Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A certified nurse midwife in Nebraska sought to provide home birth services but was prevented from doing so by state law. The Nebraska Certified Nurse Midwifery Practice Act requires midwives to work under a supervising physician through a practice agreement and prohibits them from attending home births outside authorized medical facilities. The midwife alleged that these restrictions forced her to turn away women seeking home births and sued state officials, claiming the law violated her constitutional rights and the rights of her prospective patients.The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska dismissed the midwife’s claims. The court found that she failed to state a claim for violation of her own rights under the Due Process Clause and lacked standing to assert claims on behalf of her prospective patients. The district court concluded that the statutory requirements were rationally related to legitimate state interests in health and safety and that the midwife did not have a sufficiently close relationship with prospective patients nor could she show that those patients were hindered from bringing their own suits.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that the Nebraska law regulating midwifery is subject to rational basis review and that the legislature could rationally believe the restrictions serve legitimate interests in public health and safety. The court also held that the midwife lacked third-party standing to assert the rights of prospective patients because she did not have a close relationship with them and they were not hindered from bringing their own claims. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding the dismissal of all claims. View "Swanson v. Hilgers" on Justia Law

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) initiated a civil enforcement action against several individuals, alleging they orchestrated profitable “pump-and-dump” schemes to artificially inflate stock prices and then sell shares at a profit, harming investors. The SEC ultimately obtained final judgments and recovered over $11 million in sanctions. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC is required to pay whistleblower awards to individuals who voluntarily provide original information leading to successful enforcement actions. After posting a Notice of Covered Action, five claimants submitted applications for whistleblower awards related to this enforcement action.The SEC’s Claims Review Staff awarded 30 percent of the monetary sanctions to Daniel Fisher, a former executive at a company central to the investigation, finding that Fisher provided new, helpful information that substantially advanced the investigation. The staff denied the other applications, including those from Lee Michael Pederson, John Amster, and Robert Heath, concluding that their information was either duplicative, based on publicly available sources, or not used by enforcement staff. Pederson and Fisher were found not to have acted jointly as whistleblowers, and Amster and Heath’s information was not relied upon in the investigation. The SEC affirmed these determinations in its final order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the SEC’s final order, applying a deferential standard to the agency’s factual findings and reviewing legal conclusions de novo. The court held that substantial evidence supported the SEC’s determinations: Pederson and Fisher did not act jointly, Pederson’s individual tips were not original or helpful, and Amster and Heath’s information did not lead to the enforcement action. The court also rejected Pederson’s due process and procedural arguments and denied his motion to compel. The petitions for review were denied, and the SEC’s order was affirmed. View "Pederson v. U.S. Securities Exch. Comm." on Justia Law

Marcus D. Evans, an inmate at the Varner Supermax Unit in Arkansas, was placed in full restraints to attend a prison program. After returning to his cell, officers removed his hand restraints but refused to remove his leg restraints, despite his repeated requests. Evans remained in leg restraints for approximately 15 hours, during which he experienced pain, had difficulty sleeping, and was forced to cut off his clothing to shower. Medical records indicated he reported significant pain but showed no serious physical injury. Evans alleged that the officers’ refusal to remove the restraints was intentional and stemmed from prior altercations and threats.Evans filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, asserting an excessive force claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the officers. The officers moved for summary judgment, arguing qualified immunity. A magistrate judge recommended granting summary judgment, finding that while a jury could find a constitutional violation, the right was not clearly established. The district court declined to adopt this recommendation, holding that existing precedent clearly established that prolonged restraints without penological justification could constitute excessive force, and denied qualified immunity.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the denial of qualified immunity de novo. The court held that the officers’ refusal to remove the leg restraints constituted a use of force, and that Evans’s pain and discomfort, even absent serious injury, were sufficient to support an excessive force claim. The court further found that existing case law clearly established that subjecting an inmate to prolonged restraints without penological justification could violate the Eighth Amendment. Therefore, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to the officers. View "Evans v. Smith" on Justia Law

