Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a citizen of Africa who became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 2012, pleaded guilty to aggravated identity theft predicated on wire fraud. In the plea agreement, Petitioner admitted that she “aided and abetted” her mother in the mother’s scheme of “defrauding” the State of California of $475,350.28.The Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") charged Petitioner as removable, characterizing her conviction as a conviction for an offense involving “fraud or deceit” with a loss to the victim exceeding $10,000, thus qualifying as an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). In so holding, the BIA determined that the elements of the identity theft offense included a reference in the alternative to several qualifying felony offenses, and required as an element that the identity theft be committed “during and in relation to” one of the other qualifying felonies.Petitioner appealed, arguing her conviction did not qualify under the categorical approach as an offense involving fraud or deceit. She also sought relief under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"). An immigration judge rejected Petitioner's arguments, as did the BIA. Petitioner appealed.On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that the BIA appeals did not err in concluding that Petitioner's conviction was a qualifying aggravated felony based on her express admission that she had aided and abetted a scheme to defraud a victim of more than $475,000. Further, the Eighth Circuit found that the BIA did not apply the wrong legal standard in finding Petitioner ineligible for withholding of removal and did not err in denying CAT relief. View "Chantelle Robbertse v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

K.C. Hopps, Ltd., sued its insurer, The Cincinnati Insurance Company, seeking coverage for lost business income incurred during the COVID-19 pandemic. Cincinnati moved for summary judgment based on K.C. Hopps’s inability to show physical loss or damage, which the district court denied. After the jury returned a verdict for Cincinnati, K.C. Hopps renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law and moved for a new trial. The district court denied both motions.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that K.C. Hopps alleged that COVID-19 particles were present at its properties. The court wrote that has repeatedly rejected similar claims for COVID-19-related business interruptions because the insured did not sufficiently allege physical loss or damage. The court explained that even if K.C. Hopps could show actual contamination of its properties, any possible contamination was not the cause of its lost business income. K.C. Hopps did not limit its operations because COVID-19 particles were found at its properties—it did so because of the shutdown orders. K.C. Hopps remained open until government orders limited its operations. And even if its premises weren’t contaminated, K.C. Hopps “would have been subject to the exact same restrictions.” View "K.C. Hopps, Ltd. v. The Cincinnati Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a diversity action in the District of Nebraska against Defendant, seeking damages for losses allegedly caused by an auto accident in 2015. Defendant’s Answer admitted that her negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. After protracted discovery disputes over expert witness disclosures, the district court excluded all of Plaintiff’s numerous treating physician witnesses for failure to comply with Rule 26(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the summary judgment record supports the district court’s conclusion that the treating physician’s letter “demonstrates that his causation opinion was not formed during his treatment of Plaintiff.” Therefore, the district court did not abuse its wide discretion in determining that the physician was a prospective expert witness subject to the disclosure requirements of Rule 26(a)(2)(B) and excluding his testimony for Plaintiff’s failure to comply with that Rule. View "J.T. Johnson, Jr. v. Jenna Friesen" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of first-degree murder and use of a firearm during a crime of violence that caused death. The district court sentenced Defendant to serve two concurrent life terms of imprisonment. Defendant appealed, asserting the district court committed four errors during trial: (1) when it allowed the government to present evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) of Defendant’s jealous behavior toward two other men; (2) when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal, finding the government had presented sufficient evidence of premeditation; (3) when it sua sponte failed to instruct the jury on imperfect self-defense; and (4) when it denied Defendant’s request to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that evidence of the manner of killing also gives rise to a reasonable inference of premeditation. Although Defendant provided three different versions of what happened, in one accounting before the jury, Defendant told law enforcement that he aimed and fired at the victim, who was indisputably shot in the back of the head at a distance of at least three feet away. Further, Defendant retrieved that gun from his bedroom closet and shot the victim in the head as she tried to escape. Defendant’s actions after the shooting also point towards premeditation. Because there is ample evidence that supports the jury’s finding that the killing was premeditated, Defendant’s sufficiency of the evidence claim fails. View "United States v. Casey Crow Ghost" on Justia Law

Defendant was sentenced to 30 months of imprisonment after McKenzie pled guilty to failure to register as a sex offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2250(a). Defendant appealed, arguing the district court incorrectly applied U.S.S.G. 5G1.3(b) by failing to account for the time he had served in Florida for a related state offense.Agreeing with Defendant, the Eighth Circuit reversed Defendant's sentence, finding that the district court did not reduce the sentence after finding the time served in Florida was for relevant conduct. Thus, the Eighth Circuit vacated Defendant's sentence and remanded for clarification. View "United States v. Alfonso McKenzie" on Justia Law

