Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2007 Pedersen began working for BMA dialysis clinics. She became a registered nurse. On April 17, 2012, clinic manager Ince talked to Pedersen about Pedersen’s aggression and patient care performance issues; Pedersen was to be transferred to another clinic with more experienced staff. Pedersen yelled at Ince. Later that day, the two met with nephrologists to discuss patient care planning. Pedersen informed the nephrologists about mispackaging of blood samples a week earlier. Ince discussed how the incident had been handled. Following the meeting, Pedersen contacted regional manager Kienzle and others to report the mispackaging. Kienzle informed them that the incident had been investigated and no samples were affected. On April 19, a patient reported that Pedersen had slapped her arms; others complained that Pedersen had impersonated a manager and had inappropriately documented patient treatment. BMA investigated. Pedersen went on medical leave. BMA determined Pedersen could return under a corrective plan. Pedersen did not return. BMA offered Pedersen employment as a technician due to Pedersen’s long absence and new policies; she could be retrained as an RN. Pedersen refused to return unless BMA met her conditions. After several months, BMA terminated Pedersen’s employment, characterizing her failure to return as voluntary resignation. Pedersen sued, alleging retaliation and violation of the Minnesota Whistleblower Act. The district court granted BMA summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Pedersen v. Bio-Med. Applications of Minn." on Justia Law

Lincoln, a meat-packing company, and Puretz, an investor, formed Hastings, an Illinois LLC, to bid on cattle-processing plants being sold at a bankruptcy auction. Puretz was to contribute 70% of acquisition and start-up capital; Lincoln 30%, plus management and 40,000 head of cattle per year. Additional details about financing and operations were to be negotiated. To bid, Hastings had to deposit $250,000. Puretz contributed $150,000; Lincoln contributed $100,000. Hastings successfully bid at $3,900,000. Negotiations regarding operations and financing deteriorated. Hastings closed the purchase. Lincoln refused to contribute additional funds and dissociated from Hastings. Under Illinois law, if a member dissociates and the LLC does not dissolve, the LLC must purchase the dissociating member’s distributional interest. Lincoln sought a determination of fair value. The district court held that Lincoln and Puretz each held a 50% interest in Hastings, that the value of Hastings on the dissociation date was $3,900,000, and that Lincoln’s only contribution was $100,000, rejecting Lincoln’s assertions that its identification of the opportunity, business plan, and “sweat equity” had “substantial value.” The court concluded that the value of Lincoln’s interest was $1,950,000, less 30% that Lincoln failed to contribute ($1,170,000), plus return of $100,000, and awarded Lincoln $880,000. The Eighth Circuit reversed. Lincoln and Puretz contemplated that any capital contributed to Hastings would be returned in proportion to their contributions before profits or losses generated by operations were divided equally. Because Lincoln did not make its 30% contribution to capital, it was not entitled to a 30% distribution. View "Lincoln Provision, Inc. v. Aron Puretz" on Justia Law

McKay was indicted for aggravated sexual abuse of a child by force, 18 U.S.C. 2241(a), and aggravated sexual abuse of a child under age 12, section 2241(c), concerning the granddaughter of the woman with whom McKay lived. McKay pleaded guilty to two counts of abusive sexual contact. The indictment was dismissed. The plea agreement recited that McKay knew the victim’s age, that he used threat and force, and that because of a 2002 conviction for the murder of his seven-week-old son, he was required to register his address and not have contact with children. The court indicated that it was considering an upward departure from the Guidelines range. Neither party submitted arguments. The PSR calculated an advisory Guidelines range of 100 to 125 months’ imprisonment, noted McKay’s history of repeated probation violations and failure to comply with registration requirements. Because the grandmother was away from home or asleep when the incidents occurred, the PSR advised that the victim was in McKay’s “custody, care[,] and supervisory control.” The district court adopted the PSR’s facts and Guidelines range without objection, rejected a joint recommendation, and imposed term of 360 months with lifetime supervised release. The Eighth Circuit found the sentence substantively reasonable. View "United States v. McKay" on Justia Law

From 1995-2009, Johnson worked for CRE. In the last three years, Johnson worked from home, 8 hours a day at a computer. Johnson was covered under CRE’s United disability insurance policy. In 1999, Johnson was diagnosed with fibromyalgia. In 2004, she underwent neck surgery for nerve injuries. On the day she resigned, Johnson visited MacDonald, her primary care physician, who diagnosed anxiety, depression, fibromyalgia, and chronic pain. Johnson completed a short-term disability form. MacDonald completed an Attending Physician’s Statement. United denied the application. Based on the recommendations of its doctor, United denied Johnson’s appeal. Johnson sought long-term disability benefits. MacDonald completed a Physician’s Statement that imposed multiple limitations. United denied the claim. Johnson appealed. United referred Johnson’s file and medical records to Boscardin, an orthopedic surgeon, who determined that, although Johnson experienced chronic pain in her neck and spine, Johnson’s complaints were not supported by “conclusive, objective evidence.” McClellan, Johnson’s surgeon, responded that he “[o]verall” agreed with Boscardin. United denied the appeal. Johnson sued under ERISA. The district court granted Johnson summary judgment, finding that United failed to consider Johnson’s condition as a whole. The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding the denial supported by substantial evidence. View "Johnson v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Howard allegedly rear-ended Gumby's vehicle, Gumby sued Howard and his employer, UPS. Contending that Gumby’s health might have contributed to the accident, UPS requested information including medical records and the identity of anyone with knowledge concerning this defense. Gumby provided the names of one physician and one hospital from which he had received pre-accident care. Gumby died a year later. Comstock, Gumby’s daughter and estate administrator, was substituted as plaintiff. A year after discovery began, Comstock produced documents revealing more medical providers, but did not produce all requested information. The court ordered Comstock to complete production by September 28. She failed to do so. In December 2012, Comstock provided UPS with over 3,000 pages of documents. Some were duplicates, but new documents showed that Gumby had vision problems; suffered dizziness, paranoia, and hallucinations while driving; had been instructed not to drive at night; and had been hospitalized hours before the accident. Comstock had called law enforcement that night, worried because Gumby, had left Pennsylvania to drive to Arkansas. UPS had already deposed Gumby and family members. The district court noted further misconduct concerning expert test results. The court found “extreme prejudice” and sanctioned Comstock under FRCP37(b)(2) by dismissal. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Comstock v. UPS Ground Freight, Inc." on Justia Law

