Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After Hopkins was arrested for driving while impaired for the third time in 10 years, officers impounded her vehicle under Minnesota Statute 169A.631(e)(1), She received a notice of seizure and intent to forfeit her vehicle. Hopkins filed a challenge and requested immediate return of her vehicle. The court administrator did not schedule a hearing on the demand because that “judicial determination . . . must not precede adjudication in the criminal prosecution of the designated offense without the consent of the prosecuting authority.” Hopkins neither requested a decision on her demand prior to resolution of her underlying criminal case nor utilized procedures that allow an owner to give security or post bond in exchange for the vehicle. Hopkins voluntarily withdrew her demand. The resolution of her criminal case was delayed by continuances pending the outcome of litigation relating to the breathalyzer. Hopkins pled guilty, then filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging the vehicle forfeiture statute violated the federal and state constitutions by depriving Hopkins of procedural due process and by unreasonably seizing her vehicle. The district court dismissed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Hopkins voluntarily ceased pursuing available state administrative remedies, so she waived her post-deprivation procedural due process claim. View "Hopkins v. City of Bloomington" on Justia Law

Riding home from a bar, Partlow talked about suicide. When they reached his apartment, Partlow jumped out of the running car, ran into his apartment, and locked the door. His aunt (Lisa) called 911. Officer Mann arrived and requested backup, stating that there was a weapon involved and that the subject had said, “You don’t want to see this.” Beedy, Stadler and Craig arrived, heard the door crash open, turned, and saw Partlow carrying a shotgun, with Lisa holding his other arm. They yelled, “Drop the gun.” Partlow seemed surprised by their presence. Lisa fell, freeing Partlow’s arm. Officers testified that Partlow chambered a round and aimed at them. They opened fire, hitting Partlow in the eye, forearm, hands, groin, hip, and shin. Beedy secured Partlow’s shotgun and discovered a live round in the chamber. Partlow was convicted of terrorizing, N.D. Code 12.1-17-04. Lisa testified that Partlow putting the gun down when the officers opened fire. Partlow sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court held that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. The Eighth Circuit reversed. It is possible that the officers were mistaken, but their mistake was objectively reasonable in light of known circumstances. View "Partlow v. Stadler" on Justia Law

The Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS) is a national electronic registry that does not originate, assign, or service mortgages, but charges a fee when members record or transfer a mortgage on the registry. Initially, mortgages are recorded with the county recorder and MERS becomes the mortgagee of record. With subsequent transfers, MERS remains the mortgagee of record in county property records, but tracks the transfers for priority purposes on its registry. Transfers of mortgages are not recorded in the county where the property is located. Counties brought a class action, alleging that Lenders violated Minnesota law by allowing mortgagees to circumvent recordation in the counties. The district court dismissed, finding no duty to record a mortgage assignment under Minnesota law. The Eighth Circuit affirmed that the recording statute is not mandatory and declined to certify the question to the Minnesota Supreme Court. View "Ramsey Cnty. v. MERSCORP Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

Paulino suffered a spinal-cord injury in a work-related accident that left him permanently paraplegic. Employer's workers’ compensation insurer was Chartis. After medical treatment and intensive rehabilitation, Paulino moved to CCS for post-acute rehabilitation. When Paulino was capable of basic self-care, CCS set a discharge date of April 30. Paulino had workers’ compensation income of less than $400 per week and was ineligible for other assistance as an undocumented Mexican national. He required wheelchair-accessible housing, an electric hospital bed, and access to public transportation. His case manager was unable to locate suitable, affordable housing acceptable to Paulino. CCS refused to discharge Paulino to a residence not adequately adapted to Paulino’s needs. Chartis continued to pay medical bills and was prepared to pay for modifications to a permanent home, but notified Paulino that it would not pay his CCS living expenses (rent, utilities, groceries, cable television) after April 30. On May 6, Chartis withdrew those payments. Paulino continued to reside at CCS. A court affirmed the Iowa Workers’ Compensation Commissioner's conclusion (Ia Code 85.27) that special circumstances case made Paulino's continued stay at CCS appropriate and compensable. Paulino sued, alleging bad-faith denial of benefits as of May 6, seeking consequential and punitive damages. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Chartis. View "Paulino v. Chartis Claims, Inc." on Justia Law

Booker led Minneapolis police on a high-speed chase after an attempted traffic stop. When the car stopped, police found a loaded handgun under the brake pedal. Booker had been driving; the car’s owner, Mack, was in the back seat. Crook was the front seat passenger. Crook testified that, during the chase, Booker pulled out a gun, “showed it,” dropped it, tried to retrieve it, and asked for help finding it. Mack testified he never saw Booker with the gun, but Booker “made a reference” to a gun during the chase. Booker testified that Mack said, during the chase, that Mack’s gun was under the seat, causing Booker to panic. Both had felony convictions. The court instructed the jury, without objection, that the government must prove that Booker “knowingly possessed the firearm” and: A person may have actual possession or constructive possession … sole or joint possession. A person who knowingly has direct physical control … is in actual possession. A person who although not in actual possession has both the power and the intention … to exercise … control over a thing, either directly or through another … is then in constructive possession .... “possession” … in these instructions, includes actual [and] constructive possession and … sole [and] joint possession. The jury asked: “Can you have constructive possession without touching the gun?” The court conferred with counsel, then referred the jury to the constructive possession instruction and the knowing possession element of the offense. The Eighth Circuit affirmed Booker’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. 922(g). View "United States v. Booker" on Justia Law

