Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Prospect Funding Holdings (NY), LLC, won arbitration awards against Ronald Palagi and his law firm, Ronald J. Palagi, P.C., LLC. Palagi and his firm filed an application to vacate the awards in federal court, which the district court granted.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court reasoned that applicants seeking to vacate or confirm awards under Section 9 and Section 10 must identify an “independent jurisdictional basis” for their actions. The court wrote that the dispute between Prospect and Palagi and his firm does not contain a federal question, so diversity of citizenship between the parties must exist. Here, the application to vacate the 2021 awards does not identify any jurisdictional basis whatsoever. Crucially, Palagi and his firm failed to plead the parties’ citizenship in the application. Palagi’s individual citizenship has never been pleaded before the court. Diversity of citizenship has not been established so the district court lacked jurisdiction over the case. View "Prospect Funding Holdings (NY) v. Ronald J. Palagi, P.C., L.L.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued several prison officials under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for deliberate indifference after she was assaulted by a fellow inmate and co-defendant. She appealed the district court’s dismissal of one prison staff member, the grant of summary judgment to other staff members, and the denial of her motion to alter or amend the judgment.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that under Nebraska law, Plaintiff had four years to sue after her cause of action accrued. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims started to accrue when she was assaulted in September 2016, the moment she could “sue and obtain relief.”. When Plaintiff sought to sue Defendant in December 2020, more than four years later, her claims were time-barred. The court explained that it is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary, so the district court did not err. Moreover, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Plaintiff’s motion, considering she had notice of what she needed to do to comply with the local rules and neglected to do so. View "Christine Bordeaux v. Cheryl Bicknase" on Justia Law

Defendant is one of four former Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) officers involved in the death of George Floyd. Defendant was convicted of two counts of deprivation of rights under color of law resulting in bodily injury and death. He appealed the district court’s denial of his motions for acquittal and a mistrial. On appeal, Defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence to convict him and that prosecutorial misconduct deprived him of his right to a fair trial.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant specifically argued that no reasonable jury could have found that he had the requisite mens rea to commit the crimes. The court wrote that to prove Defendant acted willfully, the Government produced evidence that Defendant knew from his training that (1) Chauvin’s use of force on Floyd was unreasonable and (2) he had a duty to intervene in another officer’s use of unreasonable force. The court concluded that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, there was sufficient evidence that Defendant acted willfully on this charge.   In regards to Defendant’s second charge: his deliberate indifference to Floyd’s serious medical needs, the court held that it agreed with the district court that the evidence on this count is “not overwhelming,” but nonetheless, a reasonable jury could find that Defendant acted willfully. Ultimately, the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Defendant acted willfully on both Section 242 counts and that any prosecutorial conduct did not deprive Defendant of his right to a fair trial. View "United States v. Tou Thao" on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant guilty on three counts: (1) Aggravated Sexual Abuse of a Child, (2) Committing a Felony Sex Offense Against a Minor While Required to Register as a Sex Offender, and (3) Tampering with a Witness. After the verdict, Defendant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. The district court denied the motion and subsequently sentenced Defendant to life plus 120 months in prison. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal because there was insufficient evidence to convict on the aggravated sexual abuse and witness tampering charges. Defendant also challenged his sentence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that here, the evidence at trial presented “two conflicting hypotheses” about Defendant’s motivation in making these phone calls. The jury found more credible the government’s explanation. And while there was no direct evidence that Defendant attempted to corruptly persuade his mother, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that he did. Given that all reasonable inferences must be construed in favor of upholding the verdict, this court will not disturb the jury’s decision on this count. View "United States v. Kimo Little Bird, Sr." on Justia Law

Four employee benefit funds and their Boards of Trustees, as well as two labor unions (collectively, “Boards”), sued B.F.W. Contracting, LLC and B.F.W. Contractors, LLC (collectively, “Contractors”) to compel an audit and recover money damages pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) signed onto by Contractors. The district court granted summary judgment for the Boards and found damages in the amount of $48,568.76.   The Eighth Circuit reversed. The court explained that the Boards argued that the Contractors forfeited the argument about supplemental dues because they failed to raise it before the district court. The court concluded that the Boards are incorrect. The Contractors made this argument in their Response to the Statement of Material Facts by Plaintiff, as well as in their Supplemental Reply Memorandum. The court found that this was enough to avoid forfeiture and allowed the court to consider the issue on appeal.   Additionally, the Boards argue that failure to pay the supplemental dues resulted in a breach of the CBA provision, which authorized the dues under the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 186(c)(2). However, as the plain language of the CBA makes clear, there is no violation of that provision if the Contractors never received the employee authorization cards as required by both the CBA and 29 -6- U.S.C. Section 186(c)(4). Without a breach of this subsection of the CBA, these statutory provisions are inapplicable. View "Greater St. Louis Const. Laborers Welfare Fund v. B.F.W. Contracting, LLC" on Justia Law

