Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued Defendant, a corrections officer, under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging a violation of his constitutional rights while Plaintiff was a detainee at a jail in Minnesota. Defendant moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that qualified immunity protects governmental officials from suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 unless a plaintiff shows that the official’s alleged conduct violated a clearly established right of the plaintiff. The court wrote that because Plaintiff was a detainee at the time of the incident, his relevant constitutional rights arise under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendant argued that he did not violate Plaintiff’s clearly established right under the Fourteenth Amendment. He maintains that no constitutional violation occurred because “manual contact with a detainee’s genitals may be necessary as part of a search.” The court explained that as a general proposition, it is clearly established that “the sexual assault of an inmate by a guard violates the inmate’s constitutional rights.” The court explained that right is violated when a government official’s conduct is so egregious “that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.” Plaintiff asserts that Defendant subjected him to a strip search and, without legitimate penological justification, grasped his naked penis, squeezed it hard, and gestured. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a jury could find that the alleged conduct constituted sexual abuse or assault. View "Wilbert Glover v. R. Paul" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of attempted Hobbs Act robbery and three firearm charges, including possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c). Defendant argued that there is insufficient evidence to support his attempted Hobbs Act robbery conviction and that his Section 924(c) conviction should be vacated in light of United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022). He also challenged his sentence’s substantive reasonableness.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed his attempted Hobbs Act robbery conviction but vacated his Section 924(c) conviction under Taylor. The court also vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court explained that here Defendant repeatedly surveilled L.B.’s home. He donned a disguise and scripted his false entry. He had a rifle and planned to neutralize, if necessary, those he found inside. But he preferred to wield a handgun and told his fake accomplice he wouldn’t rob the house without one. Just before the trade, he was arrested. All told, the district court did not clearly err by finding the circumstances showed Defendant was about to complete all the acts he believed necessary to complete the Hobbs Act robbery but for the police’s intervention. The court explained that after Defendant’s trial, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Taylor and held that “attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not satisfy the elements clause” of Section 924(c). This means that Defendant’s attempted Hobbs Act robbery conviction no longer qualifies as a predicate crime of violence for his Section 924(c) conviction. Thus the court vacated his Section 924(c) conviction in accordance with Taylor. View "United States v. Rufus Dennis" on Justia Law

L.W.’s appendix ruptured during her incarceration, and she subsequently died from sepsis. Plaintiff, as special administrator of L.W.’s estate, filed suit against the county in which L.W. was incarcerated, as well as against the individuals involved in her incarceration and medical care, alleging civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and tort claims under state law. The medical malpractice claim against the jail physician, Defendant, went to trial. Defendant moved for judgment as a matter of law at the close of Plaintiff’s evidence. The district court granted the motion. The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff and awarded $1.3 million in damages. The district court granted Defendant a credit against the verdict for the value of the settlement, amending the judgment to $800,000. Defendant appealed the denial of judgment as a matter of law on the medical malpractice claim. Plaintiff appealed the grant of judgment as a matter of law on the punitive damages claim, as well as the grant of credit against the verdict.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it does not believe that the court’s decision to preclude the use of legal terms like “reckless” would have had any bearing on its decision to grant judgment as a matter of law on punitive damages. The court explained that it does not matter that separate wrongdoings caused L.W.’s injuries. UCATA does not focus on the cause of the injury or the policy reason for imposing liability. It focuses on the injury, which Plaintiff has alleged is the same for the Section 1983 claims as it is for the medical malpractice claim View "Christine Turner v. Garry Stewart, M.D." on Justia Law

Defendant ended up at a Twin Cities chiropractic clinic after an automobile accident. The visit resulted in a job: the clinic hired him to recruit patients. And then another one did too. Defendant’s role was to bring in as many accident victims as possible. Each new patient could undergo treatment up to $20,000, the limit of basic economic benefits available under most Minnesota automobile insurance policies. After a jury trial, the district court ordered Defendant to pay $187,277 in restitution to the insurance companies he defrauded. On remand, the amount of restitution decreased. This time, the district court concluded that Defendant qualified as a runner for only 53 of the 65 victims, which dropped the award to $155,864. Defendant, for his part, has adopted an all-or-nothing strategy: he does not believe he owes a single penny of restitution.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant received up to $1,500 per patient he recruited, which satisfies the pecuniary-gain requirement. A series of text messages establishes the remaining elements. When the clinic owner later said she was “praying for some ice and snow” to bring in more clients, Defendant replied that he had “been praying for [the] last four weeks.” It was reasonable to conclude from these messages that Hussein “directly procure[d]” these patients with at least a “reason to know,” if not actual knowledge, that the provider’s purpose was to obtain benefits under an automobile-insurance contract. View "United States v. Abdisalan Hussein" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of enticing a minor to engage in sexual activity. The charge arose from Defendant’s response to an online advertisement and his dialogue with an undercover detective who posed as a fourteen-year-old girl. At trial, the district court declined Defendant’s request to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of entrapment, and Defendant appealed that decision.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment. The court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to warrant the requested instruction. The court explained that the evidence here shows that the government presented Defendant with an opportunity to entice an arguably sexually precocious minor whose appearance was arguably more mature than average. Defendant responded to an advertisement, and broached the topic of unlawful sexual activity with a fourteen-year-old girl. The detective posing as a minor carried on a lengthy dialogue with Defendant, but did not employ the tactics most likely to warrant an entrapment instruction: pressure, assurances that a person is not doing anything wrong, persuasion, fraudulent representations, threats, coercive tactics, harassment, promises of reward, or pleas based on need, sympathy, or friendship. Without more, there was not sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the government impermissibly induced Defendant to commit the offense. View "United States v. Darren Lasley" on Justia Law