A waste hauling company operating in Kansas City brought suit against a mobile waste compaction business and its franchisor. The waste hauler owns containers that are leased to customers, who sometimes contract separately with the compaction company to compress waste inside those containers. The hauler alleged that the compaction company’s activities damaged its containers and interfered with its business relationships. The hauler sought various forms of relief, including damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and nominal damages, but ultimately disavowed any claim for actual monetary damages, citing a lack of evidence to support such damages.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri denied the hauler’s request for a temporary restraining order, finding no irreparable harm. During discovery, the hauler admitted it could not identify or quantify any actual damages and stipulated it was not seeking damages outside Kansas City. The district court granted the compaction company’s motion to strike the hauler’s jury demand, holding that the hauler had not presented evidence of compensatory damages, that nominal damages were unavailable under Missouri law for the claims asserted, and that the remaining claims were equitable in nature. After a bench trial, the district court entered judgment for the compaction company and its franchisor, finding the hauler failed to prove essential elements of its claims, including actual damages and direct benefit conferred for unjust enrichment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the hauler was not entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment because it failed to present evidence of compensatory damages and nominal damages were not available for its claims under Missouri law. The court also affirmed judgment for the compaction company on the trespass to chattels and unjust enrichment claims, finding the hauler failed to prove dispossession, damages, or a direct benefit conferred. View "Allied Services v. Smash My Trash, LLC" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with multiple counts after sexually abusing a female relative over a period of years, beginning when she was eight years old and continuing until she turned eighteen. He produced nude photographs and videos of the victim, including recordings of sexual assaults. Following his arrest, he was indicted on eight counts. He entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to two counts of sexual exploitation of a child in exchange for the government’s dismissal of the remaining counts and a recommendation of a 25-year sentence. The agreement also allowed the defendant to recommend a 20-year sentence.The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota accepted the plea but ultimately sentenced the defendant to 45 years’ imprisonment, which was within the applicable Guidelines range of 30 to 60 years. At sentencing, the government advocated for a 25-year sentence, using language such as “restrict its recommendation to 25 years” and “ask the court to impose no less than 25 years.” The defendant did not object to the government’s phrasing at the time. The district court considered the relevant statutory factors, including the nature and seriousness of the offense, the need for just punishment, and the protection of the community, before imposing the sentence.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed whether the government breached the plea agreement and whether the sentence was substantively unreasonable. Applying plain error review, the court held that the government’s statements did not breach the plea agreement, as they were consistent with its obligation to recommend a 25-year sentence. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a 45-year sentence, as it properly considered all relevant factors. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

A police sergeant in Dermott, Arkansas, was terminated from his position after being charged with tampering with physical evidence and abuse of office. The charges stemmed from an incident in which the sergeant received a bag of quarters, believed to be stolen, from another officer following a robbery investigation. The sergeant’s documentation of the evidence was inconsistent, and the quarters were not turned in to the department. During a subsequent investigation, the sergeant admitted he may have used the quarters for personal purposes. Although the charges were later dismissed, the sergeant maintained that his termination was solely due to the criminal charges. He also previously reported another officer’s excessive use of force, which he claimed was a motivating factor in his firing.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granted summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings in favor of the defendants, including the police chief, the officer involved, and the city. The court found that the sergeant failed to establish a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether his termination was motivated by his protected speech, as the firing occurred long after his report and the criminal charges provided an obvious alternative explanation. The court also determined that the sergeant was not seized under the Fourth Amendment, negating his malicious prosecution claim, and that he lacked a property interest in his employment under Arkansas law, defeating his due process claims. The court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims and found them lacking on the merits, including claims under the Arkansas Whistle-Blower Act, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and defamation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the sergeant failed to present sufficient evidence to support his federal constitutional claims or his state law claims, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in retaining and resolving the state law claims. View "Brown v. City of Dermott Arkansas" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a former police officer in Dermott, Arkansas, alleged that he was forced to resign in retaliation for reporting a fellow officer’s excessive use of force. The incident in question involved the other officer grabbing an arrestee by the neck while the arrestee was restrained. Subsequently, the officer accused the plaintiff of taking money from a parolee, which the parolee confirmed in a statement. The police chief referred the matter to a prosecutor, who initiated a state police investigation. During this period, the plaintiff’s employment status became unclear, with conflicting statements about whether he was fired or resigned. The plaintiff ultimately resigned after a job offer from another police department was rescinded due to the ongoing investigation. He was later charged with abuse of office and witness bribery, but the charges were dismissed when the parolee could not be located.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims. The court found that the plaintiff had voluntarily resigned and had not suffered an adverse employment action, which was necessary for his First Amendment retaliation claim. The court also determined that the plaintiff was not “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment for his malicious prosecution claim, as a summons to appear in court did not constitute a seizure. The court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims and found that they failed on the merits, including claims under the Arkansas Whistle Blower Act, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and defamation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiff’s voluntary resignation did not amount to an adverse employment action, and that he was not seized under the Fourth Amendment. The court also agreed that the state law claims failed as a matter of law. View "Brown v. City of Dermott Arkansas" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant began communicating online with an individual he believed to be a thirteen-year-old girl named Stella, who was actually an undercover police officer. Their conversations quickly became sexual, and they arranged to meet in person, at which point the defendant was arrested. After his arrest and release on pretrial supervision, the defendant deleted messages and blocked accounts of other purported minors, who were also undercover officers. Additionally, the defendant had been communicating with a real fourteen-year-old girl, Y.F., from whom he received sexually explicit images and with whom he had a prior acquaintance.The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota presided over the trial. The government introduced evidence of the defendant’s communications with other undercover accounts as Rule 404(b) evidence. The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts, including attempted sexual exploitation and enticement of a minor, and receipt of child pornography. The district court sentenced him to life imprisonment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed several issues. The court held that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the defendant knew Y.F. was a minor, based on his prior relationship with her and other circumstantial evidence. The court also found that, even if the admission of the Rule 404(b) evidence was erroneous, any error was harmless given the strength of the government’s case. However, the Eighth Circuit determined that the district court may have improperly considered the trauma to the victim caused by the defendant exercising his right to trial when imposing the life sentence. As a result, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the convictions but remanded the case for resentencing. View "United States v. Barrios" on Justia Law

