenced a garnishment action to recover part of the amount from PALS’s insurer, Westchester, which argued that PALS’s failure to provide notice and to cooperate extinguished Westchester’s payment obligation. While acknowledging unanswered questions of state law, the Eighth Circuit affirmed judgment in favor of Northwest. A Clark County ordinance mandates hangar-keepers liability insurance to protect parties like Northwest. Given this purpose, insurance coverage could not be avoided for an insured’s simple failure to satisfy the technical post-loss conditions on statutorily mandated coverage. View "NW Airlines, Inc. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law

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Sims was charged as a felon in possession of a firearm. A magistrate ordered that the government disclose all expert testimony by April 10. Trial was set for April 28. Immediately after arresting Sims, officers sent a gun seized from him to a crime lab for DNA testing. The lab mistakenly believed that it did not have a DNA sample from Sims for comparison. The analyst e-mailed a detective, who did not respond. Nor did the analyst hear from prosecutors. Meanwhile, Sims and the government discussed a potential plea. The deadline passed. On April 14, Sims’s lawyer announced that Sims would not plead guilty. The government contacted the lab about the DNA tests. The lab then located a DNA sample from Sims. The government did not tell the court or Sims that it was awaiting DNA evidence, did not update its expert-witness list, and stated, at the April 17 pretrial conference, that it was ready for trial. On April 21, the lab reported that Sims was the source of most of the DNA on the gun. The next day, the government sent Sims’s attorney a copy of the report and information about its expert witness and filed a “Supplemental Notice of Expert Witnesses.” The district court excluded the testimony, reasoning that the government acted with reckless disregard for the deadline and that the evidence would cause “extreme prejudice.” The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Sims" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Ravensborg, an enrolled member of the Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians and a lifelong resident of the reservation, pled guilty to assault resulting in serious bodily injury. According to the presentence investigation report, Ravensborg had his first incident with the criminal law when he was arrested for misdemeanor robbery about a year after his father died from cancer in June 2012. He had a history of depression and mental illness. The district court granted him release prior to his sentencing, with conditions that he must comply with supervision from pretrial services, refrain from using illegal controlled substances, and report all contact with law enforcement. Ravensborg violated the terms of his release by testing positive for marijuana on two separate occasions. He was also arrested for alleged assault and the stalking of his girlfriend. The court revoked Ravensborg's release. His calculated guidelines range was 33 to 41 months imprisonment. The district court sentenced him to 41 months imprisonment, having found a downward variance unwarranted because of the seriousness of the offense and Ravensborg's poor behavior on supervised release. The Eighth Circuit upheld the sentence as substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Ravensborg" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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CMS collects consumer debts, subject to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692a(6). CMS commences consumer state-court collection actions by filing standard-form complaints that allege, that “more than 90 days have elapsed since the presentation of this claim” to the consumer and seek prejudgment interest and attorney fees “as allowable by law.” When named plaintiffs contested CMS’s complaints, CMS served nearly identical discovery requests seeking disclosure of detailed employment and financial information. Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against CMS and in-house CMS attorneys, claiming that CMS’s standard-form pleadings violate the FDCPA and the Nebraska Consumer Protection Act. In certifying four classes, the district court agreed that the predominant common question was whether the defendants sent each class member standard collection complaints and discovery requests, which violate the FDCPA and NCPA. The four classes consist of persons who received a county court collection complaint or discovery requests seeking to collect a debt “for personal, family, or household purposes,” or had such a collection action pending during the applicable limitations periods. The Eighth Circuit reversed, concluding that the court failed to conduct the “rigorous analysis . . . of what the parties must prove” that FRCP 23 requires. View "Powers v. Credit Mgmt. Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

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Hutterites disavow individual property ownership for a communal lifestyle. The Hutterian Church has three conferences. South Dakota’s Hutterville Colony belonged to the Schmiedeleut Conference. Hutterville’s nonprofit corporation operates a communal farm, conducts business, and owns all property. In 1983, when the Colony formed, Kleinsasser led Schmiedeleut Conference. Several ministers repudiated Kleinsasser’s leadership in 1992 and followed Wipf. Colonies following Wipf ratified a new constitution. Kleinsasser’s colonies did not. Each group claimed that it was the true Schmiedeleut. Waldner, Hutterville’s ecclesiastical leader, its corporation’s president, and a director, was loyal to Kleinsasser. The complaint alleges that through “sham” corporate meetings in 2008-2009, Wipf faction members were elected to replace Waldner faction officers and directors. Each faction conducted business in the name of the company. In 2009 a state trial court determined that Wipf faction members were the duly elected directors and officers. Waldner and Kleinsasser excommunicated Wipf faction members. State courts rejected a challenge to the excommunication, reasoning that control of the corporation could not be determined without addressing religious questions. In a second state action, the supreme court reversed appointment of a receiver, concluding that even corporate dissolution is beyond secular jurisdiction. As the factions were contesting the receiver’s accounting, the Waldners filed suit under RICO, as individuals and in their “official” capacities as purported directors and officers, claiming that attorneys worked with the Wipf faction to “wrest control” of Hutterville, and that the receiver was part of the plan. The district court dismissed, reasoning that official capacity standing required knowing who truly controls Hutterville, which involves religious disputes; individual claims for property damages claims were dismissed based on the renunciation of individual property. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Hutterville Hutterian Brethren, Inc. v. Sveen" on Justia Law