Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The district court found that defendant's refusal to complete a Post-Conviction Risk Assessment (PCRA) violated a condition of his supervised release and sentenced him to seven days imprisonment with no term of supervised release to follow. Defendant appealed a week after he was released, contending that the Government violated his Fifth Amendment rights by forcing him to choose between incriminating himself and violating the conditions of his supervised release. The court dismissed the appeal as moot where the possibility that defendant could face an enhanced sentence for a future crime because of his supervised release violation does not establish a concrete and continuing injury because the court must assume that defendant will conduct his future activities in accordance with the law, and the "capable of repetition" exception does not apply. View "United States v. Stanko" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his 100-month prison sentence for drug offenses for being too long and the Government appealed defendant's sentence for being too short. At issue was the ambiguity of the career offender enhancement under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1(a). The court concluded that the district court correctly applied the career offender enhancement; the "law of the case" doctrine was inapplicable in this case; the "rule of lenity" and policy considerations compelled the court to give defendant the benefit of his reading that the underlying sentence did not count separately from the non-qualifying offense by receiving any points under U.S.S.G. 4A1.1(a), (b), or (c); and based on the analysis and all the facts, including defendant's entire criminal history, the district court did not err in imposing defendant's sentence. The court also concluded that the district court did not procedurally err in imposing an upward departure and variance and defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable where the district court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and took into account defendant's underlying criminal history despite the ambiguity of the career offender provision. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "United States v. Parker" on Justia Law

Richard L. Brown and Susan Brown-Thill, co-trustees of the EDB Trust, signed an Arbitration Agreement for resolving a broad range of disputes. These consolidated appeals concern two awards following an initial arbitration. The March 14 award authorized distributions from family-owned limited partnerships to family trusts. The December 12 award declared invalid Brown's attempt to resign as co-trustee and name his successor, and removed Brown as co-trustee, applying the Uniform Trust Code's standards for the statutory removal of a trustee as adopted in Missouri, the situs of the controversy, and Florida, the situs of the EDB Trust. The district court denied Brown's attempt to vacate both awards and Brown-Thill's request for a contractual award of attorneys' fees in both suits. The court concluded that the March 14 award cannot be vacated on the ground of procedural irregularities and the arbitrator's procedural errors did not violate the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 10(a)(2), (3), and (4). In regards to the December 12 award, the district court did not err in interpreting the EDB Trust Agreement; the arbitrator's interpretation of the Trust Agreement's removal provision is not a ground for vacating the award; the court concluded that Brown-Thill properly submitted the removal issue under the Arbitration Agreement, the arbitrator then had power to construe and apply the Trust Agreement's removal provision and to make findings regarding the statutory standards for removal which Brown-Thill could present in a judicial proceeding, but the arbitrator exceeded his powers by exercising the exclusively judicial function of removing Brown on statutory standards; however, this decision is of no practical importance because of Brown's unconditional resignation as co-trustee; and the court rejected Brown's FAA challenge. Finally, the court concluded that Brown-Thill was not entitled to recover attorneys' fees. Accordingly, the court affirmed except with a modification and denied Brown's motion to take judicial notice.View "Brown v. Brown-Thill" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence after being convicted of ten counts of wire fraud and one count of mail fraud for obtaining from his disabled cousin some $300,000 through a fraudulent scheme. The court concluded that the district court did not commit procedural error by applying a 12 level enhancement for the total loss amount; the district court did not commit procedural error by applying a 2 level vulnerable victim penalty; defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable; and the district court did not clearly err in imposing a $25,000 fine. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "United States v. Callaway" on Justia Law

Debtor, a managing member of Twister's Iron Horse Saloon, appealed the bankruptcy court's order determining that a debt arising from a civil judgment in favor of appellees for copyright infringement was excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(6). Some of the music played or performed at Twister's was in the repertoire of the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP). Appellees granted ASCAP a nonexclusive right to license public performance rights of their works. Twister's did not hold a public performance license. In this case, the court agreed with the bankruptcy court that debtor had willfully failed to obtain an ASCAP license and maliciously disregarded the rights of ASCAP's members and Federal copyright law. Therefore, the debt was excepted from discharge and the court affirmed the judgment.View "Sailor Music, et al. v. Walker" on Justia Law

Asarco filed suit against UP alleging breach of contract and seeking contribution regarding a dispute about environmental liability for a lead refinery and smelter which polluted Omaha, Nebraska. The district court granted UP's motion to dismiss, ruling that UP did not breach the agreement and consent decree that protected UP from Asarco's claims. Despite receiving notice of UP's settlement, Asarco did not object before the district court issued the consent decree. Asarco waited until after entry of the consent decree and brought this collateral case. The court concluded that the district court correctly recognized that all of Asarco's claims were prohibited contribution claims even though some were disguised as breach of contract claims. In light of the consent decree, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601-9675, protected UP against any contribution claim related to the site. Further, the district court correctly concluded that UP neither waived CERCLA's contribution protection nor breached the tolling agreement by invoking that protection. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "ASARCO v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, appealed the district court's denial of his motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255(b). Petitioner alleged that his attorney failed to file a requested notice of appeal. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion by making a factual determination based on the relative credibility of counsel and petitioner without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on whether petitioner requested that counsel file an appeal.View "Franco v. United States" on Justia Law

Syngenta, producer of a genetically-modified corn seed, filed suit against Bunge, an agricultural produce storage and transport company, alleging breach of an obligation under the United States Warehouse Act (USWA), 7 U.S.C. 241-256; breach of a duty to third party beneficiaries of a licensing agreement between Bunge and the federal government; and false advertising in violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125. The court concluded that the text of the USWA and the structure of the Act do not implicitly authorize a private cause of action for violations of a warehouse operator's fair treatment obligations; Syngenta is not a third-party beneficiary of the License Agreement and the district court did not err in dismissing this claim on the pleadings; and the court found it was necessary to remand the Lanham Act claim, in light of Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., for the district court to determine in the first instance whether Syngenta has standing to bring the claim under the zone-of-interests test and proximate causality requirements. Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the USWA and third-party beneficiary claims, and vacated the grant of summary judgment to Bunge on the Lanham Act claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Bunge North America, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the County and others under 42 U.S.C. 1983, after he was investigated and prosecuted for rape and murder. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the district court erred in granting defendants summary judgment. The court concluded that officers did not violate plaintiff's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination where plaintiff failed to introduce sufficient evidence to raise a question of material fact as to whether the officers' conduct overbore plaintiff's will; the district court did not err by granting defendants summary judgment on plaintiff's Sixth Amendment claim where plaintiff failed to allege a violation of the right to counsel as no statements made by him without counsel present were introduced at trial; and the district court did not err by granting summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim where Detective Bartlett's second probable cause statement would still have established probable cause if the omitted facts at issue had been included. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Dowell v. Lincoln County, Missouri, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, parents of minor children who reside in the District, filed suit challenging a resolution to exempt the District from the Public School Choice Act of 2013, Ark. Code Ann. 6-18-1901 et seq. Plaintiffs alleged that the District violated their constitutional rights when it resolved, for the 2013-2014 school year, to opt-out of the Act. The district court denied a preliminary injunction and plaintiffs appealed. The court held that the appeal was moot where the time period in which the requested relief would have been effective has expired and the controversy was not capable of repetition, yet evading review. View "Adkisson, et al. v. Blytheville Sch. Dist. #5" on Justia Law