Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sections 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846. He was sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. One special condition of supervised release required him to participate in a sex offender treatment program. At sentencing, the district court1 overruled Defendant’s objection to this special condition because the government advised that he “had just been released from prison in 2014 for violating the terms of his Sex Offender Registry.” Defendant appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed and dismissed the appeal as moot. The court explained that the issue in the first revocation proceeding – Defendant’s refusal to attend sex offender treatment -- is behavior “capable of repetition” while “evading review.” Therefore, when the appeal in No. 23-1245 was filed, the court delayed ruling on the mootness issue, anticipating Defendant might challenge reimposition of this special condition in the second revocation sentence. But, the court wrote, he failed to do so. Additionally, neither brief in No. 23-1245 challenges the special conditions of supervised release reimposed in the second revocation sentence, including the sex offender treatment condition. The condition challenged in No. 22- 2610 was reimposed in the second revocation sentence and not challenged in the appeal of that sentence. Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal in No. 22-2610 as moot. View "United States v. Adrian Weems" on Justia Law

The Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990 (AWCPA)1 extended copyright protection to “architectural works,” defined in 17 U.S.C. Section 101 as “the design of a building as embodied in any tangible medium of expression, including a building, architectural plans, or drawings.” The principal question raised by this appeal is whether First Security Bank & Trust Company (the “Bank”), which purchased an uncompleted building in a sale approved by the bankruptcy court in the property owner’s Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding, infringed the architect’s copyright in the building by completing the building without the permission of the building’s architect, Cornice & Rose (“C&R”).   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court agreed with the district court there was no actionable infringement because C&R’s infringement claims are precluded by the bankruptcy court’s order approving the sale. The court explained that C&R makes no showing on appeal that the district court would have reached a different result (i.e., denied summary judgment) had it been allowed to file a sur-reply. In other words, the argument is entirely procedural. Further, it ignores that sur-replies are viewed with disfavor and that a party appealing the denial of leave to file a discretionary pleading has a heavy burden to prove that the adverse procedural ruling mattered. Here, even if C&R’s contention that DSC and WWA raised new or additional arguments in the supplemental affidavit is fairly debatable. Thus, the court concluded that the denial of permission to file the requested sur-reply in a thoroughly litigated case was a textbook example of harmless error. View "Cornice & Rose International, LLC v. Four Keys" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former employee, sued on behalf of herself and similarly situated employees, claiming that St. Luke’s violated the Fair Labor Standards Act’s (“FLSA”) overtime provisions by failing to fully compensate employees for work performed. She also brought an unjust-enrichment claim under state law. The district court certified two classes with different lookback periods: (1) an FLSA collective comprised of employees who worked for St. Luke’s between September 2016 and September 2018, 1 and (2) an unjust-enrichment class comprised of all employees who worked for St. Luke’s in Missouri between April 2012 and September 2018. Houston also asserted individual claims, one under the Missouri Minimum Wage Law, and one for breach of her employment contract. The district court granted summary judgment to St. Luke’s on all claims.   The Eighth Circuit vacated and remanded. The court explained that Plaintiff has raised a genuine dispute that the rounding policy does not average out over time. The court explained that no matter how one slices the data, most employees and the employees as a whole fared worse under the rounding policy than had they been paid according to their exact time worked. Here, the rounding policy did both. It resulted in lost time for nearly two-thirds of employees, and those employees lost more time than was gained by their coworkers who benefited from rounding. The court concluded that the employees have raised a genuine dispute that the rounding policy, as applied, did not average out over time. The district court, therefore, erred in granting summary judgment on the FLSA and Missouri wage claims. View "Torri Houston v. St. Luke's Health System, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sustained a spinal injury during a rollover car accident in Mexico. Plaintiff, along with his wife (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed a claim for damages against General Motors, LLC (“GM”) on theories of strict liability, negligence, and loss of consortium. The district court applied the law of Coahuila, Mexico, under Missouri’s choice of law principles and granted GM’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s choice of law decision.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that its conclusion in Azarax that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow a party to rely on foreign law does not lead to the conclusion the district court abused its discretion here when it decided the opposite under different facts. Further, the court wrote that after considering the Section 6 factors and the parties’ arguments, it concluded Missouri’s relationship to this case does not overcome the presumption that the place of the injury—Coahuila, Mexico—is the place with the most significant relationship to the parties and occurrence. View "Nicolas Valadez Rey v. General Motors, LLC" on Justia Law

Two dog owners sued a police officer and the Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners after the officer shot a dog during an encounter at a residence. The dog owners alleged that the officer violated their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments by unreasonably “seizing” the dog. They also asserted that the Board’s policies and customs caused the officer to commit the alleged violation. The district court granted summary judgment for the officer and the Board.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that given the behavior of the dog, and the failure of the owner to control the animal at the doorway, a reasonable officer could have perceived the dog as an imminent threat. Thus, the officer’s s firing of a first shot was reasonable. The court further wrote that the circumstances in LeMay are readily distinguishable from the officer’s doorway encounter with a growling dog who suddenly rushed at him and then turned in the direction of his fellow officer. View "Brandee Buschmann v. Kansas City Police Department" on Justia Law

