Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Cortez Ingram pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine base. Both parties recommended an 87-month sentence, but the district court for the Eastern District of Missouri imposed a 123-month sentence and three years of supervised release. Ingram appealed, arguing that the court was bound by the plea agreement to sentence him to 87 months and that the court erred in departing upward to impose an above-guidelines sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that the district court was not bound by the plea agreement under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(A). The plea agreement was nonbinding on the court and was not converted to a binding agreement under Rule 11(c)(1)(C). Therefore, the court did not err in declining to accept the parties' sentencing recommendation.Ingram also argued that the district court erred in departing upward to impose an above-guidelines sentence. The court of appeals found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in departing upward under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.21 based on Ingram's possession of cocaine and a loaded firearm during his arrest in 2022 (the uncharged conduct). The district court was not prohibited from considering this conduct in sentencing Ingram.Finally, Ingram believed he should have had access to the probation officer's sealed sentencing recommendation. The court of appeals found that under local rules and administrative order in the Eastern District of Missouri, the probation officer's sentencing recommendation was not to be disclosed. Therefore, the court did not err in failing to disclose the sentencing recommendation to Ingram.The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Ingram" on Justia Law

The United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded a decision from the bankruptcy court in a case involving unpaid child support. The debtor, Justin Gary LaMonda, petitioned for bankruptcy relief under Chapter 7. He was married to Natalia LaMonda, and after they divorced, he was ordered to pay child support. The case has been converted multiple times, from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13, and then back to Chapter 7 again. Natalia LaMonda filed an unsecured priority claim for unpaid child support, which the Chapter 7 Trustee objected to. The bankruptcy court sustained the Trustee's objection, leading to this appeal.The Appellate Panel found that Natalia LaMonda's claim for unpaid child support arose after the order for relief and before the case was converted under section 1307 of the Bankruptcy Code. According to the Panel, her claim should therefore be treated as if it arose before the petition date, making it eligible for treatment as a priority unsecured claim. Thus, the Panel held that the bankruptcy court erred by disallowing Natalia LaMonda's claim based on the Trustee's objection. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "LaMonda v. Harder" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to increase the monthly restitution payment of Ronald Totaro, who was convicted in 2001 of sixty-one counts of various crimes including mail fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, and racketeering. The court ruled that the increase from $200 to $1,000 was justified by Totaro's financial circumstances, his willful failure to comply with the initial restitution order, and the fact that he still owed nearly $2 million to his victims. Totaro had argued that the increase was too substantial and that his early release and receipt of Social Security payments did not constitute a "material change" in his financial situation. The Court of Appeals disagreed, citing the substantial assets shared by Totaro and his wife, which included their home, a $45,000 vehicle, and over $80,000 in savings. The court also noted Totaro's pattern of trying to evade his obligations and consequences for his behavior. View "United States v. Totaro" on Justia Law

Ronald Ragan, Jr. brought a suit against Berkshire Hathaway Automotive, Inc. (BHA) alleging that the company had copied his car dealership customer intake form ("Guest Sheet") without his permission, constituting copyright infringement. The case was brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Ragan held a certificate of registration for the Guest Sheet issued by the United States Copyright Office and asserted that BHA continued to use the form after acquiring a company that had previously copied and used the Guest Sheet. BHA argued that the Guest Sheet was not copyrightable. The district court agreed with BHA and ruled in its favor. On appeal, Ragan argued that the district court erred in finding the Guest Sheet uncopyrightable. The appeals court, however, upheld the district court's decision, ruling that the Guest Sheet lacked the requisite originality to be protected under copyright law. The court found that the Guest Sheet, which contained basic questions and prompts, did not exhibit sufficient creativity, and was designed to record, not convey, information. The court also dismissed Ragan's claim that the district court ignored the statutory presumption of copyright validity granted to the Guest Sheet by the certificate of registration, stating that the copyrightability of the Guest Sheet could be determined by an examination of the Guest Sheet alone. View "Ragan v. Berkshire Hathaway Auto, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision to deny Peter David Davis's appeal to reopen his case. Davis, a Liberian citizen, was admitted as an asylee to the United States in 2008. However, following multiple criminal convictions, his asylum status was terminated and removal proceedings were initiated. Davis conceded his removability but requested a waiver of inadmissibility for humanitarian purposes, which was denied. His appeal to the BIA was also unsuccessful.On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Davis argued that the BIA erred by not providing a reasoned explanation for its application of the motion-to-reopen standard. The Court of Appeals agreed, stating that the BIA's single sentence explanation did not meet the requirements for reasoned decision-making, as it did not explain how the elements of a motion to reopen applied to Davis's case. The Court held that the BIA's decision was an abuse of discretion as it was without rational explanation and failed to consider all factors presented by Davis. Consequently, the Court granted Davis's petition for review and remanded the case back to the BIA for further proceedings. However, the Court did not address Davis's other arguments regarding due process and competency as they were related to the request to submit new evidence, which would be considered upon remand. View "Davis v. Garland" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Raymond Lee March appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from his home during a police search. March had pleaded guilty to unlawfully possessing a firearm as a prohibited person, but retained his right to appeal the suppression issue. The police had executed a search warrant at March's home based on information that March's nephew, Edwin Goodwin, was storing firearms at March's home. During the search, the police seized two firearms and some marijuana.March argued that the evidence was insufficient to establish probable cause for the search warrant, which was based on the discovery of two marijuana stems in his trash and the information about Goodwin's firearms. The district court had ruled that the search warrant was supported by probable cause, and alternatively, even if probable cause was lacking, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied.The Court of Appeals did not address the existence of probable cause, but agreed with the district court that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule was sufficient to resolve the appeal. The court held that even if the affidavit for the warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause, the evidence should not be suppressed because the officer had obtained the search warrant from a judge in good faith and had reasonably relied on the judge's determination of probable cause. The court found that the information in the affidavit justified reasonable reliance on the judge's determination of probable cause. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment and denied March's motion to suppress the evidence. View "United States v. March" on Justia Law