The Director of the Missouri Department of Corrections relied on staff to investigate and address sexual assault allegations against a prison guard. At summary judgment, Appellant requested qualified immunity. The district court concluded that a reasonable jury could find that she knew prisoners faced “a substantial risk of sexual assault.”   The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the entry of judgment in Appellant’s favor and denied Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the appeal. The court wrote that even if it assumes that Appellant should have done more, neither “controlling authority” nor “a robust ‘consensus of cases of persuasive authority’” required it. The court explained that Plaintiff’s “broad right” to protection from sexual assault, in other words, “does not answer” the “specific and particularized” question of whether Appellant violated the Eighth Amendment by waiting for her staff to complete their investigation. View "Teri Dean v. Anne Precythe" on Justia Law

Two organizations, one individual, one business (collectively “Private Plaintiffs”) and seventeen states (“the States”) sued the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”) for overstepping its statutory authority and for violating federal law in promulgating the “Definition of ‘Frame or Receiver’ and Identification of Firearms” (“Final Rule”). Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiffs have not clearly shown how the Final Rule will prevent them from engaging in constitutionally protected conduct. Regarding the business plaintiff in this case, we are left unsure what behavior it wishes to engage in, as an LLC, that is protected by the Second Amendment. Plaintiffs also argued they will suffer economic harm without a preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs asserted generally that compliance costs and uncertainty surrounding the validity and scope of the Final Rule will be costly to businesses and lead to fewer sales of firearms. However, Plaintiffs do not explain the economic harm in definite enough terms to show the extent of any harm is “actual and not theoretical.” The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding Plaintiffs have not met their burden. View "Morehouse Enterprises, LLC v. Bureau of ATF" on Justia Law

Robert Half International, Inc. (“RHI”) provides legal staffing solutions for its clients. Plaintiff worked for RHI as a contract attorney performing document review. Plaintiff was employed on various projects on an as-needed basis. Defendants Marcia Miller and Theresa Hodnett were Plaintiff’s coworkers and had no supervisory duties related to Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged that Miller, Hodnett, and other coworkers engaged in a pattern of discrimination and harassment toward her. Plaintiff appealed the district court’s dismissal of her claims against Marcia Miller and Theresa Hodnett.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. The court explained the relevant conduct at issue here is RHI’s continuous employment of Miller following the doorway incident. The court explained that no reasonable jury could find this conduct rises to the requisite level necessary to establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff asserts that Miller committed a battery against her during the doorway incident. In Minnesota, the battery is an intentional and offensive contact with another person.   Further, the court wrote that it reviewed the video footage of the alleged trip and find there is sufficient evidence in the video to create a factual dispute as to whether Miller intended to lift her leg, make contact with Plaintiff, and cause Plaintiff to trip. Because of the factual dispute, summary judgment on this claim is improper the court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s battery claim and remand. View "May Yang v. Robert Half Int., Inc." on Justia Law

After being passed over for a superintendent role, Plaintiff sued her employer, Pulaski County Special School District (“PCSSD”), and its board members for discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. A jury found in her favor on her Title VII and Section 1981 retaliation claims and awarded damages, including punitive damages. Defendants appealed the district court’s denial of their motion for judgment as a matter of law and the punitive damages award. Plaintiff cross-appeals the district court’s denial of her request for front pay, additional back pay, and equitable relief.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the judgment. The court explained that, as a whole, the evidence demonstrates that she believed she reported the disparity in the facilities as part of her duty to oversee compliance with Plan 2000, which sought to rectify discrimination against students in public education. The court explained that it does not rule out that the disparity in the facilities could affect employees too, there is simply no evidence here that Plaintiff believed she was complaining about a discriminatory employment practice. Thus, a jury could not conclude that Plaintiff had a good faith belief that she was reporting a discriminatory employment practice. View "Janice Warren v. Mike Kemp" on Justia Law

The Trustee for the bankrupt debtor, Simply Essentials, LLC, filed a Motion to Compromise under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019(b) and a Motion to Sell Property Free and Clear of Liens under 11 U.S.C. Section 363(f). Pitman Farms, the owner of Simply Essentials, who is also a creditor in this action, objected. Pitman Farms argued that the sale included Chapter 5 avoidance actions and that such actions are not part of the bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. Section 541(a). The bankruptcy court granted the motion, finding Chapter 5 avoidance actions are part of the bankruptcy estate. Pitman Farms filed a motion to appeal the decision. The Bankruptcy Court certified Pitman Farms’ motion to appeal, and the Eighth Circuit granted permission to appeal.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court agreed with the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that Chapter 5 avoidance actions are the property of the estate and affirmed the order approving the Trustee’s motion to sell the property of the estate. The court explained that to the extent that Pitman Farms argues the property is created in a third period of time, a time that is equivalent to the moment the bankruptcy proceeding commences, we disagree. Finding such a period of time existed “would frustrate the bankruptcy policy of a broad inclusion of property in the estate[.]” View "Pitman Farms v. ARKK Food Company, LLC" on Justia Law