In October 2021, Defendant flew from Japan to Missouri with her and Plaintiff’s child, L.T. In March 2022, Plaintiff filed a petition for the return of their child under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“Hague Convention”) to have L.T. returned to Japan. The district court found L.T. was “at home” in Japan before Defendant removed the child to the United States. The district court granted Plaintiff’s petition to have L.T. returned to Japan. Defendant appealed arguing Japan cannot be L.T.’s habitual residence because Sarah was coerced into living in Japan and therefore did not intend to make Japan L.T.’s home.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that there is no evidence of physical abuse, violence, or threats of violence in this case. Additionally, having considered the testimony and having reviewed the text message exchanges between the parties, the court did not find evidence of the type of verbal abuse or controlling behavior that would suggest that Defendant was coerced or forced into staying in Japan. Therefore, Defendant’s coercion argument on appeal is inconsistent with the district court’s factual findings, which are not clearly erroneous. View "Naoteru Tsuruta v. Sarah Tsuruta" on Justia Law

Coloplast Corporation and Coloplast Manufacturing US, LLC (collectively, Coloplast) manufacture and market Restorelle L, a surgical mesh device. Plaintiff sued Coloplast for injuries allegedly caused by the implantation of Restorelle L mesh. After excluding portions of Plaintiff’s expert opinions and testimony, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Coloplast. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in excluding her expert’s opinion on specific causation and in granting summary judgment on her negligent design claim.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the expert’s supplemental declaration was untimely because it was submitted after the deadlines for disclosure of expert reports and completion of all discovery. The court reasoned that Rule 26(e)(2) requires that an expert’s supplement “be disclosed by the time the party’s pretrial disclosures under Rule 26(a)(3) are due.” Rule 26(a)(3)(B), in turn, states that “Unless the court orders otherwise, these disclosures must be made at least 30 days before trial.” Plaintiff maintains that she, therefore, had until thirty days before trial to disclose the expert’s supplemental declaration. However, the court explained that she ignored the caveat that Rule 26’s default timing provision applies only if the court does not order otherwise. Here, the court set deadlines in its scheduling order, those deadlines superseded the default rules, and Plaintiff failed to meet those deadlines. Further, the court wrote that the district court also did not abuse its discretion when it decided to exclude the expert’s report and declaration without considering lesser sanctions. View "Angela Cantrell v. Coloplast Corp." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of unlawful possession of a firearm as a felon. The district court sentenced him to sixty months’ imprisonment. Defendant appealed the court’s evidentiary rulings at trial and the determination of his sentence. The parties dispute whether Defendant’s term of imprisonment for the state assault offense was “anticipated.” Defendant says the state sentence was anticipated because the state assault charge was pending in state court. The government counters that any state sentence was speculative and not “anticipated” because Defendant had not been convicted of any state offense.   The Eighth Circuit concluded that there is no reversible error and therefore affirmed the judgment. The court concluded that there is no plain error warranting relief because it is not obvious under current law that Defendant’s state term of imprisonment was “anticipated.” Section 5G1.3(c) does not define “anticipated,” and Defendant cites no authority from the Eighth Circuit. The court explained that given the absence of a definition in the guidelines, and the limited authority on the issue, the court wrote, it is at least subject to reasonable dispute whether the filing of a state charge, by itself, makes a future state sentence “anticipated” within the meaning of Section 5G1.3(c). Further, the court concluded that the district court made an individualized assessment based on the facts presented and acted within the wide latitude available to a sentencing judge who weighs the relevant factors. View "United States v. Montgomery Lebeau" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for two counts of assaulting a federal officer and one count of using a firearm to further a crime of violence. The first assault count was based on Defendant’s altercation with Officer Johnson, the second on Defendant’s pointing his rifle at Troopers Shipley and Wakefield and Sheriff Medley. The third count, using a firearm to further a crime of violence, was based on the second assault count. At trial, Defendant moved for judgment of acquittal, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for all counts. The district court denied both motions. Defendant was convicted of all three counts, and the district court denied his subsequent motion for reconsideration of the denial of his judgment of acquittal. He appealed his convictions.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Officer Johnson testified that when he went to the house the first time, it was in the back of his mind to look for possible firearms violations. His concern about the possible access to weapons is the reason he did not let Defendant go back inside the house. Thus, the jury could have concluded that Officer Johnson was fulfilling the mission of the ATF to enforce federal firearms statutes when he went to the home. To be sure, he was also conducting a state investigation, but an officer can be “engaged in the performance of official [federal] duties” while simultaneously fulfilling state duties. Further, the court wrote that there is sufficient evidence that Troopers Shipley and Wakefield and Sheriff Medley were assisting Officer Johnson “in the performance of official duties” when they were assaulted. View "United States v. Zerak Brown" on Justia Law

Alliance Pipeline L.P. (“Alliance”) entered into contracts with four states (“State Agreements”) as well as contracts with individual landowners in order to build a natural gas pipeline. The contracts with landowners provide easements for the pipeline right-of-way. In 2018, some landowners on the pipeline right-of-way filed a class-action lawsuit against Alliance. After the class was certified, Alliance moved to compel arbitration for the approximately 73 percent of plaintiffs whose easements contain arbitration provisions. Alliance appealed, arguing the district court erred by not sending all issues to arbitration for the plaintiffs whose easements contain arbitration provisions.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court explained that the district court that the damages issues are subject to arbitration for the plaintiffs whose easements contain an arbitration provision. Plaintiffs make two arguments against sending any issues to arbitration: (1) Plaintiffs’ claims cannot be within the scope of the arbitration provisions because the claims allege lack of compensation for “ongoing yield losses,” not “damages to crops” and (2) Plaintiffs’ claims arise under the State Agreements, which do not have arbitration provisions. The court found the arbitration agreements to be enforceable and to cover all issues. The court held that as to the arbitration class members, the claims should be dismissed without prejudice. As to the members of the class without arbitration provisions, the court saw no reason why these class members cannot proceed with the lawsuit in the normal course at the district court. View "H&T Fair Hills, Ltd. v. Alliance Pipeline L.P." on Justia Law