The defendant, Henry Watkins Jr., was stopped while driving by a police officer due to a mismatched license plate. Upon approaching the vehicle, the officer smelled marijuana and eventually found cocaine, ecstasy, and a loaded 9-millimeter handgun in the vehicle. Watkins was the sole occupant at the time. He was subsequently indicted and convicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Watkins appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that there were errors in his sentencing. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found sufficient evidence for the conviction, as Watkins was the only person in the vehicle and made movements consistent with hiding the gun. Therefore, the court affirmed Watkins's conviction. However, the court found procedural errors in Watkins's sentencing, as the district court presumed the Guidelines range to be reasonable and adopted a sentence without considering the factors in § 3553(a). The court vacated Watkins's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing consistent with its opinion. View "United States v. Watkins" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Curtis Stewart, an inmate in the Missouri correctional system, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against various Missouri Department of Corrections (MDOC) officials, including MDOC Director Anne Precythe. Stewart alleged that he was subjected to excessive force and cruel and unusual punishment due to a policy of handcuffing and shackling prisoners to a steel bench for hours. Precythe filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, asserting that she was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied Precythe’s motion with respect to qualified immunity.The appeal court reversed the district court's decision. It held that Stewart failed to plausibly allege that Precythe authorized a policy that permitted jailers to use excessive force where it was unnecessary or unprovoked. The court also found that the complaint did not plausibly allege that Precythe acquiesced in any such practice of unprovoked or unwarranted excessive force because it failed to allege a pattern of such conduct.The court further noted that Stewart’s allegations against Precythe regarding the restraint policy did not violate the Eighth Amendment. The court held that the allegations represented the kind of punishment necessary “to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.” There were no allegations that Precythe’s conduct in adopting and promulgating the policy was “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Therefore, the court concluded that Precythe was entitled to qualified immunity. The court reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity to Precythe and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Stewart v. Precythe" on Justia Law

In this appeal before the United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit, the defendant, Linda Riaski, who was convicted of one count of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, appealed the denial of her request for a hearing under Franks v. Delaware. The case involves a search warrant that was issued based on an affidavit prepared by Deputy Sheriff Jerry Brisky, who relied on information provided by a confidential informant (CI). The CI claimed to have observed Riaski packaging methamphetamine for distribution and to have seen Riaski with a black 9 millimeter handgun. The search of Riaski's residence resulted in the discovery of methamphetamine and firearms.Riaski's appeal was based on the argument that the district court erred in denying her request for a Franks hearing to challenge the validity of the search warrant. She claimed that the affidavit supporting the search warrant was misleading because it omitted information about the CI’s credibility, her criminal history, her drug use, the financial arrangement between her and Deputy Brisky, and certain facts alleged in Riaski’s own affidavit.The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Riaski failed to make a substantial preliminary showing that Deputy Brisky intentionally or recklessly omitted facts with the intent to mislead the issuing judge, and that the affidavit, even if supplemented by the omitted information, could still support a finding of probable cause. The court reasoned that the omitted information about the CI's criminal history and drug use would not have altered the probable cause determination, as the affidavit had already provided a basis for the CI’s reliability, disclosing that she previously had provided accurate information and had made controlled purchases under Brisky’s supervision. The court also found that the omission of the details and existence of the agreement between Brisky and the CI did not render the affidavit misleading. The judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Riaski" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a lower court's ruling in a case involving Sarah Felts, who had been blocked on Twitter by Lewis E. Reed, the then-President of the St. Louis Board of Aldermen. Felts sued Reed in his official capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated. The district court ruled in favor of Felts, granting her declaratory relief, nominal damages, costs, and attorney’s fees. On appeal, the Board’s new President, Megan E. Green, challenged the district court's ruling.The court held that the act of blocking Felts on Twitter constituted a final municipal policy decision in the area of the City’s business associated with the office of the President of the Board of Aldermen. It also held that Reed administered the account under color of law as an official government account, and that blocking Felts violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court further concluded that Reed, as the President of the Board of Aldermen, had the authority to establish the final social media policy for his office and that his decision to block Felts was a deliberate choice of a guiding principle and procedure to silence online critics. Therefore, the City of St. Louis was held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court affirmed the district court's judgment granting Felts declaratory relief and nominal damages. View "Felts v. Green" on Justia Law