Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Bailey was convicted of federal prostitution charges in 2004. Minneapolis police officers took trial exhibits to a locked police storage facility, including $2,036 in cash, a wallet, and a cell phone. Years later Bailey moved for return of the property, but the government could not locate it. Bailey sought damages. The government agreed to pay Bailey $2,500 "by a check . . . made payable to Robert Bailey" to be mailed to the address of his lawyer. The Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services notified Bailey that he owed past due support of $45,956.48 and announced the state's "intent to collect this amount through the federal administrative offset process and by withholding . . . [tax refunds] or other federal or state payment(s)." The notice cited 31 U.S.C. 3716, indicating that "certain federal payments which might otherwise be paid to you will be intercepted for payment of current and past due support." It advised Bailey of his rights, such as having the debt redetermined. Bailey unsuccessfully moved to vacate his settlement agreement. He was advised that the $2,500 had been administratively offset against his child support obligation. The Eighth Circuit affirmed; the government did not breach Bailey's settlement agreement View "United States v. Bailey" on Justia Law

In 1988, Brake began working at Hutchinson. She was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis (MS) in 2000, but continued to work. Brake purchased disability insurance through Hutchinson’s plan in 1988. Hutchinson, as the plan administrator, ceded discretionary authority to Hartford to construe the plan and make eligibility determinations. In 2007, Brake purchased "buy-up" coverage that excluded a disability if medical treatment for that condition was rendered within 12 months prior to the effective date. The limitation ended after a year without a claim: if Brake was treated for MS between April 1, 2006, and April 1, 2007, and then became disabled as a result of MS before April 1, 2008, the exclusion would limit her benefits to core plan coverage. Brake began experiencing problems with her MS in 2007 and received benefits from a separate short-term disability plan. On March 25, 2008, she stopped working at Hutchinson. In May, she applied for LTD benefits, stating her onset of disability as July 27, 2007. Hartford informed her that her LTD benefits were approved, but not at the buy-up plan rate. Brake claimed that doctor visits during the 12 months were for a pap smear and a yearly routine MRI. Hartford cited the same records which indicated that Brake was increasingly less able to manage her MS conditions during the 12 months before her purchase of buy-up coverage. In Brake’s suit under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1001, the district court found that Hartford did not abuse its discretion. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Hartford. View "Brake v. Hutchinson Tech., Inc.," on Justia Law

Desloge has a population of 5,054; 97.4% are white. The Ku Klux Klan regularly distributes leaflets on streets and sidewalks, wearing robes and hoods. Imperial Wizard Ancona contacted city officials about plans to distribute leaflets in 2012 and learned that an ordinance prohibited "solicitation activities" on public streets. The district court issued an injunction, concluding that the ordinance was not narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. In 2013 Ancona and the Klan returned to distribute leaflets concerning gun rights. They stood along a sidewalk at a four way stop, holding up leaflets. If a vehicle’s occupant signaled for a leaflet, a Klan member would step into the street to supply one. A police officer told them about a 2013 traffic ordinance , which prohibited "stand[ing] in or enter[ing] upon a roadway for the purpose of soliciting rides, employment, business or charitable contributions from, or distribut[ing] anything to, the occupant of any vehicle." The Klan left. While litigation was pending, the city amended the ordinance, adding a preamble and defining terms to explain that it sought to address "public safety concerns," distracted drivers, and resulting collisions. "Roadway" was defined as the entire road, from one curb or pavement edge to another, including parking lanes. The district court granted an injunction, concluding that some provisions were not narrowly tailored. The Eighth Circuit reversed. There was no evidence that the ordinance was created to curtail the Klan's message or its speech in Desloge; it is not impermissibly underinclusive. View "Traditionalist Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of Desloge" on Justia Law

Debtors and Starion entered into loan transactions. The promissory notes and mortgages provided that the Debtors were liable for Starion’s attorney fees and costs of collections. The Debtors also executed personal guarantees. Defaults resulted in a 2012 Workout Agreement between Starion and the Debtors, who consented to entry of judgments against them to secure their personal guarantees. Based upon properly filed confessions of judgment, executed under the Agreement, a North Dakota state court entered judgments against Debtors for $2,078,034.26 and $1,000,000.00, plus interest. Debtors filed a voluntary chapter 11 petition. The Debtors’ Second Amended Plan of Reorganization stated: Debtors agree to pay Starion’s allowable attorney’s fees and costs associated with both Debtors’ bankruptcy proceedings including but not limited to reasonable attorneys’ fees, consulting, appraisal, filing fees, late fees … as provided in the Plan. The Plan was confirmed. Later the Debtors refused to pay requested appraisal and engineering costs and attorneys’ fees. Starion requested that the bankruptcy court compel payment of $125,014.64 based upon the Plan and 11 U.S.C. 506(b). The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the Debtors. The Eighth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed, noting that the obligation has appeared throughout the long documented history of the relationship. View "Starion Fin. v. McCormick" on Justia Law

DeCoteau was convicted of gross sexual imposition in 1996. His 2012 habeas petition had six claims. The district court dismissed, finding four claims time-barred, one procedurally barred, and the other without merit, but granted a certificate of appealability as to whether the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act limitations period applies on a claim-by-claim basis. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. AEDPA’s one-year limitations period applies to “an application” for habeas corpus, running from the latest of: the date on which judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or expiration of the time for seeking review; the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by state action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed; the date on which a newly-recognized constitutional right was initially recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or the date on which the factual predicate of the claim could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). The court rejected DeCoteau’s argument that the word “application” focuses on the date of the latest claim within the entire application, allowing review of all claims if one is timely. View "DeCoteau v. Schweitzer" on Justia Law