Defendant conditionally pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon. He argued the district court should have suppressed the gun and shell casing found in his apartment. He challenged the steps the officers took from the moment they entered his apartment.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that a suspect who has just illegally used a gun is on a different Fourth Amendment footing than someone who merely possesses one. Moreover, the court wrote that first, when the officers asked Defendant whether they could “look” around “to make sure there’s nobody else in the apartment,” he replied, “[y]es ma’am. You can do whatever you want.” Based on that reply, he consented to at least a protective sweep of the apartment. Second, after Defendant blurted out that there had been suspicious activity outside, it was reasonable for the officers to believe that Defendant had provided consent to look there. Third, consent extended to the retrieval of the gun itself after Defendant confessed to “firing the shot” and admitted that the gun was in a kitchen cabinet. View "United States v. Cornell Williams" on Justia Law

Officers shot and killed Brian Quinones-Rosario as he approached officers with the knife drawn. His widow as trustee, sued the officers and their employing municipalities. She alleged an excessive use of force that resulted in an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court concluded that the officers did not commit a constitutional violation, and granted judgment for the officers and the municipalities. Plaintiff appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the use of force “must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”. Applying those principles, and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Quinones, the court concluded that the officers’ use of force was objectively reasonable. The court explained that Quinones-Rosario posed an imminent threat of death or serious physical injury to the officers. He aggressively wielded a knife that he refused to drop despite repeated commands to do so. He then charged at the officers with the knife. One officer deployed a non-lethal taser against him, but it had no effect. The officers reasonably believed that Quinones-Rosario posed a serious threat to their safety. The officers fired more rounds when Quinones-Rosario survived the first round of shots and continued to approach the officers with the knife. The court concluded that their actions were a reasonable defensive response under the circumstances. View "Ashley Quinones v. City of Edina, MN" on Justia Law

Petitioner initially entered the United States on a traveler’s visa, but he later became a permanent resident after marrying a United States citizen. Then, roughly a decade later, he and his accomplices robbed a delivery van belonging to “an ATM vendor.” Petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of Hobbs Act robbery and spent five years in prison. Once immigration officials found out about the conviction, they started removal proceedings. As relevant here, the government argued he was removable because Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence. The immigration judge and the Board agreed and refused to waive inadmissibility.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Hobbs Act robbery requires proof of an “unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property from the person . . . of another, against his will, by means of actual or threatened force.” Thus, Petitioner is removable for having committed a “crime of violence.” Moreover, the court wrote that the decision in Taylor “does not change our position” that a completed Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence. View "Garfield Green v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was prescribed an antibiotic and suffered serious adverse effects. He sued the healthcare providers and hospitals that were involved in his treatment for medical negligence, and a jury found in favor of Defendants. Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, challenging the district court’s comments to the jury and its evidentiary rulings. The district court denied the motion, and then awarded costs to the defendants as the prevailing parties. Plaintiff appealed the judgment entered pursuant to the jury’s verdict, the denial of his new-trial motion, and the award of costs. Plaintiff contends that the district court improperly denied his motion for a new trial. He maintains that the district court (1) made improper comments about the Bactrim label and about his lawyer; and (2) erroneously limited his cross-examination of Dr. Leingang.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that it acknowledges Plaintiff’s concerns—the district court’s supplemental comments were ill-advised. Nevertheless, the district court emphasized that it was the jury’s choice to determine the “measure of weight” and the importance of the label. And the court instructed the jury that manufacturer information was “competent evidence” to consider “in determining whether each medical professional met the standard of care in this case.” On the whole, it was made clear to the jury that all factual questions—including the import of the Bactrim label to Plaintiff’s case—were to be resolved by them. The court concluded, after considering “the complete charge to the jury,” that the district court did not abuse its discretion. View "Marco Gonzalez v. Salem Shahin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs placed their child AMS at a private academy after the Chamberlain School District did not meet AMS’s needs. A state hearing examiner decided that Chamberlain violated federal law and awarded Plaintiffs costs associated with AMS’s placement at the academy. The district court affirmed.  The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Chamberlain argued that Plaintiffs weren’t eligible to remove the case from state court to federal court because they weren’t “defendants” under 28 U.S.C. Section 1441(a). The court explained that while Plaintiffs initially sought to recover from Chamberlain, their status changed when Chamberlain sought the state court’s review of the hearing examiner’s decision. At that point, Chamberlain became the plaintiff for removal purposes. Thus, because Plaintiffs were defendants, they were allowed to remove, so the district court didn’t err in denying remand. Further, the court explained that giving due weight to the outcome of the administrative proceedings, it concludes that Chamberlain denied AMS a FAPE. View "Judith Steckelberg v. Chamberlain School District" on Justia Law