Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

While an inmate in Federal Correctional Institution - Forrest City, Spencer was assigned a cell for a medical assessment. Correctional Officer t Sheldon entered the cell to assist staff with checking Spencer's restraints. Spencer backed himself into a corner and was verbally abusive. Staff members told Spencer to sit on the bunk, but Spencer was uncooperative and aggressively resisted. While forcibly being placed on the bed, Spencer bit Sheldon's abdomen. Spencer was then placed in "four-point" restraints around 9:10 a.m. and was not removed from those restraints until 3:45 p.m. the following day. After a hearing, the Disciplinary Hearing Officer found that Spencer assaulted Sheldon and disciplined Spencer with losses of privileges. Spencer brought a petition for habeas corpus alleging a Fifth Amendment due process violation for being put in four-point restraints without being afforded a hearing. The district court dismissed without prejudice, finding that conditions-of-confinement claims cannot be raised in the context of habeas petitions. The Eighth Circuit remanded, stating that the court should liberally construe the pro se petition and decide the conditions-of-confinement claims under the principles of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents. View "Spencer v. Haynes" on Justia Law

Garcia and six co-defendants were charged with conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture containing methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a), 846. Garcia pled guilty without a plea agreement. The district court concluded that Garcia was responsible for more than 15 kilograms of a mixture containing methamphetamine, which resulted in a base offense level of 38 under U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(c)(1). Garcia also received a two-level enhancement under 2D1.1(b)(12) 2 for maintaining a premise for the purpose of distributing a controlled substance, and a three-level enhancement under 3B1.1(b) for being a manager or supervisor in criminal activity involving five or more participants. After applying a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, the court calculated Garcia's total offense level at 40 and imposed a within-Guidelines range sentence of 292 months. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court erred by incorrectly calculating his base offense level, relying on inadmissible hearsay in determining that Garcia had maintained a stash house, concluding that he was a manager or supervisor, and refusing to impose a sentence below the Guidelines range. View "United States v. Garcia" on Justia Law

In 2011, Schriener obtained a residential mortgage from Quicken Loans that was secured by a deed of trust. Quicken Loans acquired the deed of trust that the parties used from Wolters Kluwer Financial Services, Inc. for a fee. Quicken Loans assisted Wolters Kluwer in preparing the deed of trust by providing necessary information. The deed of trust, however, was not written or reviewed by an attorney licensed to practice law in Missouri. In connection with Schriener’s residential mortgage, Quicken Loans charged him an “origination charge” of $575.00 and “adjusted origination charges” of $1,705.63. These charges are reflected on the parties’ HUD-1 settlement statement. The HUD-1 did not list a fee for the preparation of the deed of trust. Schriener filed a putative class action, alleging that Quicken Loans improperly engaged in law business under Mo. Rev. Stat. 484.020; violated the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. 407.010; and was unjustly enriched. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, based on Shriener’s concession that Quicken did not charge him for the deed of trust. View "Schriener v. Quicken Loans, Inc." on Justia Law

Reeves, an inmate housed in the isolation unit at Ouachita River Unit in Malvern, provided information to correctional officers about a prison nurse who was bringing contraband into the facility. While Lieutenant King and another officer made security rounds in the unit, Reeves attempted to initiate a conversation with them. King responded by commenting, “Go ahead and snitch to the major like you did to him on the nurse and he’ll get back with you later.” King made this comment in the presence of several inmates, and Reeves suffered emotional distress and fear of retaliation. The next day, Arkansas Department of Corrections transferred Reeves, who then filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that King violated his Eighth Amendment rights by calling him a snitch. King sought summary judgment. The magistrate determined King was not entitled to qualified immunity because Eighth Circuit precedent provides a detention officer violates his duty to protect an inmate by labeling that inmate as a snitch. The district court adopted the recommendations and denied the motion for summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. A reasonable correctional officer in King’s position would have known that labeling Reeves a snitch would violate his constitutional right to protection. View "Reeves v. King" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Kelley on two counts of arson. Before trial, Kelley moved to have his court appointed attorney replaced. The magistrate judge denied Kelley’s motion. On the morning Kelley’s trial was to begin, Kelley moved for substitute counsel or, alternatively, to proceed pro se. The district court denied the motion. At trial, a jury found Kelley guilty on both counts. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of substitute counsel, based on its finding that the public defender was not doing anything other than acting in [Kelley’s] best interests and that Kelley’s specific complaints did not rise to the level of “[j]ustifiable dissatisfaction.” The court remanded for clarification as to Kelley’s request to proceed pro se. The court denied that request without any explicit discussion, perhaps due to the unusual circumstance of a courtroom observer shouting a question during ex parte proceedings, which resulted in a recess. It was not clear whether the district court found Kelley’s request to be unclear and equivocal, in the first instance; found the request untimely or obstructionist; or found Kelley could not produce a valid waiver of his right to counsel. View "United States v. Kelley" on Justia Law