In 2006, the Secretary of the Interior approved amendments to Title 8 of the Omaha Tribal Code, which modified the tribe's Beverage Control Ordinance and allowed the tribal government to impose a 10 percent sales tax on the purchase of alcohol from any licensee on tribal land. The Omaha Tribe attempted to enforce this alcohol tax on establishments in or near Pender engaged in the sale of alcoholic beverages. Those establishments and the village claimed that they were not located within the boundaries of the Reservation and not subject to the tax. The district court denied declaratory and injunctive relief. The Omaha Tribal Court as well and the district court determined that Pender and the areas at issue are located on Omaha tribal land. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that Congress did not intend to "diminish" the boundaries of the Omaha Indian Reservation in Nebraska when it enacted an 1882 Act that ratified an agreement for the sale of Omaha tribal lands to non-Indian settlers. View "Smith v. Parker" on Justia Law

Markert, President of Pinehurst Bank, approved nominee loans to friends and family of bank customer Wintz. The loan proceeds were used to cover Wintz’s $1.9 million overdraft at the Bank. A jury convicted Markert of willful misapplication of bank funds by a bank officer, 18 U.S.C. 656. At sentencing, applying U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(1), the district court found that Markert’s offense caused an actual loss equal to the amount of the loans, resulting in a 16-level enhancement and a guidelines range of 87 to 108 months in prison. The court sentenced Markert to 42 months. The Eighth Circuit remanded for resentencing. After considering arguments, but without an evidentiary hearing, the court reduced its prior finding by $60,000, to reflect repayments prior to detection and re-imposed the same 42-month term. The Eighth Circuit again remanded, holding that the government failed to sustain its burden to prove actual loss. While “the loss here cannot be zero,” the court declined to give the government a third chance to present evidence and ordered that, on remand, actual loss for sentencing purposes is zero, reducing the guidelines range to 12-18 months. Markert has already served more than 18 months; the court directed that he be immediately released. View "United States v. Markert" on Justia Law

Ibson and her family were insured by UHS through a policy available to her to as a member of her law firm. Due to an error, UHS began informing Ibson’s medical providers that Ibson and her family no longer had insurance coverage. Although UHS eventually paid the claims it should have paid all along, Ibson sued, raising state law claims of breach of contract, negligence, and bad faith, and seeking punitive damages. UHS responded that Ibson’s claims were preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and barred by the policy’s three-year contractual limitations period. The district court agreed and entered summary. The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded, agreeing that Ibson’s state law claims are preempted under ERISA, but rejecting entry of summary judgment on the basis of the three-year contractual limitations period. View "Ibson v. United Healthcare Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Banks noticed that computer-generated counterfeit checks were being cashed from the accounts of Kansas businesses that had reported mail theft. The scheme spread to Missouri. Norwood traveled with Eggleston, to recruit homeless men to cash counterfeit checks. They stayed at a hotel with coconspirators who printed the checks. While Eggleston talked to the homeless recruits, Norwood acted as security. The pair would examine each person's identification so that the checks could be printed using that person's name. After they cashed checks totaling $12,321.79, they were arrested. Uncashed checks for $4,163.87 were found in their vehicle. Norwood pleaded guilty to knowingly and intentionally conspiring to commit bank fraud (18 U.S.C. 1349). The district court applied a two-level enhancement for use of sophisticated means. The government offered no additional evidence. Neither party objected to the facts giving rise to the enhancement. The court then applied a two-level enhancement for the unauthorized use of a means of identification to produce or obtain another means of identification. The parties did not dispute the facts, so the government did not produce any evidence; both sides declined oral argument. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that Norwood had only limited knowledge and participation and should not be held responsible for the actions of the entire conspiracy and challenging the sufficiency of the evidence used to establish the predicate facts for both enhancements. View "United States v. Norwood" on Justia Law

Townsend worked as an Arkansas pharmaceutical sales representative for Bayer, selling Mirena, a contraceptive device. Townsend visited physicians, including Dr. Shrum. Townsend learned Shrum was importing from Canada a version of Mirena that was not FDA-approved, at half the cost of the approved version. Shrum had submitted Medicaid claims at the same rate as the approved version and bragged about $50,000 in extra profit. Townsend sought guidance from his superiors. Bayer told Townsend not get involved. Townsend called the Medicaid Fraud Hotline, although he feared losing his job. Shrum was charged with Medicaid fraud. Meanwhile, Bayer changed its method of reimbursing sales expenses. Not understanding the change, Townsend’s wife spent funds intended for those expenses, causing Townsend’s account to be closed temporarily. Although Townsend's account had been reactivated, Bayer fired him, claiming his closed account prevented him doing his job. Townsend sued, citing anti-retaliation provisions of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3730(h).). A jury awarded Townsend back pay, doubled to $642,746, and $568,000 in emotional distress damages. The court denied front pay and ordered Bayer to reinstate Townsend. The Eighth Circuit affirmed on all issues except the emotional distress damage award and remanded to allow Townsend the option of accepting a remittitur of $300,000, or a new trial on emotional distress damages. View "Townsend v. Bayer HealthCare Pharm. Inc." on Justia Law