HomeServices of America, Inc.; BHH Affiliates, LLC; and HSF Affiliates, LLC (collectively, “HomeServices”) appealed from the district court’s denial of HomeServices’s motion to compel unnamed class members to arbitrate their claims against it.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here, HomeServices conceded before the district court that “neither the named plaintiffs nor any purported class member has any contract or direct relationship with HomeServices relevant to the claims asserted in this case.” Moreover, the Listing Agreements and their included Arbitration Agreements do not name HomeServices as a party or third-party beneficiary. The court explained that the district court correctly concluded this “narrow, party-specific language . . . does not clearly and unmistakably delegate to an arbitrator threshold issue of arbitrability between nonparties, including HomeServices.” Thus, the court held that the district court correctly concluded that “the court—not an arbitrator—must address whether HomeServices can enforce the Arbitration Agreements.” Moreover, the court held that the district court did not err in denying HomeServices’s motion to compel the unnamed class members to arbitrate their claims against it. View "Scott Burnett v. HomeServices of America, Inc." on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of assaulting a person assisting a federal officer, and a second jury convicted Defendant of drug offenses. On appeal, Defendant raised several challenges to his convictions.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant complains that the district judge was unaware that the clerk collected data on the race of potential jurors. But whether or not the district judge was familiar with the information gathered by the clerk, the relevant reports were available to Defendant on request. Defendant could have inquired about information on the racial composition of jury pools before the pre-trial motion deadlines. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motions as untimely. Moreover, evidence of drug activity by a conspirator during the conspiracy is relevant evidence of the existence of the conspiracy. The evidence here was prejudicial in the sense that it tended to prove the existence of the conspiracy, but it was not unfairly prejudicial because it was directly relevant to the charged offense. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. View "United States v. Marcus Burrage" on Justia Law

Farmer William Topp raises crops and livestock in Monroe County, Iowa. After several rough years, he filed for Chapter 12 bankruptcy—intended for “family farmers.” Farm Credit Services of America had financed part of Topp’s farm operation and filed a $595,000 claim as a secured creditor. The claim arose from five loans of various durations, with interest rates ranging from 3.5% to 7.6%. Together, the loans were secured by $1.45 million of Topp’s real estate. This bankruptcy appeal arises from a dispute between the farmer and his creditor over their proposed repayment plan. The two could not agree on the appropriate discount rate that should apply to the farmer’s deferred payments so as to satisfy the creditor’s present claim. The bankruptcy court sided with the farmer.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the bankruptcy court studied the Till/Doud relationship and the prevalence of postTill decisions using the prime rate. The court considered the length of the proposed maturity period, the fact that Farm Credit’s claim was substantially over-secured, and the overall risk of nonpayment. In the end, the court approved a 4% rate—the treasury rate plus 2% for risk. By focusing on the starting rate rather than the ultimate rate, Farm Credit has failed to show that the bankruptcy court clearly erred in its determination that a 4% rate was sufficient to ensure full payment on “the value, as of the effective date of the plan,” of the secured claim. View "Farm Credit Services of America v. William Topp" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of a conspiracy under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(d), based on his involvement with the Crips street gang. The Eighth Circuit court affirmed Defendant’s conviction but remanded for resentencing. On remand, the district court imposed a sentence of 71 months imprisonment. Defendant appealed the sentence. The principal dispute on appeal concerns whether the district court erred by failing to account for a term of imprisonment that Defendant served in Nebraska for state drug offenses that were committed in the course of the RICO conspiracy.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the court originally sentenced Defendant to 84 months’ imprisonment but effectively gave Defendant“credit” for the eleven-month period from July 2018 through May 2019, when he was serving federal and state sentences concurrently. The incremental punishment for the federal offense originally was 73 months imprisonment. On remand, the state sentence had been discharged, and the court imposed only 71 months imprisonment for the federal offense. Defendant thus received a lesser net punishment after the remand, and he did not lose any “credit” for time served in state custody. View "United States v. Jerell Haynie" on Justia Law

A former BNSF Railway Company employee died from lung cancer in 2018. Plaintiff, on behalf of her late husband’s estate, brought this wrongful death action against BNSF under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), alleging that her husband’s cancer was caused by his exposure to toxins at work. The district court excluded Plaintiff’s expert witness testimony and granted summary judgment to BNSF.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that there is no direct evidence that Plaintiff’s husband was exposed to asbestos or diesel combustion fumes. Even if a jury could infer that Plaintiff’s husband had been exposed, there is no evidence of the level of exposure. The court explained that while a quantifiable amount of exposure is not required to find causation between toxic exposure and injury, there must be, at a minimum, “evidence from which the factfinder can conclude that the plaintiff was exposed to levels of that agent that are known to cause the kind of harm that the plaintiff claims to have suffered,” There is no such evidence here. Moreover, the court explained that the district court did not abuse its considerable discretion by determining that the expert’s opinion lacked a sufficient foundation and that, in turn, his methodology for proving causation was unreliable. View "Rebecca Lancaster v. BNSF Railway Company" on Justia Law