Dean Naylor served as the jail administrator for the Muscatine County Sheriff’s Office from 2010 until his termination in May 2020. His firing followed public controversy over religious commentary he posted online, including a document and YouTube videos expressing post-tribulation Rapture beliefs and making inflammatory statements about Muslims and the gay community. After a local newspaper article highlighted these views, public officials and community members raised concerns about the treatment of detainees at the jail, and representatives from Johnson County and the United States Marshals Service questioned whether they would continue housing overflow inmates at the facility.Naylor sued Muscatine County in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, alleging his termination violated Title VII by discriminating against him based on his religion. The district court granted summary judgment to Muscatine County, finding that retaining Naylor would impose an undue hardship on the County, specifically citing potential harm to the jail’s public image and the risk to business relationships with outside entities that contract for overflow detainee housing.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment ruling de novo. The appellate court held that Muscatine County had not provided sufficient evidence to establish, as a matter of law, that retaining Naylor would cause an undue hardship under Title VII. The court found that the evidence of reputational harm and threatened business relationships was speculative and did not eliminate genuine disputes of material fact. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Naylor v. County of Muscatine" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who was charged with multiple counts of sexual abuse and abusive sexual contact involving two minor victims, Sarah and Jane, who were the daughters of his then-girlfriend. The alleged conduct occurred while the defendant lived with the family on the Yankton Sioux Reservation. The incidents included sexual acts with Sarah, beginning when she was 14, and inappropriate sexual contact and conversations with Jane when she was 14. The allegations came to light after one of the girls disclosed the conduct to her aunt, which led to a family meeting and subsequent involvement of tribal child protection services and the FBI. All three children were interviewed, and the defendant denied the allegations, suggesting they were fabricated due to family tensions.The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota conducted a jury trial in April 2024. The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts. The district court imposed concurrent sentences for the counts involving Sarah and a consecutive sentence for the count involving Jane, totaling 135 months of imprisonment and five years of supervised release. During trial, the court admitted certain out-of-court statements made by the victims and their family members, over the defendant’s objections, and provided limiting instructions to the jury regarding the purpose of these statements.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed whether the district court erred in admitting hearsay testimony from the victims’ aunt and grandmother, and whether any such error was harmless. The Eighth Circuit held that while the district court clearly abused its discretion by allowing testimony that went beyond the limited nonhearsay purpose and improperly bolstered the victims’ credibility, the error was harmless. The court found the improper testimony was cumulative of the victims’ in-court testimony and did not substantially influence the verdict. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Mousseaux" on Justia Law