Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellants were each pepper-sprayed by Police Officer William Olsten while participating in a protest in downtown St. Louis. Each of them sued various officials, alleging First Amendment retaliation and excessive force claims, as well as various other federal and state law claims. In each case, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the city officials on all the federal claims and declined supplemental jurisdiction on the state law claims.   The Eighth Circuit consolidated the cases and affirmed. The court explained that here, Appellants admit that “every other non-police officer in the vicinity was actively involved in a protest” and that the officer “moved his arm side to side and indiscriminately sprayed numerous protestors.” One cannot simultaneously single out Appellants and “indiscriminately” spray the crowd. And there is no evidence in the record that either Appellant had any interaction with the officer or that the officer was aware of their presence, or that either did anything to differentiate themselves from the other protestors in the crowd. While one Appellant argued she was filming the protest, there is no evidence that the officer observed her filming or deployed pepper spray in retaliation for her doing so. Regardless of whether the officer’s action was appropriate or reasonable under the circumstances, the lack of evidence causally connecting the officer’s adverse action of using pepper spray to Appellants’ protected expression is fatal to the retaliation claims. View "Rasheen Aldridge v. City of St. Louis, Missouri" on Justia Law

Dakota Energy Power Cooperative, Inc., a member of East River Electric Power Cooperative, Inc., sought to withdraw from East River and to terminate the parties’ long-term power contract so that it could purchase electricity from another source. When East River resisted, Dakota Energy sued for anticipatory breach of contract and sought a declaratory judgment providing that it had a contractual right to withdraw from East River by way of a buyout. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of East River, and Dakota Energy appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that under the UCC, the terms of a written contract “may be explained or supplemented” by certain extrinsic evidence, including “usage of trade.” Dakota Energy’s proffered trade usage evidence would effectively add an entirely new provision to the WPC. Moreover, under the UCC, “the express terms of an agreement and any applicable . . . usage of trade must be construed whenever reasonable as consistent with each other.” Here, the express terms of the WPC—which provide that the agreement will “remain in effect” until December 31, 2075, and which contain no provision allowing for an early buyout—are inconsistent with any trade usage evidence suggesting something to the contrary. Therefore, the court concluded that the WPC unambiguously requires Dakota Energy to purchase all of its electricity from East River until December 31, 2075, and that no provision in the WPC or East River’s Bylaws allows for an earlier termination of that obligation. View "Dakota Energy Coop, Inc. v. East River Electric Power Coop., Inc." on Justia Law

Defendants appealed their convictions for conspiracy to commit wire fraud; wire fraud and aiding and abetting wire fraud and money laundering; and money laundering and aiding and abetting money laundering.  On appeal, Defendants claimed the district court erred when it admitted a redacted plea agreement that Ridings signed but which did not ultimately result in a guilty plea. By the terms of the plea agreement, one Defendant waived his rights under Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. That Defendant also appealed his sentence, asserting that the district court imposed a sentence above the Sentencing Guidelines range based on his religious beliefs in violation of the First Amendment.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that there was an overwhelming quantum of evidence received at trial that was consistent with Defendant’s statement, rendering admission of the factual statement, even if it was error, harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, the court explained that here, the district court specifically stated that its sentence was not based on Defendant’s faith, but rather, the district court considered that Defendant used faith to manipulate people who were susceptible to such manipulation and lull people into a false sense of security. The court explained that it has upheld sentences where the district court took into account a defendant’s abuse of a religious connection. Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by considering Defendant’s abuse of others’ faith, nor is the sentence it imposed substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Phillip Ridings" on Justia Law

Certain healthcare entities entered into a lease agreement and related lease schedules with Winthrop Resources Corporation (Winthrop). Prospect ECHN, Inc. (Prospect) purchased the healthcare entities’ assets and later sought to be released from their obligations to Winthrop. After negotiations failed, Prospect filed suit against Winthrop, alleging that the schedules must be recharacterized as security interests under the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), as adopted by Minnesota. If recharacterized as security interests, Prospect owns the equipment that Winthrop had leased to it and can argue that Winthrop must return any security deposits and excess payments. If the schedules are true leases, however, Prospect owes Winthrop the amounts due under the contracts. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Winthrop, concluding that the agreement and schedules constitute true leases and that Prospect had breached them. The court awarded damages to Winthrop and determined that it was entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that although the U.C.C. demands recharacterization under its bright-line test or when so compelled by the facts of the case, it does not demand so here, where the parties negotiated a lease agreement and related schedules that skirt the line of creating security interests without crossing it. Thus, the court concluded that the district court correctly granted summary judgment in Winthrop’s favor. Further, the court found no error in the award of damages in the amount of the unpaid lease charges and other amounts due, as well as in the amount of the accelerated lease charges. View "Prospect ECHN, Inc. v. Winthrop Resources Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are food service managers employed by the Independent School District 191 in Burnsville, Minnesota. In 2015, Plaintiffs signed a contract to join the union that represents service workers in the school district, the School Service Employees International Union Local 284. These contracts authorized the school district to deduct monthly union dues from the union member’s paycheck and to send those dues to Local 284 on the union member’s behalf. The employees terminated their membership in the union in March 2020 and later sued the school district and Local 284. They alleged that the deduction of dues from their paychecks violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and also contravened Minnesota law. At issue on appeal is whether a school district and a labor union violated the free speech rights of union members by deducting union dues from employee paychecks.   The Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court that the school district’s employees failed to state a claim, and the court, therefore, affirmed the judgment dismissing the action. The court explained that the employees’ argument mischaracterizes their choice: they were “faced with a constitutional choice—whether or not to join” the union. They chose to join the union and authorize the school district to deduct dues from their paychecks. They did so in exchange for the benefits of union membership, and they “assumed the risk that subsequent changes in the law could alter the cost-benefit balance of their bargain.” View "Pollyanna Burns v. School Svc Emp Union Local 284" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs individually and as next friends of their minor daughter, I.B., appealed the district court’s dismissal of disability discrimination and civil rights deprivation claims, and denial of their motion to reconsider dismissing with prejudice a state law negligence claim against the Bentonville, Arkansas School District (“the District”).   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Arkansas law provides a direct cause of action against the liability insurer of a school district that is “not subject to suit for tort.” Plaintiffs’ Complaint named “John Doe” as an additional defendant, alleged on information and belief that the District maintained liability insurance, identified the insurer as John Doe, and stated that “the joinder of [John Doe] will be made upon verification of its identity.” Eleven months later, the district court ordered Plaintiffs to show good cause for an extension of the deadline to add parties, if they opposed dismissal of the John Doe defendant without prejudice. When Plaintiffs did not respond, the district court dismissed John Doe without prejudice, leaving the District, with its statutory immunity, the only negligence defendant. Plaintiffs were not deprived of a remedy for the alleged negligence of District employees and agents. View "Rodney Baker v. Bentonville School District" on Justia Law