Minneapolis imposes an annual vacant building registration fee on owners of vacant buildings “to recover all costs incurred by the city for monitoring and regulating vacant buildings, including nuisance abatement, enforcement and administrative costs.” If unpaid, the city can levy and collect the fee as a special assessment against the property. DRB owns a vacant building in Minneapolis and for several years failed to pay that registration fee. In 2011, DRB received notice the city intended to assess $6,550 for DRB’s unpaid 2010 fee. After a hearing attended by DRB, an administrative hearing officer levied the fee. This process repeated in 2012 and a fee of $6,746 was levied. DRB did not appeal either assessment, but brought a separate suit, on behalf of itself and similarly situated landowners. A magistrate judge recommended judgment in favor of the city, concluding the city had provided DRB with proper notice of the assessments and DRB did not bring its challenges to the assessments within the statutory 30-day appeal period. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s adoption of the recommendation. View "DRB #24, LLC v. City of Minneapolis" on Justia Law

EEOC sued CRST in its own name, under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, alleging that CRST subjected Starke and 270 similarly situated female employees to a hostile work environment, in its Driver Training Program. For two years, EEOC failed to identify the women comprising the putative class; the court ordered EEOC to make all class members available for deposition or risk a discovery sanction. EEOC filed updated lists of allegedly aggrieved individuals, but failed to make all of them available for deposition before the deadline. The court barred EEOC from pursuing relief for any individual not made available for deposition before the deadline. EEOC then listed 155 individuals for whom it was still pursuing relief and 99 individuals, allegedly sexually harassed, but for whom EEOC was not pursuing relief based on the order. Following remand, the court dismissed, but for one claim, which settled for $50,000, and awarded CRST $92,842.21 in costs, $4,004,371.65 in attorneys' fees, and $463,071.25 in out-of-pocket expenses. The Eighth Circuit held that CRST is not entitled to attorneys' fees for claims dismissed based on EEOC's failure to satisfy pre-suit obligations and a purported pattern-or-practice claim. On remand, the court must individually assess each claim for which it granted summary judgment on the merits and explain why it deems each to be frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc." on Justia Law

Iowa officers saw men getting into a parked vehicle. Its license plate was not properly lit. They initiated a traffic stop. In the vehicle were the driver, Marshall; the front seat passenger, Battle; and a back right passenger, Hardy. Based on the vehicle’s slow stop and the occupants’ inconsistent accounts, the officers asked the men to exit the vehicle so they could conduct a dog sniff. Hardy ran before being apprehended. The officers did not observe him discarding anything and did not find contraband when they retraced his steps in the snow. A search revealed a handgun with a loaded magazine under the front passenger seat. Debris and tubing connected to electric controls blocked access to the gun from the back seat. Officers believed it had been placed from the front. Hardy agreed to testify in exchange for his charges being dropped. Investigators interviewed Williams, Battle’s long-time acquaintance, who stated that Williams witnessed Battle shoot a man in Des Moines. A lab report matched the firearm to the Des Moines shooting. The district court admitted evidence concerning the Des Moines shooting at Battle’s trial. Other witnesses indicated that Hardy could have been the shooter. The court held that evidence of Hardy’s prior convictions and other criminal acts was largely inadmissible and refused to grant judicial immunity to Marshall to testify about contraband he claimed he found when retracing Hardy’s footsteps after the arrest. The court applied a four-level enhancement for use of a firearm in connection with the Des Moines shooting and sentenced Battle to the statutory maximum of 120 months imprisonment as a felon in possession. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Battle" on Justia Law

Todd, born in 1963, was a high school graduate, and worked primarily as a laborer, often for temporary services. Todd’s last employment before seeking disability benefits ended in April 2007 because the temporary job was completed. Todd claimed inability to work due to anxiety, cramping in his feet, and difficulty breathing. Until his death in July 2009, Todd was treated for major depressive disorder, alcoholism, alcohol dependence, emphysema, and generalized anxiety disorder. Todd also experienced tremors of unknown etiology. An ALJ decided: Todd had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 14, 2007; Todd suffered from emphysema, tremors, an affective disorder, an anxiety disorder, and alcohol dependence; Todd did not have an impairment or combination of impairments so severe as to meet or equal the criteria of a listed impairment; Todd had the residual functional capacity to perform light work and was capable of performing his past relevant work as a laborer; and Todd was “not under a disability.” The district court agreed. Although the ALJ improperly weighed the medical professionals’ opinions, the error was harmless because substantial evidence supported a finding that Todd’s limitations would not be disabling if he stopped using alcohol. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Bernard v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Yellow Horse was convicted of conspiracy to distribute less than 50 kilograms of marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(D), and 846. At sentencing, the district court determined Yellow Horse could have reasonably foreseen the conspiracy involved 100 kilograms or more of marijuana and calculated his Guidelines range accordingly, imposing a sentence of 57 months imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Yellow Horse knew a number of actors were involved in the conspiracy, understood that it distributed sizable amounts of marijuana and other drugs, and personally witnessed the handling of large quantities of marijuana. View "United States v. Yellow Horse" on Justia Law