Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Eighth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction for numerous drug offenses. The court held that the evidence against him was overwhelming, and he does not claim a reasonable probability that, but for the introduction of the challenged evidence, he would not have been found guilty.Defendant operated a website on which he once advertised 4- Fluoroamphetamine, a drug similar to the prescription medicine Adderall. Broussard received numerous orders for the Adderall analogue. But instead of shipping his customers the drug they ordered, he sent them fentanyl, a potent narcotic. As a result, eleven people died, and several others were seriously injured. Police investigated, and a grand jury indicted Defendant on numerous drug offenses. Broussard, representing himself, filed several motions in limine. One of his motions sought exclusion of all evidence “presented to invoke sentiment by expressing how the deaths or injuries of the alleged victims influenced personal experiences.” The jury found Defendant guilty on all counts, and the district court sentenced Broussard to life in prison. He appealed, arguing that the district court erred in allowing the Government to introduce evidence about the victims’ lives.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the challenged evidence was arguably relevant to show that the victims were unlikely to have knowingly sought fentanyl or to have obtained it from some other source. It was also relevant to show that the victims were in good health, making it less likely that they died from some cause other than a fentanyl overdose. And taking into account the evidence’s arguable relevance, its introduction was not obviously unfairly prejudicial. Further, the court wrote that the evidence against him was overwhelming, and he does not claim a reasonable probability that, but for the introduction of the challenged evidence, he would not have been found guilty. View "United States v. Aaron Broussard" on Justia Law

At Northwest Missouri State University, they must notify an administrator before distributing “non-University publications.” Plaintiff Richard Hershey earns money promoting a vegan lifestyle on college campuses. In September 2015, he visited Northwest Missouri State with a stack of written materials. A student called campus police to report a “suspicious male” who was “attempting to pass something out to . . . students.” About a year later, Northwest Missouri State updated its policy. Nearly five years after he visited, Hershey sued multiple Northwest Missouri State officials under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 to declare the old and new policies unconstitutionally overbroad and to enjoin their enforcement. The district court, for its part, treated the two policies as materially indistinguishable from one another. The main problem, at least in the district court’s eyes, was that neither required “a decision on the proposed speech within a reasonable period of time,” which could have the effect of silencing speakers indefinitely. So it awarded Hershey most of the relief he requested.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded the entry of judgment in Defendants’ favor. The court explained that the procedural safeguards that must accompany prior restraints do not apply to content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions. No matter the First Amendment theory, Hershey has not shown that the advance-notice requirement has “a substantial number” of unconstitutional applications. It is neither content-based nor an impermissible prior restraint on speech, meaning it can remain in place. View "Richard Hershey v. Dr. John Jasinski" on Justia Law

Defendant le 120c(b) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), codified at 10 U.S.C. Section 920c(b) (2012). He later failed to register as a sex offender in Iowa and pleaded guilty to violating the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). On appeal, Defendant argued the “categorical approach” applies to his SORNA tier analysis.   The Eighth Circuit reversed. The court explained that it held pursuant to the categorical approach, that his prior statute of conviction is “overbroad” in relation to SORNA’s Tier III listed comparator offenses. The court held for the first time, in line with a consensus of authority from other circuits, that the categorical approach applies to SORNA’s tier analysis. Further, the court agreed with Defendant that the application of the categorical approach resulted in his classification as a Tier I offender. The court explained that turning to the application of the categorical approach, the present case leaves no room for the United States’ suggested and generalized broadening of the analysis based on SORNA’s use of the term “comparable.”   Here, the offense of conviction is unambiguously broader in scope than the SORNA comparators. The offense of “forcible pandering” employs the defined term “prostitution,” which may be found based on “sexual contact.” “Sexual contact” includes over-the-clothes touching. Such contact falls outside the scope of SORNA’s Tier III comparator offenses as found in 18 U.S.C. Sections 2241 and 2242, both of which require a “sexual act” as defined in 18 U.S.C. Section 2246 and which does not include over-the-clothes touching. View "United States v. Michael Coulson" on Justia Law

Defendant conditionally pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sections 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). The district court sentenced Defendant to a 132-month term of imprisonment and 5 years of supervised release. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress. Defendant argued that because he was arrested without probable cause when officers placed him in handcuffs during an investigative stop, the evidence seized from his backpack must be suppressed as the fruit of his unlawful arrest.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here the officers had a legitimate concern that Defendant might try to run from the scene. When Detective Love asked for permission to search his suitcase, Defendant was calm and cooperative, giving the impression that it was “not a big deal.” However, as an additional officer started asking him questions, he showed physical signs of nervousness. Defendant already knew that the K-9 had alerted to his suitcase. Then, as Love was searching the suitcase, Defendant asked to go brush his teeth, which would have allowed him to leave the scene with his backpack, out of the officers’ sight. Given the change in Defendant’s demeanor over a short period of time, the perceived attempt to discard contraband outside the presence of the officers, and the other factors that aligned at least in part with drug-trafficking behavior, the officers had a legitimate concern that Defendant might try to flee. View "United States v. Daniel Bonilla" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute and to unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence found during a police search of a vehicle after concluding Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the reportedly stolen vehicle. Defendant appealed, arguing the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed under the alternative rationale that the search was reasonable under the automobile exception. The court explained that a reasonable officer would believe there was a fair probability that evidence of a crime would be found in the vehicle at the time of the search. The court further wrote that because the vehicle was reported stolen, officers could search it for evidence of it being stolen. Additionally, the court noted that officers may consider the known criminal history of a suspect in conducting the probable cause analysis. Therefore, the officers had probable cause to search the vehicle and the district court was ultimately justified in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. The court wrote that It follows that it would not exclude the evidence obtained from the storage unit because the warrant to search the unit was based on probable cause from the evidence obtained during the valid search of the car. View "United States v. Bryce Vittetoe" on Justia Law