Colbert alleges that in traffic court deputy Chapman beckoned him to a group of officers and loudly said, “Don’t be eyeballing my officers”; when Colbert said he was not, an officer grabbed Colbert and said “shut up”; when Colbert told that officer to let go, officers handcuffed him, threw him against a wall (causing his nose to bleed), threw him to the floor, tased him twice, “hog tied” him, and dragged him out. A state court found Colbert guilty of disorderly conduct and refusal to submit to arrest. Colbert sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging unreasonable seizure and excessive force. The district court dismissed. Colbert appealed dismissal of his excessive-force claim. The Eighth Circuit reversed. When a state prisoner seeks damages under section 1983, the court must consider whether judgment for the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. If the court determines that the plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should proceed. A finding of excessive force would not necessarily invalidate Colbert’s convictions. View "Colbert v. Chapman" on Justia Law

The Arkansas DHS regulates child care facility licensing and administers the USDA Child Care Food Program. Sparkman day care facility provided disability services funded by DHS and participated in the Program through DHS. The Program prohibits placement of disqualified individuals in a position of authority, 7 C.F.R. 226.6(c)(3)(ii)(B). DHS Policy states that violations can result in exclusion of a provider from further funding. DHS alleged that Sparkman placed a disqualified individual, Whitaker, in a position of authority. Sparkman believed that racial animus motivated DHS to place Whitaker on the disqualification list, but did not raise an equal protection claim at the hearing. Before the hearing was complete, the ALJ resigned, stating "as an African American male I cannot continue to work in a[n] office where racism and harassment continue to exist." Another ALJ, a Caucasian present as an observer, upheld DHS's termination of funding. With state appeals pending, Sparkman filed a federal complaint. The district court stayed proceedings. Following state court remand, DHS appointed a private attorney to serve as hearing officer; Sparkman agreed to the selection. Sparkman again made no equal protection or due process claims. The hearing officer decided in DHS's favor. Sparkman’s state court appeal alleged ex parte communications between DHS and the hearing officer. The state courts upheld the decision. The federal court concluded that claim preclusion barred Sparkman's due process and equal protection claims. The Eight Circuit affirmed, holding that the claims could have been brought during the state administrative proceeding and judicial review. View "Sparkman Learning Ctr. v. Ark. Dep't. Human Servs." on Justia Law

A.C. saw people outside her apartment building, including Daniels and Hudson. A.C. left. Returning, she learned that there had been an altercation. As a neighbor was explaining, Daniels and Hudson approached, angrily demanding to find certain individuals. Daniels brandished a handgun and threatened A.C. Her brother approached. Daniels fired a shot toward him before fleeing. Officers responded, drove to Hudson’s house, and detained Daniels and Hudson. Executing a warrant, they recovered the handgun that had fired the casing found near A.C’s building and ammunition with the same stamping as that casing. While 92% of the population could be excluded as a contributor to DNA from the handgun, Daniels was not excluded. Sergeant Lambie read Daniels his Miranda rights. Daniels initialed the Miranda advisories, signed a waiver form, and voluntarily admitted to shooting the gun, appearing alert. The interview was recorded. The court denied Daniels’ motion to suppress. Days before trial, the government first learned that a video recording existed of Daniels and Hudson in the squad car, eight hours before the Lambie interview. Daniels alleged that it showed him intoxicated, so that his statements were involuntary. The court denied Daniels’ motions. He was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm and sentenced as an armed career criminal to 204 months, below the Guidelines range of 262 to 327 months. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to admission of Daniels’s statements and to the sentence. View "United States v. Daniels" on Justia Law

Lucas was arrested on suspicion that he had reentered the U.S. illegally. As part of the investigation, the arresting officer requested Lucas’s alien file (A-file) which contained a signed warrant of deportation. A signed warrant indicates that the attesting witness observed the deportee leaving the country. The district court denied Lucas’s pretrial motion to suppress the warrant. At trial, the government introduced the contents of Lucas’s A-file into evidence, including the warrant of deportation which indicated that he had been deported in 2005, under an order of removal. The court rejected an argument that the admission of the warrant violated Lucas’s Sixth Amendment confrontation rights. The jury found Lucas guilty of illegal reentry, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a). The court sentenced him to time served with no supervised release to follow. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to admission of the warrant. View "United States v. Lorenzo-Lucas" on Justia Law

In 2011, Thomas pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute cocaine base (crack cocaine). The district court determined that he was a career offender, resulting in an advisory guidelines range of 188-235 months in prison, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. The court granted a downward departure and sentenced Thomas to 180 months in prison. Thomas moved for a reduction of his sentence based on Amendment 782 of the Sentencing Guidelines, which became effective November 1, 2014, and retroactively reduced most drug quantity base offense levels by two levels. The Eighth Circuit affirmed denial of the motion, reasoning that Thomas’s base offense level and sentence were based on his status as a career offender, not on the drug quantity table. Amendment 782 did not lower the sentencing range established for a career offender; Thomas’s “applicable guidelines range” was unaffected by Amendment 782. View "United States v. Thomas" on Justia Law