Petitioners petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) June 17, 2022, decision denying their motion for reconsideration of the Board’s July 29, 2021 decision. In the July 29, 2021 decision, the Board granted the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) motion to reinstate Petitioners’ removal proceedings and reissued the Board’s prior October 15, 2013 decision, which dismissed Petitioners’ appeal of a decision denying their applications for asylum and related protection.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it discerned no abuse of discretion. The court explained that the Board offered a rational explanation for rejecting Petitioners’ request for clarification. The Board’s July 29, 2021 decision—by Petitioners’ own acknowledgment—reissued the October 15, 2013 decision. This decision, in turn, permitted voluntary departure consistent with the IJ’s February 9, 2012 decision. Both the Board’s October 15, 2013 decision and the IJ’s February 9, 2012 decision warned Petitioners of the consequences of filing a motion for reconsideration: automatic termination of voluntary departure and immediate effect of the alternative order of removal. Here, Petitioners chose to move for reconsideration. Their action automatically terminated the voluntary departure that the October 15, 2013 decision authorized. View "Tsatsral Bekhbat v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. On appeal, Defendant argued judgment of acquittal or a new trial and in calculating the drug quantity for purposes of sentencing.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the magistrate judge, after hearing testimony from the officer, concluded that his conduct in drafting the affidavit amounted to negligence. But to prevail here, Defendant “must show more than negligence or an innocent mistake.” And the court agreed with the district court that the officer did not act recklessly in his efforts to obtain a search warrant, despite the time pressure. The record does not indicate that the officer entertained serious doubts about or had obvious reasons to question the accuracy of his statements. Therefore, Defendant is not entitled to suppression under Franks. Further, the court held that the information included in the warrant affidavit, the officers’ good-faith reliance on the search warrant for Defendant’s home, was objectively reasonable. Moreover, the court wrote that there was no abuse of discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial because there was no reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different had the Gentry evidence been produced. Finally, the court saw no clear error in the district court’s drug quantity calculation. View "United States v. Melroy Johnson, Sr." on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for committing mail and wire fraud against his spouse and National Life Insurance. He moved to dismiss the indictment for failure to state an offense, which the district court1 denied. Welker appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the indictment included allegations about Defendant’s intentional concealment of material information from and misrepresentations to R.W., supporting that he had the “intent to defraud” her. And it alleged that he used the mail and wire in furtherance of his scheme. These allegations were sufficient to apprise Defendant of the nature of the accusations against him and to enable the district court to determine that the facts stated were adequate in law to support a conviction. Further, the court wrote that Defendant provided no support for the proposition that an indictment must sufficiently allege a violation of state law to sufficiently state a federal mail or wire fraud offense. Ultimately, the court held that the indictment charging Defendant is not “so defective” that it fails to charge him for mail and wire fraud under federal law. View "United States v. Michael Welker" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a previously convicted felon. At sentencing, the district court determined a base offense level of 24 after concluding that Defendant had sustained two prior felony convictions for a crime of violence. The court sentenced Defendant to 96 months imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court committed procedural error when it calculated his base offense level and failed to follow the procedures of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(3).
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the sentence but remanded for correction of the court’s statement of reasons. The court explained that the district court was not required to resolve every disputed issue and to amend the presentence report accordingly. But Rule 32 does impose a duty either to resolve disputes or to determine that a ruling is unnecessary and then to append a copy of the court’s determinations to the report. Defendant requested, and the government does not resist, a remand for the district court to amend its statement of reasons to reflect that it did not resolve Defendant’s objection to the presentence report regarding gang affiliation. Accordingly, the court agreed that the remedy is warranted. View "United States v. Christopher Conrad" on Justia Law