The Arkansas NAACP and the Arkansas Public Policy Panel, two advocacy groups with members living throughout the state, oppose the new map. They sued nearly everyone who had anything to do with it under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. After reviewing the text, history, and structure of the Voting Rights Act, the district court concluded that private parties cannot enforce Section 2. The enforcement power belonged solely to the Attorney General of the United States, who was given five days to join the lawsuit. When he declined, the case was dismissed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that Congress did not give private plaintiffs the ability to sue under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The court explained that in substance, the advocacy groups asked the court to excuse the absence of text because legislative history answers the question. The court explained that at one point, this approach may have held sway. But here, the legislative history does not complete the statutory story. Rather, it tells a different story, one not reflected in the text of anything Congress passed. To the extent that legislative history can be helpful in any case, this one is not it. View "AR State Conference NAACP v. AR Board of Apportionment" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was filming a protest when Officer Olsten pepper sprayed the crowd. She sued Officer Olsten, Commissioner Hayden, and the City of St. Louis for violating her First Amendment rights, among other things. The district court granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claims. On appeal, Plaintiff challenged the district court’s grant of summary judgment on her First Amendment claim against Officer Olsten and her municipal liability claim against the City. She also argued that her state law causes of action should be “reinstated.”   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that there is no evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that De Mian’s actions motivated Officer Olsten to spray in her direction. So the lack of a causal connection is “so free from doubt as to justify taking this question from the jury.” Plaintiff argued that she is a well-known reporter and is readily identifiable because she is in a wheelchair. But this fact, without more, is insufficient for a jury to infer that Officer Olsten knew or recognized her. She also speculates that Officer Olsten may have been retaliating against her for filming. But “there is no evidence Officer Olsten observed her filming or deployed pepper spray in retaliation for her doing so.” View "Heather De Mian v. City of St. Louis, Missouri" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a retail customer, brought a putative class action under the Class Action Fairness Act against clothing retailers The Gap, Inc. and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Old Navy, LLC (“Defendants”). Plaintiff alleged that she purchased numerous products at Old Navy stores and online at discount prices that were deceptively advertised because Defendants did not sell a substantial quantity of these products at the advertised “regular” prices prior to selling them at the advertised “sale” prices. She sought class-wide compensatory damages under the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (“MMPA”). The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint with prejudice, Plaintiff appealed, arguing that she plausibly pleaded ascertainable loss under Missouri’s benefit-of-the-bargain rule.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court agreed with the district court’s decision to “join a growing number of courts in finding that complaints based solely on a plaintiff’s disappointment over not receiving an advertised discount at the time of purchase have not suffered an ascertainable loss.” Further, the court wrote that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint also alleged that the actual fair market value of some of the products she purchased “may have even been less than the discounted prices that she paid.” This theory of ascertainable loss does not depend on Defendants’ comparison pricing for the value represented component of the benefit-of-the-bargain rule. Plausible allegations of such immediate injury would satisfy an MMPA plaintiff’s burden to show an ascertainable loss. However, these allegations are based solely on information and belief, which are generally insufficient under Rule 9(b). View "Jill Hennessey v. The Gap, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner is a citizen of Guatemala. He says that from elementary school through adulthood, his classmates and coworkers touched his “private parts” and subjected him to homophobic slurs because he is bisexual. He left university because of verbal abuse, and he quit his job at a restaurant after his coworkers harassed him. But he testified that he never suffered a physical injury, and he never reported the harassment to the police or to authorities at his school or workplace. After his friend was murdered, Petitioner left for the United States. He was detained at the U.S. border after he entered without inspection. He applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protections under the Convention Against Torture. An immigration judge (IJ) denied his application, and he appealed to the BIA. The BIA dismissed his appeal. Petitioner petitioned for review of the denial of his application for asylum.   The Eighth Circuit denied the petition, holding that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s determination. The court explained that Petitioner cited evidence of impunity for crimes against transgender women and alleged that police regularly extort and harass male and transgender sex workers. But as the BIA reasoned, he is neither a transgender woman nor a sex worker. He also testified that a gay man was once beheaded when Petitioner was a child. But there is no record evidence that gay men are regularly killed in Guatemala such that there is a pattern or practice of it. So a reasonable fact-finder could adopt the BIA’s implicit position that Petitioner did not show a pattern or practice of persecution. View "Robinson Juarez-Vicente v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The presentence investigation report recommended a base offense level of 20 under USSG Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) because Defendant’s 2013 Missouri conviction for second-degree robbery is a “crime of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines. Overruling Defendant’s objection, the district court adopted this recommendation, resulting in an advisory guidelines sentencing range of 63 to 78 months imprisonment. The court imposed a 72-month sentence followed by three years of supervised release. Defendant appealed the sentence, arguing the district court erred in determining that his prior conviction for Missouri second-degree robbery is a crime of violence under the Guidelines.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the Guidelines define “crime of violence” to mean “any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” that either “(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another” (the force clause), or “(2) is murder . . . robbery [etc.]” (the enumerated offenses clause). The court concluded that controlling Eighth Circuit precedent has established that a prior conviction for Missouri second-degree robbery under Mo. Rev. Stat. Section 569.030.1, the statute in effect when Defendant committed the offense, is a crime of violence under USSG Section 4B1.2(a)(1). View "United States v. Cody Rethford" on Justia Law