Sellner pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 846. Judgment was entered on March 8, 2013. Her attorney did not file notice of appeal. In July 2013, Sellner filed a pro se motion to vacate her sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, including counsel’s failure to file a notice of appeal as requested. Sellner’s attorney submitted an affidavit, stating that when Sellner asked him about filing an appeal, he told her that he would file an appeal if she insisted, but that Sellner decided to forgo an appeal after counsel explained to Sellner that she had waived her right to appeal. In November 2013, Sellner filed another pro se 2255 motion, alleging a violation under Alleyne v. United States. The district court dismissed the July motion on the merits without an evidentiary hearing and the November motion as barred by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) as “second or successive.” The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded after the government conceded that the case should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the claim of failure to file a notice of appeal. View "United States v. Sellner" on Justia Law

Bonnie, a Trinity Health employee, enrolled her family in a Blue Cross group health plan. Trinity served as plan administrator. Bonnie took FMLA leave and then short-term disability leave, which expired June 8, 2011. Bonnie requested long-term disability benefits from Unum, which provisionally paid medical care claims under a “Reservation of Rights.” In October 2011 Unum denied Bonnie’s request but did not seek repayment. June 8, 2011 was the last day Bonnie qualified for benefits and was considered an employee. Her termination was not processed, so the family received benefits until Trinity deemed them retroactively terminated. The Coles were first alerted to their loss of insurance on June 1, 2012 by husband’s physician. They obtained insurance through husband’s employer, retroactively effective June 1, 2012. Blue Cross did not seek a refund of claims paid between January 1, and April 30, 2012. The Coles claimed violation of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act by failing to notify them of their right to continuing health care coverage. The district court declined to award statutory damages, reasoning that unreimbursed medical bills from May 2012 were less than the COBRA premiums they would have had to pay to maintain insurance. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Cole v. Trinity Health Corp." on Justia Law

Four boys, ages 10 to 12, visited and occasionally stayed at Stong’s apartment. Officers executed a search warrant, seized computers and a camera memory card from Stong’s living room, and found pornographic images and videos of the boys and other children. At trial, parents identified the boys in redacted versions of the child pornography. One parent, who had known Stong for 10 years, identified Stong’s voice from the videos. The parent, who had cleaned Stong’s apartment, and the officer who conducted the search, identified it as the place where two pornographic images were taken. Stong was convicted of sexual exploitation of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), and possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B); (b)(2). The presentence report recommended and the court applied sentencing enhancements because Stong’s offense involved a sexual act or sexual contact (USSG 2G2.1(b)(2)(A)) and because Stong’s offense involved material that portrays sadistic or masochistic conduct or other depictions of violence (USSG 2G2.1(b)(4)), resulting in advisory life imprisonment. Relying on his advanced age and poor health, Stong requested a downward departure. The district court sentenced Stong to 110 years’ imprisonment, the sum of the statutory maximum sentences for his convictions. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Stong" on Justia Law

Goodwin, scheduled to be executed on December 10, 2014 based on his conviction for first-degree murder, sought a certificate of appealability with respect to his Eighth Amendment claim of intellectual disability or, in the alternative, authorization to file a successive habeas application. Goodwin claims that he is intellectually disabled and that,in his case, the Supreme Court of Missouri issued a decision that was contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2014 decision, Hall v. Florida. The Eighth Circuit denied relief, noting state court findings that “Goodwin has eight independent intelligence tests spread over twenty years that indicated that Goodwin is not retarded” and that Goodwin’s single IQ score within the five-point margin of error for the Wechsler scale of sub-average intellectual functioning was “inadequate to raise a triable issue of fact.” Jurists of reason would not find debatable the correctness of the district court’s conclusion that Goodwin’s claim is barred by 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(1); Goodwin conceded that he raised the claim that he is mentally retarded and ineligible for execution in his initial habeas application. View "Goodwin v. Steele" on Justia Law

Williams was an Alexander police officer under chief Walters. There was animosity between them, stemming from Williams’s support of the mayor. Walters stated that he had Williams “in his cross hairs” and relieved Walters of duty. The city reinstated Walters. The city’s bookkeeper later discovered that Williams had cashed two payroll checks covering the same period without realizing that a check he found was the check that he had reported lost and had had replaced. The mayor found that it was unintentional error; the city council agreed. Williams returned the money. Williams borrowed police lights from a county deputy that were the deputy’s personal property and were marked with his name. Williams informed Walters that he had borrowed the lights. At Walters’s instruction, another officer retrieved the lights from Williams and installed them on Walters’s patrol car. A magistrate issued a warrant for Williams’s arrest, based on Walters’s affidavit, based on those incidents. Williams was arrested for theft and spent a day in jail. The prosecutor dismissed the charges. Williams sued Walters and the city under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed claims against the city, but denied summary judgment and qualified immunity for Walters. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Williams v. Walters" on Justia Law